1	WILLARD K. TOM General Counsel							
2	KAREN D. DODGE							
4	kdodge@ftc.gov MARISSA J. REICH mreich@ftc.gov							
5	Federal Trade Commission 55 West Monroe Street, Suite 1825							
6	Chicago, Illinois 60603 (312) 960-5634 (Telephone) (312) 960-5600 (Facsimile)							
7 8 9 10	RAYMOND E. McKOWN Cal. Bar No. 150975, rmckown@ftc.gov Federal Trade Commission 10877 Wilshire Boulevard, Suite 700 Los Angeles, California 90024 (310) 824-4343 (Telephone) (310) 824-4380 (Facsimile)							
11 12	Attorneys for Plaintiff FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION							
13	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT							
14	CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA							
15		Case No. CV 11-6397 DSF (Ex)						
16	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,	MEMORANDUM OF POINTS						
17	Plaintiff,	AND AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF FTC'S						
18 19	v.	MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON ALL COUNTS AGAINST ALL DEFENDANTS						
20	AMERICAN TAX RELIEF LLC, d/b/a	AND RELIEF DEFENDANTS; OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE,						
21	American Tax Relief, et al.,	FOR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION OF CLAIMS						
22	Defendants, and							
23	YOUNG SOON PARK, a/k/a Young S. Son, et al.,	Date: August 6, 2012 Time: 1:30 p.m.						
24	Relief Defendants.	Ctrm: 840 (Roybal Federal Bldg.)						
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TABLE OF CONTENTS 1 2 I. 3 II. 4 III. 5 IV. DEFENDANTS' DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES 4 6 Α. 7 В. 8 1. 9 2. 10 3. Authorization Forms and Congratulations Letter 8 11 C. 12 1. Ouestionnaires and Requests for Financial Documents 9 13 2. 14 D. Defendants Failed to Reduce Consumers' Tax Debts 10 15 E. 16 V. 17 A. 18 В. 19 1. 20 21 a. 22 that Consumers Qualified for Tax Relief Programs and Would Obtain Significant Tax Debt Reductions b. 23 24 25 2. 26 Count III: Defendants' Unauthorized Charges 18 a. 27 C. 28

1		D.	The Court Should Order Equitable Relief Against Defendants 21
2			1. Injunctive Relief
3			2. Equitable Monetary Relief
4		E.	The Court Should Order Equitable Relief
5	VI.	CON	CLUSION
6			
7			
8			
9			
10			
11			
12			
13			
14			
15			
16			
17			
18			
19			
20			
21			
22			
23			
24			
25			
26			
27			
28			
			ii

Case 2:11-cv-06397-DSF-E Document 325 Filed 06/08/12 Page 3 of 31 Page ID #:8932

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Cases CFTC v. CoPetro Mktg. Group, Inc., 502 F. Supp. 806 (C.D. Cal. 1980) 21 FTC v. Affiliate Strategies, Inc., 09-41-1-JAR, 2011 WL 3111948 16 (D. Kan. July 26, 2011) FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc., 569 F. Supp. 2d 285 (D. Mass. 2008) 14 FTC v. J.K. Publ'ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176 (C.D. Cal. 2000) 18, 19, 20 2000 WL 35594143 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000). FTC v. John Beck Amazing Profits LLC, 2:09-cv-04719-JHN-CWx, . . . 19, 21, 23 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70068 (C.D. Cal. April 20, 2012) FTC v. Medicor, LLC, CV 01-1896 CBM (EX), 2002 WL 1925896 22 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2001)

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2	FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2010)			
3	FTC v. Network Servs. Depot, 617 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2010)			
4	FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 1994) 13, 14, 21, 23			
56	FTC v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc., CV-S-94-623-PMP (LRL.),			
7	FTC v. Publishing Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168 (9th Cir. 1997) 19, 20			
8	FTC v. Sharp, 782 F. Supp. 1445 (D. Nev. 1991)			
9	FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2009)			
10	FTC v. Think Achievement, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013 (N.D. Ind. 2000)			
11	FTC v. U.S. Sales Corp., 785 F. Supp. 737 (N.D. Ill. 1992)			
12	FTC v. Washington Data Resources, 09-cv-2309-T-23TBM,			
13	FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020 (7th Cir. 1988) 13			
14 15	In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc., 104 F.T.C. 648			
16	Kraft, Inc. v. FTC, 970 F.2d 311 (7th Cir. 1992)			
17	Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489 (1st Cir. 1989) 13, 14			
18	SEC v. Antar, 831 F. Supp. 380 (D.N.J. 1993)			
19	SEC v. Colello, 139 F.3d 674 (9th Cir. 1998)			
20	SEC v. Cross Fin. Servs., Inc., 908 F. Supp. 718 (C.D. Cal. 1995)			
21	SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801 (2d Cir. 1975)			
22	SEC v. Murphy, 626 F.2d 633 (9th Cir. 1980)			
23	U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 1953)			
24				
25				
26				
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28				

C	ase 2:11-cv-06397-DSF-E Document 325 Filed 06/08/12 Page 6 of 31 Page ID #:893	5								
1	Statutes									
2	15 U.S.C. § 45									
3	15 U.S.C. § 45(n)									
4	15 U.S.C. § 53(b)									
5										
6	Rules and Regulations									
7	Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6)									
8	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)									
9	Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)									
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I. INTRODUCTION

American Tax Relief ("ATR"), a company owned and operated by Alexander Seung Hahn ("Hahn") and his wife Joo Hyun Park ("Park"), preyed on consumers for over a decade by falsely promising to significantly reduce consumers' tax debts. Almost since the inception of the business, ATR claimed in its advertising to have helped thousands of people settle their tax debts for a fraction of the amount owed. Consumers who called ATR in response to Defendants' ads were routinely told that they qualified for Offers in Compromise ("OICs") and Penalty Abatements ("PAs") that would reduce their tax debts by tens of thousands of dollars. Based on Defendants' representations, consumers agreed to pay ATR fees ranging from \$2,500 to \$25,000 or more. In reality, the vast majority of ATR's customers did not qualify for the promised tax relief programs, and ATR did not substantially reduce their tax debts. In fact, even after being in business for over a decade, fewer than a thousand of ATR's more than 20,000 customers obtained reductions in their tax debts amounting to more than what they paid ATR.

This case is ripe for summary judgment. The uncontroverted facts show that Defendants engaged in a pattern of deceptive and unfair practices in violation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 45. Defendants consistently misrepresented that ATR already had helped thousands of people substantially reduce their tax debts (Count I), and misrepresented in telemarketing calls that individual consumers "qualified" for programs that would significantly reduce their tax debts (Count II). Defendants also sometimes placed unauthorized charges on consumers' accounts (Count III). Finally, Defendant Park's parents received millions of dollars in ill-gotten gains derived from these practices, and are named as Relief Defendants in this action (Count IV).

In support of its motion for summary judgment, the FTC has submitted overwhelming evidence of Defendants' law violations, including:

declarations/depositions of fourteen former employees; declarations from forty-one consumers; stipulations/declarations from seventeen advertisers; evidence of six undercover calls placed to ATR; declarations from the Better Business Bureau ("BBB") and two state Attorney General's offices; lawsuits filed against Defendants by the New York City Department of Consumer Affairs ("NYC") and individual consumers; internal ATR documents, including the sales script used by ATR sales representatives for over nine years, which indicated that consumers "qualified" for either an OIC or PA; the report of a tax expert with decades of experience attesting to the stringent requirements that must be met, and the uncertainty involved, in obtaining tax reductions from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"); and declarations from two IRS representatives.

By contrast, Defendants cannot produce a single witness to testify about ATR's practices or even authenticate documents. The individual Defendants and Relief Defendants, as well as all of the former employees disclosed by Defendants, have invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to testify in this case. As a result, in addition to its extensive affirmative evidence, the FTC also is entitled to an adverse inference from the invocation of the Fifth Amendment by Defendants and Relief Defendants. The corporate Defendant also failed to respond to the FTC's Requests for Admission, thereby admitting all of the FTC's requests, and failed to produce any person(s) to testify on its behalf at a Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(b)(6) deposition.

In light of the substantial and indisputable evidence supporting its claims, the FTC seeks judgment against Defendants and Relief Defendants on all Counts, and respectfully requests that the Court enter a final order containing strong injunctive relief, and equitable monetary relief of approximately \$100 million.

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On September 24, 2010, the FTC filed its Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) against Defendants and Relief Defendants in the Northern District of Illinois, and the Illinois court entered a Temporary Restraining Order (Dkt. No. 15). On November

9, 2010, after a contested hearing, the Illinois court entered a Preliminary Injunction upon finding that "the record contains an abundance of evidence showing that consumers were harmed, not helped, by ATR" and that the FTC is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims. (Dkt. No. 62 at p. 11.)

On July 20, 2011, the Illinois court granted Defendants' motion to transfer venue to the Central District of California. (Dkt. No. 194.) Fact discovery closed on March 30, 2012, and expert discovery closed on April 30, 2012. (Dkt. No. 227.) The matter is set for trial on November 6, 2012. (*Id.*)

III. DEFENDANTS AND RELIEF DEFENDANTS

Defendant American Tax Relief LLC is a California limited liability company that had its principal place of business in Los Angeles from 1999 through 2004 and in Beverly Hills from 2005 through September 27, 2010. (SF 1-3, 7-9.) Although ATR's LLC status was suspended October 1, 2009, it was held out as an LLC up until September 27, 2010. (SF 4, 6.)

Defendant Alexander Seung Hahn was the manager and supervisor of ATR, and oversaw the company's daily operations. (SF 25-26, 31-32.) The Honorable Alicemarie H. Stotler in the Central District of California previously found Hahn to be the owner of ATR, and third parties and employees of ATR likewise believed Hahn to be one of ATR's owners. (SF 22-24.) Hahn also sometimes identified himself as ATR's CEO or president. (SF 20-21.) Hahn, among other things, hired, trained and supervised ATR's sales representatives, signed contracts on behalf of ATR, and approved and placed its advertisements. (SF 27-35, 37-38.)

Defendant Joo Hyun Park, Hahn's wife, was the owner of ATR. (SF 51, 54.) Park held ATR's bank accounts, signed checks and contracts on ATR's behalf, was named in lawsuits, and signed settlement agreements regarding ATR's business practices. (SF 55-62.) She visited ATR's offices on occasion, and her brother, Dong Park, was a supervisor in ATR's Sales Department. (SF 64, 66.)

Relief Defendants Young Soon Park and Il Kon Park are Defendant Park's parents. (SF 78, 91.) Although they admit that they were never employed by ATR, they have received many millions of dollars of Defendants' ill-gotten gains. (SF 80, 82-88, 93, 95, 97-98.)

IV. DEFENDANTS' DECEPTIVE BUSINESS PRACTICES

A. Defendants' Deceptive Advertisements

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Since 1999, Defendants marketed ATR's tax relief services nationwide through postcards, television, radio and print advertisements, and on ATR's Internet website. (SF 151-152.) Defendants' advertisements represented that, with ATR's help, consumers who "qualified" for tax relief could save significant amounts of money on their tax debts and stop aggressive IRS collection actions, such as bank levies and garnishments. (SF 165, 167-176, 179-186, 189-197, 200-204, 206-218, 221-235, 238-244, 247-263.) Central to Defendants' ads were claims that ATR already had helped thousands of people reduce their tax debts. Such claims were made nearly since ATR's inception. (SF 161, 174, 181, 191, 200-201, 215, 221-223, 244, 252, 254-255.) For example, postcards that Defendants mailed to taxpayers as early as 2000 represented that ATR "has helped thousands settle their taxes for only Pennies-on-the-Dollar." (SF 161.) Nationallyaired television and radio ads made similar claims, including that ATR has helped thousands of people "settle their tax debt for a fraction of what they owed" or "eliminate up to 85% of their delinquent taxes." (SF 191, 215, 221.) Defendants' website also represented that ATR had already "successfully resolved thousands of cases in all 50 states," and that it could help save people a "significant amount of money" by settling their tax debts. (SF 252-253.)

ATR advertisements often included "testimonials" from supposed customers describing how much ATR purportedly had saved them on their tax debts. (SF 154, 165, 167-168, 175-176, 179-180, 207-214, 226, 262-263.) For example, in several ads, Defendants highlighted a truck driver who purportedly reduced his tax

debt from \$24,000 to \$2,000. (SF 193, 207, 263.) Another couple claimed their tax debt went from \$200,000 to \$40,000. (SF 179-180, 209.) Defendants' ads and website even highlighted a "former professional athlete" whose tax debt was reduced from \$100,000 to \$20,000, as well as a client who supposedly owed \$3 million in tax debt, but only had to pay the IRS \$3,000.\(^1\) (SF 185-186, 193, 262.) Defendants' ads gave the impression that the testimonials, and cases described, were of actual ATR customers, but Defendants used actors in their ads and cannot identify the specific ATR "customers" whose alleged experiences are touted. (SF 154-156.)

Most of the ads directed consumers to call ATR's toll-free number for a "free consultation" to see whether ATR could reduce their tax debts. (SF 158, 233-235.)

B. Defendants' Sales Practices

1. ATR's "Qualification" Process

The ATR representatives who answered consumers' calls referred to themselves as "tax consultants," but they were merely commission-based sales people with no tax experience. (SF 269, 273, 275-276, 278-280.) Some even had criminal records. (SF 277.) At the beginning of the call, the sales representatives would walk consumers through a brief interview which lasted 15 minutes or less, supposedly to see whether consumers "qualified" for tax relief. (SF 281-283.) The interview consisted of some basic questions about the consumers' tax debts, income, assets, and liabilities. (SF 284-285, 288-291.) Sales representatives told consumers that estimates were sufficient for purposes of the interview. (SF 287.)

¹ While some of ATR's television ads briefly displayed small-print, onscreen disclaimers, ATR's radio and print ads did not contain any form of disclaimer. (SF 177, 187, 198, 219 (tv); SF 236, 245 (radio and print).) The disclaimers that appeared during the television ads were not prominent, and consumers did not even notice them. (SF 266.)

After the ATR representatives collected this information, they placed consumers on hold, purportedly to determine whether consumers "qualified" for tax relief. (SF 293.)

When the sales representatives came back on the line, they regularly represented that consumers "qualified" either for an OIC or PA.² (SF 294, 297, 323-326.) The "Close" script that sales representatives used from at least January 2001 through September 27, 2010 includes only these two options, confirming that ATR consistently represented that consumers "qualified" for these forms of tax relief. (SF 319-322.) Moreover, Defendants' sales representatives routinely told consumers that the OIC or PA would significantly reduce their tax debts, and even told consumers specific amounts by which their tax debts would be reduced. (SF 300-302, 321.) Sales representatives also touted ATR's rates of success and expertise in reducing consumers' tax debts. (SF 303-305, 329-330.)

Despite representing to individual consumers that they "qualified" for an OIC or PA, ATR's sales representatives had no idea whether consumers qualified or not. (SF 275-276, 299.) The financial information the sales representatives gathered during the telephone interviews was too superficial and incomplete to reach any conclusions about whether consumers qualified for an OIC or PA. (SF 284-291.) It simply is not possible for a tax practitioner, let alone a sales representative with no tax training, to determine in a brief telephone interview whether someone is qualified for an OIC or PA. (SF 101-102, 107, 113-115.) Instead, detailed and exact information about a consumer's income, all of their assets, and their tax and other liabilities is necessary to analyze a consumer's

² In rare instances, sales representatives told consumers they qualified for "tax relief." Like consumers who were "qualified" for OICs or PAs, consumers who "qualified" for "tax relief," internally referred to as the "Catch All" option, were led to believe that ATR would significantly reduce their tax debts. (SF 295-296, 342, 356.)

potential eligibility for an OIC or PA. (SF 100, 104-106, 116-122, 126-128, 138-142.) Even then, it is not possible to know in advance whether the IRS will accept OIC and PA requests. (SF 115, 136, 142.) In fact, these arrangements are difficult to obtain, and the IRS's acceptance rate for OICs over the last decade has been only 34% or less. (SF 130-135, 141-142, 144.)

After telling consumers they "qualified," sales representatives then often attempted to create a sense of urgency by warning consumers about the IRS's aggressive collection tactics – e.g., obtaining liens or levies over properties and garnishing wages. (SF 308-310.) Sales representatives assured consumers that ATR could stop these collection tactics immediately simply by filing a power of attorney. (SF 306, 312.) These claims also were false. According to a tax expert, filing a power of attorney with the IRS does not stop collection actions, and consumers continued to have their wages garnished and bank accounts levied. (SF 108, 368-369.)

2. Collection of ATR's Fee

After telling consumers that they "qualified" to receive significant reductions on their tax debts, sales representatives informed consumers that an upfront, "one-time flat fee" was required before ATR could begin working on their case. (SF 318, 331.) This fee ranged from approximately \$2,500 to \$25,000 or more for each consumer, and consumers were required to pay over the telephone either through debits from their bank accounts or charges to their credit cards. (SF 332-335, 337-338.) Consumers who could not pay the entire fee up-front were offered the option of installment payments, with the first installment to be paid

³ Follow-up letters to consumers who did not initially hire ATR warned that "the government has recently given more funding to the Collection Branch of the IRS to be more aggressive when going after taxpayers with overdue debt." (SF 358-359, 361.) These letters also reiterated the false claim that ATR already has "successfully helped thousands" of people "settle their tax debts." (SF 362-363.)

immediately. (SF 336.) Although the fee was steep, consumers were assured that ATR would obtain substantial reductions in their tax debts and that the fee "handles the case from start to finish." (SF 300-305, 318, 341-342, 344.) In many instances, however, this proved to be false, as ATR later required consumers to pay additional amounts for a variety of reasons. (SF 413-419.)

3. Authorization Forms and Congratulations Letter

Following the sales calls, ATR faxed consumers two authorization forms – a power of attorney form authorizing ATR to represent the consumer before the IRS, and a form authorizing the IRS to provide ATR with information about the taxpayer.⁴ (SF 311, 350.) Consumers were directed to immediately sign and return the forms so that ATR could begin working on their cases. (SF 311-312.) ATR then forwarded these forms to the IRS, but this often was the extent of ATR's communication with the IRS about consumers' tax debts. (SF 391.)

In addition to the forms, ATR sent consumers a letter congratulating them for contacting ATR and confirming that the consumer "qualified" for tax relief. (SF 353-357.) Consumers who had been "qualified" for an OIC received a letter indicating that this relief "allows people to settle their total tax debt for only a fraction of the debt." (SF 353.) Consumers who had been "qualified" for a PA received a letter stating that "the IRS must accept" a petition to remove the consumer's penalties and interest "as it is submitted PER IRS GUIDELINES." (SF 354-355.)

⁴ To perpetuate the idea that the sales representatives would personally work on callers' cases, power of attorney forms sent to consumers contained sales representatives' names even though they had no ability to represent consumers before the IRS. (SF 101, 274, 351.) ATR removed the sales representatives' names from these forms before they were submitted to the IRS. (SF 352.)

C. Defendants' Purported Tax Relief Services

1. Questionnaires and Requests for Financial Documents

Once consumers hired ATR, they did not get the immediate service ATR had promised, nor did the aggressive collection actions stop. (SF 368-369, 389-390.) Instead, consumers received an additional package in the mail containing, among other things, detailed financial questionnaires and document request lists, which consumers were told "need your immediate attention. . . . so that your case may be completed as soon as possible." (SF 370-371, 377-381.) Although some consumers were told during the sales call that they would need to fill out a simple questionnaire, they received in the mail several multi-paged questionnaires that asked for a variety of detailed financial information not sought during the initial telephone interview. (SF 313-315, 378, 380-381.) The document request lists were equally extensive, and listed various types of financial documents that consumers were required to provide to ATR. (SF 377, 379.)

Along with the questionnaires and document requests, consumers also received two letters, including one which supposedly came from ATR's "Accounting Department" and revealed information about ATR's restrictive cancellation policy in small print at the bottom. (SF 11, 371-373.) According to that policy, consumers could only obtain a 50% refund of "your total fee" if the services were cancelled in writing within 5 days of the date of the letter. (SF 372.) This policy was never mentioned during the sales calls, and most consumers did not notice this statement in the "Accounting Department" letter. (SF 339-340, 373, 376.) In many cases, moreover, this cancellation period was about to expire, or already had expired, by the time consumers received the letter. (SF 374-375.)

2. ATR's Tax Resolution Department

The employees in ATR's Tax Resolution Department, which was located in a separate area of the office from the Sales Department, were charged with applying for tax relief on behalf of ATR's customers. (SF 12, 14.) Each of these

employees were responsible for overwhelming numbers of customer files, sometimes hundreds at a time, and they could not keep up with the files assigned to them. (SF 383-384.) As a result, ATR customers routinely found ATR to be non-responsive, and were given a series of excuses for why ATR had not made progress on their cases. (SF 388-390.)

Tellingly, ATR's own tax resolution employees did not rely on the financial information gathered by Defendants' sales representatives during sales calls when assessing consumers' eligibility for OICs and PAs. (SF 386-387.) Instead, they only assessed consumers' qualifications after receiving more detailed information and documents from consumers and the IRS. (SF 385.) At that point, tax resolution employees routinely determined that customers did not qualify for the OICs and PAs that consumers had been promised by ATR's sales representatives. (SF 392-395.) Tax resolution employees would often refuse even to file applications for the promised form of tax relief, since filing a frivolous application would violate their obligations under IRS Circular 230.⁵ (SF 396.)

D. Defendants Failed to Reduce Consumers' Tax Debts

The vast majority of ATR's 20,314 customers did not receive reductions in their tax debts. (SF 401-409.) ATR's former tax resolution employees themselves admit that they were rarely able to negotiate reductions for customers, and this is confirmed by the minimal number of acceptance letters ATR received from the IRS and state taxing authorities. (SF 404-406.) Indeed, ATR received only a total of 788 such acceptance letters before the Receivership was imposed: 569 letters for OICs and 219 letters for PAs. (SF 405-406.) Furthermore, to the extent that

⁵ When angry consumers demanded the relief they had been promised in the sales call, ATR employees sometimes would proceed to file applications knowing that they would likely be rejected. (SF 397.) In other cases, they instructed customers to hide their assets from the IRS in order to try to obtain the promised form of tax relief. (SF 398.)

the amount of a particular PA can even be quantified, it often amounted to less than what consumers had paid ATR, and in some cases, the PAs were obtained by consumers themselves, not by ATR. (SF 407-409.)

In a futile attempt to justify the claims that they reduced the tax debts of "thousands," Defendants try to include forms of tax relief other than the OICs and PAs that consumers were promised. For example, Defendants inflate their "successful results" by including: installment agreements; placed in uncollectable status; brought into compliance; statute of limitations; and tax debt eliminated. Most of these "results" do not reduce tax debts, or involve Defendants attempting to take credit for a result where none is due. Ironically, the bulk of Defendants' claimed "successes" are in the form of installment agreements, which Defendants' own ads concede "get you nowhere." (SF 231, 243, 323.)

Based on ATR's dismal results, it is no surprise that many consumers sought refunds from the company, but these requests generally were denied. (SF 422-425, 432.) ATR typically blamed its failure to get results on the very consumers it had defrauded, claiming they did not provide all of the detailed financial information that was necessary to seek an OIC or PA, or accusing them of lying to the sales representatives during the initial call. (SF 426-427.) In refusing to provide refunds, ATR also routinely cited to its five-day 50% refund cancellation policy, which was revealed only in the "Accounting Department" letter described above. (SF 432-433.)

⁶ Neither installment agreements nor being placed in uncollectible status reduces a consumer's tax debt. (SF 145-150.) ATR also cannot take credit for the statute of limitations expiring on tax debts, since that occurs on its own. (SF 109.) ATR also did not bring consumers into compliance, since it did not prepare and file tax returns for them. (SF 15.) Moreover, a tax debt can be "eliminated" simply by paying the delinquent taxes, or by filing tax returns that show the consumer has no tax liability.

E. Defendants' Unauthorized Charges

In addition to failing to provide the promised services, ATR frequently charged consumers without their express informed consent. These charges took a few forms. First, the company sometimes charged consumers who did not agree to purchase ATR's services or who agreed to pay only after ATR had secured the promised tax relief. (SF 411-412.) It did so by convincing these consumers to provide their account information, while assuring them that no immediate charges would be assessed. (SF 410.) Having obtained the account information under false pretenses, ATR then proceeded to charge the accounts immediately. (SF 410-412.) Second, Defendants sometimes charged customers additional fees without their consent – in some instances, by assessing charges without even seeking consent, and in other instances, by seeking consent, but still assessing charges even after the consumer refused to authorize them. (SF 415-421.)

V. ARGUMENT

The FTC's evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that Defendants ATR, Hahn, and Park violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45. Defendant ATR also failed to respond to the FTC's Requests for Admission, thereby admitting all of the FTC's requests. Moreover, because the individual Defendants and Relief Defendants invoked the Fifth Amendment in response to the FTC's discovery requests, the Court is entitled to draw adverse inferences against them. *See Baxter v. Palmigiano*, 425 U.S. 308, 318 (1976); *SEC v. Colello*, 139 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 1998). In light of both the significant indisputable evidence and the adverse inferences, no material factual issue exists as to whether Defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC Act. Thus, this case is ripe for summary judgment, and injunctive and equitable monetary relief should be ordered.

A. Legal Standard for Summary Judgment

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and

admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial, but it need not disprove the other party's case. *Id.* at 256; *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 323-25 (1986). Once the movant meets its burden, the non-moving party "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of their pleadings, but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). Any opposition must set forth evidence that is "significantly probative' as to any fact claimed to be disputed." *SEC v. Murphy*, 626 F.2d 633, 640 (9th Cir. 1980).

B. Defendants' Business Practices Violated Section 5 of the FTC Act 1. Defendants' Deceptive Claims

An act or practice is deceptive under the statute if "first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice is material." *FTC v. Pantron I Corp.*, 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994). Intent to defraud and good faith are irrelevant. *See, e.g., Removatron Int'l Corp. v. FTC*, 884 F.2d 1489, 1495 (1st Cir. 1989); *FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc.*, 861 F.2d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 1988). The existence of some satisfied customers also is not a defense to a deception claim. *FTC v. Stefanchik*, 559 F.3d 924, 928 n.12 (9th Cir. 2009).

Both express and implied claims are subject to Section 5(a). *See, e.g., FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc.*, 994 F.2d 595, 604 (9th Cir. 1993); *FTC v. Gill*, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1043 (C.D. Cal. 1999). Whereas express claims "are ones that directly state the representation at issue," implied claims "range from claims that would be virtually synonymous with an express claim through language that literally says one thing but strongly suggests another, to language which relatively few

consumers would interpret as making a particular representation." *In re Thompson Med. Co., Inc.*, 104 F.T.C. 648, at *6-7 (Nov. 23, 1984), *aff'd, Thompson Med. Co. v. FTC*, 479 U.S. 1086 (1986).

"Advertisements as a whole may be completely misleading although every sentence separately considered is literally true." *Donaldson v. Read Magazine, Inc.*, 333 U.S. 178, 188 (1948). In deciding whether particular statements or omissions are deceptive, courts must look to the overall "net impression" of consumers. *See FTC v. Gill*, 265 F.3d 944, 956 (9th Cir. 2001); *FTC v. Cyberspace.com, LLC*, 453 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006). Representations "capable of being interpreted in a misleading way should be construed against" the person making them. *Gill*, 71 F. Supp. 2d at 1045-46. Furthermore, disclaimers or qualifications cannot shield a defendant from liability unless they are so prominent and unambiguous as to "leave an accurate impression." *Removatron*, 884 F.2d at 1497; *FTC v. EdebitPay, LLC*, No. CV-07-4880 ODW (AJWx), 2011 WL 486260, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2011).

A claim is material if "it involves information that is important to consumers, and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding, a product." *Cyberspace.com*, 453 F.3d at 1201. Express claims, or deliberately made implied claims, are presumed to be material. *Pantron I*, 33 F.3d at 1095-96. Implied claims also may be material when they go to the heart of the solicitation or

⁷ The FTC can prove that a representation is likely to mislead consumers in two ways. First, the FTC can prove that the representation is in fact false. False claims are inherently "likely to mislead." *Thompson Med. Co.*, 104 F.T.C. at 64. Second, the FTC can prove that the advertiser lacked a reasonable basis for its claims. *FTC v. U.S. Sales Corp.*, 785 F. Supp. 737, 748-49 (N.D. Ill. 1992). Advertisers are required to have had "some recognizable substantiation for the representation prior to making it in an advertisement." *FTC v. Direct Mktg. Concepts, Inc.*, 569 F. Supp. 2d 285, 298 (D. Mass. 2008).

the characteristics of the product or service offered. *See Kraft, Inc. v. FTC*, 970 F.2d 311, 322 (7th Cir. 1992), *cert. denied*, 507 U.S. 909 (1993).

The FTC need not show that each consumer relied on the misrepresentations. *Figgie*, 994 F.2d at 605. Instead, "the proper standard to establish reliance in an FTC action . . . is based on a pattern or practice of deceptive behavior." *FTC v. Nat'l Bus. Consultants, Inc.*, 781 F. Supp. 1136, 1141-42 (E.D. La. 1991) (citing multiple cases).

a. Count I: Defendants Misrepresented that ATR had Helped Thousands of People Significantly Reduce Their Tax Debts

Defendants routinely represented that ATR already had negotiated significant tax reductions for thousands of consumers, but this claim is simply false. As described in Section IV above, ATR's claim of thousands of successes was a central part of the company's advertising and sales pitch, and it suggested that ATR was an established business with a proven track record of success. (SF 161, 174, 181, 191, 200-201, 215, 221-223, 244, 252, 254-255.)

Defendants' ads made express claims that ATR had helped thousands "settle their taxes for only Pennies-on-the-Dollar," (SF 161, 247), "settle their tax debt for a fraction of what they owed," (SF 175, 179, 181, 191, 216-217, 230, 239, 241, 248-249, 257-258) and "eliminate" or "save up to 85" percent on delinquent taxes. (SF 221, 224-225, 227-228, 233, 240.) On its website and in correspondence to consumers, ATR similarly touted its success in helping thousands of customers. (SF 252, 254-255, 357, 362-363.) These past success claims typically were combined with testimonials from purportedly real customers who were, as one advertisement put it, "people just like you," who had their tax debts reduced by up to 94% with ATR's help. (SF 174-176.) The combination of these alleged "customer" testimonials and the "thousands" of successes conveyed to consumers that ATR routinely negotiated the types of settlements advertised for its customers.

ATR's sales representatives then also referred to ATR's past successes in sales calls with prospective customers. In one recorded undercover call, for example, after qualifying the caller for a PA that would reduce his tax debt by \$30,000, the sales representative explained that "we do a couple of hundred cases like this per month and we've done it nationwide for about 11 years." (SF 304.) In another recorded call, the sales representative told a caller who had already been "qualified" for an OIC that "we've been doing this for over a decade and we've done it 19,000 times. So, we're very, very good at what we do." (SF 305.) Consumers also indicate that ATR sales representatives gave them similar assurances. (SF 303.) These representations about past successes were material to consumers' decisions to hire ATR and to pay its high fee. *See, e.g., FTC v. Affiliate Strategies, Inc.*, 09-41-1-JAR, 2011 WL 3111948, at *13 (D. Kan. July 26, 2011) (success rate claims found material to consumers' purchase decision).

The undisputed evidence also demonstrates that ATR's claims about its prior successes were false. Indeed, documentary evidence establishes that even after a decade, the OICs and PAs obtained for ATR's approximately 20,000 customers numbered only in the hundreds. (SF 402, 405-406.) Furthermore, the evidence shows that in the case of PAs, the amounts abated did not exceed the fee customers had paid to ATR, and that ATR's customers sometimes obtained the PAs for themselves. (SF 407-409.) Moreover, Defendants have been unable to identify the alleged customers whose testimonials they highlighted in their advertising campaigns. (SF 156.) Given the materiality of Defendants' past success claims, the widespread audience to which the claims were disseminated, and the fact that the claims were used to induce tens of thousands of consumers to pay ATR's hefty fee, the Commission is entitled to judgment as a matter of law against the Defendants on Count One.

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Count II: Defendants Misrepresented that Consumers Qualified for Tax Relief Programs and Would Obtain Significant Tax Debt Reductions

Defendants consistently misrepresented that individual consumers "qualified" for particular forms of tax relief. In their advertisements, Defendants directed consumers to call to see if they "qualified" for the settlements described. (SF 158, 204, 217, 227-230, 232, 234, 241.) Consumers who called were routinely told that they "qualified" for an OIC or PA that would save them significant sums of money. (SF 294, 297.) In fact, the script used by ATR for its sales calls directed sales representatives to tell consumers that they "qualified" either for an OIC or PA. (SF 319-322.) Former Sales Department employees confirm that sales representatives were directed to "qualify" nearly every caller for either an OIC or PA – the only exceptions were consumers who did not owe at least \$10,000 or \$15,000 in tax debt or were currently in bankruptcy. (SF 157, 270-271, 294.) Consumers similarly report being told that they "qualified" and that ATR would negotiate their tax debts down to little or nothing. (SF 294, 297, 300-301, 341-342.) Significantly, all of the undercover investigators also were told that they "qualified" for tax relief that would reduce their tax debts by tens of thousands of dollars. (SF 302.)

There can be no doubt that such statements were material to consumers' decisions to hire ATR. Consumers contacted the company for the sole purpose of finding out whether they qualified, and they only agreed to pay ATR's fee, despite their financial circumstances, after being assured they qualified for, and would obtain, significant reductions in their tax debt. *See FTC v. Wash. Data Res.*, 09-cv-2309-T-23TBM, 2012 WL 1415323, at *22 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 23, 2012) (verbal qualification during sales call found to be material). Furthermore, because these claims were express, consumers' reliance on them is presumed to be material.

Of course, most consumers did not qualify for the tax relief ATR had promised. Former ATR tax resolution employees themselves admit that the vast majority of ATR customers whose files they received did not qualify for OICs or PAs and that they could not reduce the tax debts of these customers. (SF 392-395.) And the FTC's expert, after reviewing undercover calls, determined that none of those callers qualified for the tax relief promised by ATR's sales representatives. (SF 400.) Consumer declarations and complaints further establish the pattern of consumers being told that they "qualified" for huge savings but, in most instances, seeing no reduction in their tax debts.

2. Defendants' Unfair Practices

Section 5(a) of the FTC Act also prohibits unfair acts or practices. An act or practice is unfair if it "causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition." 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); FTC v. Neovi, Inc., 604 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010). For a practice to be deemed unfair, the resulting injury must be: (1) substantial; (2) not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and (3) one that consumers themselves could not reasonably have avoided." FTC v. J.K. Publ'ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (cite omitted).

Courts have found the practice of charging fees without consumers' express informed consent to be unfair under the FTC Act. *Neovi*, 604 F.3d at 1155-59 (facilitating unauthorized charges found to be unfair practice); *J.K. Publ'ns.*, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1202-03 (unauthorized charges deemed unfair).

a. Count III: Defendants' Unauthorized Charges

The undisputed evidence demonstrates that Defendants had a practice of charging consumers without their express informed consent. In fact, the frequency of complaints about unauthorized charges led the BBB to notify ATR of its concern about this practice as early as 2002, but ATR did not then alter its

practices. (SF 438-439.) Former employees also acknowledge a pattern of customer complaints about unauthorized charges, and several declarants state that they had thousands of dollars taken from their accounts without authorization. (SF 424.) Because there is no disputed issue of material fact, the FTC is entitled to judgment on Count Three.

C. Defendants Hahn and Park are Individually Liable

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An individual may be held liable for corporate violations of the FTC Act if the individual actively participated in or had authority to control a corporation's deceptive practices, and the individual knew or should have known about the practices. FTC v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1170-71 (9th Cir. 1997). Authority to control the corporation "can be evidenced by active involvement in business affairs and the making of corporate policy, including assuming the duties of a corporate officer." FTC v. Amy Travel Service, 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir. 1989); see also Publ'g Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171 (power to sign corporate documents evidences authority to control); FTC v. John Beck Amazing Profits LLC, 2:09-cv-04719-JHN-CWx, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70068, at *64 (C.D. Cal. April 20, 2012). The knowledge requirement can be established by showing that the individual "had actual knowledge of material misrepresentations, was recklessly indifferent to the truth or falsity of a misrepresentation, or had an awareness of a high probability of fraud along with an intentional avoidance of the truth." Cyberspace.com, 453 F.3d at 1202. "The FTC does not need to show that an individual defendant intended to defraud consumers in order to hold that individual personally liable." J.K. Publ'ns, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1204 (citing Publ'g Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171).

The evidence shows that Hahn and Park were the principals of ATR and were significantly involved in its operations. They formulated, directed, controlled, and/or participated in the acts and practices of ATR. The breadth of their responsibilities also makes clear that they knew, or should have known, about

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the illegal activities of ATR. Hahn managed ATR, formulated ATR's business practices, hired and fired employees, arranged and approved ATR's advertising, including websites, handled ATR's payroll and some accounts payable, and supervised ATR's sales representatives and office administration. (SF 25-35.) Considering the scope of Hahn's involvement in the business, he undoubtedly had the necessary control and knowledge to be held individually liable. *FTC v. Affordable Media*, 179 F.3d 1228, 1235 (9th Cir. 1999) ("The extent of an individual's involvement in a fraudulent scheme alone is sufficient to establish the requisite knowledge for personal restitutionary liability.").

Park also should to be held individually liable. As the sole owner of ATR, Park had the authority to control the company's business practices and was, at a minimum, recklessly indifferent to ATR's unlawful business activities.⁸ (SF 54.) Park signed contracts on behalf of ATR and controlled its bank accounts, into which tens of millions of dollars were deposited. (SF 55, 59, 70.) Park was individually named in several consumer lawsuits about ATR's practices and, in connection with such lawsuits, signed settlement agreements and checks satisfying any judgments. (SF 60-62.) J.K. Publ'ns., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-07 (wife who signed documents containing information about company's unlawful practices held individually liable for restitution). Park also sometimes visited ATR's office, where she could observe its activities. (SF 64.) Furthermore, although Hahn was responsible for managing the business on a daily basis, Park's decision to permit Hahn to run her business, despite her knowledge of his criminal history, and ongoing probation, is sufficient to make her liable. (SF 67.) Publ'g Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171 (acting at the direction of someone facing criminal charges reflects reckless indifference); J.K. Publ'ns, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1206-07

⁸ Moreover, to the extent that ATR was a d/b/a of Park, there can be no question regarding her individual liability. (SF 5.)

(wife acting at direction of husband with criminal past found liable for restitution).

And despite her awareness of a criminal investigation, and the execution of federal

search and seizure warrants in April 2010, Park allowed ATR to continue operating. (SF 68-69.)

D. The Court Should Order Equitable Relief Against Defendants

To remedy Defendants' blatant violations of the FTC Act, the FTC seeks both strong injunctive and monetary relief against all Defendants. The FTC also seeks an order requiring Relief Defendants to disgorge their ill-gotten gains.

1. Injunctive Relief

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act provides that "in proper cases the Commission may seek, and after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction." 15 U.S.C. § 53(b); *see also Pantron I*, 33 F.3d at 1102. Cases involving deceptive conduct in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act are "proper cases" for injunctive relief under Section 13(b). *FTC v. H.N. Singer*, 668 F.2d 1107, 1110-11 (9th Cir. 1996); *John Beck*, 2:09-cv-04719-JHN-CWx, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70068, at *62-63.

To prevent future illegal conduct, the FTC seeks an injunction banning Defendants from telemarketing and the marketing of debt relief products or services in the future, as well as enjoining them from any practices that violate Section 5(a). A permanent injunction is justified when there is a "cognizable danger of recurrent violation," or some reasonable likelihood of future violations. *U.S. v. W.T. Grant Co.*, 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953); *CFTC v. CoPetro Mktg. Group, Inc.*, 502 F. Supp. 806, 818-819 (C.D. Cal. 1980). Past illegal conduct is highly suggestive of future violations, especially where past violations are systematic. *See CoPetro Mktg.*, 502 F. Supp. at 818-819; *SEC v. Mgmt. Dynamics, Inc.*, 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975); *FTC v. Sharp*, 782 F. Supp. 1445, 1454 (D. Nev. 1991). Appropriate injunctive remedies available to the Court to ensure effective relief include enjoining the making of misrepresentations, enjoining otherwise

permissible practices, reasonable fencing-in provisions, and record-keeping and monitoring provisions. *See FTC v. Think Achievement*, 144 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1016-18 (N.D. Ind. 2000) (discussing breadth of injunctive relief).

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Based on Defendants' history, there is reason to believe they will continue to violate the law unless strong injunctive provisions are imposed. Despite over a decade of consumer complaints and lawsuits, a lawsuit filed by NYC, warnings from the BBB, and the execution of a criminal search warrant, Defendants continued defrauding consumers out of millions of dollars. (SF 438-455.) Even after the entry of the Preliminary Injunction here, Defendants attempted to open another tax relief business similar to ATR, holding Hahn's brother out as the owner in order to hide their involvement. (SF 49, 76.) Hahn also has a long history of consumer fraud that predates ATR. In 1994, he was convicted of grand theft after taking money from his own customers' brokerage accounts and served iail time for that crime. (SF 39-40.) In 2006, he was convicted of mail fraud in connection with a telemarketing business that sold medical billing opportunities, and was sentenced to five years probation and ordered to pay restitution of over \$1.2 million. (SF 41-43.) Nevertheless, Hahn continued operating ATR, despite being on probation, and Park made his restitution payment from the proceeds of ATR. (SF 63.)

Courts have banned violators of the FTC Act from an array of practices. *See*, *e.g.*, *Gill*, 265 F.3d at 957-58 (ban on participation in credit-repair); *FTC v. Medicor*, *LLC*, CV 01-1896 CBM (EX), 2002 WL 1925896, at *1-2 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2001) (ban on telemarketing and marketing of work-at-home medical billing opportunities); *FTC v. Publ'g Clearing House*, *Inc.*, CV-S-94-623-PMP (LRL.), 1995 WL 367901, at *4 (D. Nev. May 12, 1995), *aff'd* 106 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1997) (ban on prize-promotion telemarketing). Under these circumstances, an order banning Defendants from engaging in telemarketing or marketing debt relief products or services is appropriate.

2. Equitable Monetary Relief

The Court should also enter equitable monetary relief for the full amount of consumer injury caused by Defendants' illegal practices. The authority granted by Section 13(b) gives courts the authority "to grant any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice," including the authority to order restitution or disgorgement of unjust enrichment. *Pantron I*, 33 F.3d at 1102-1103; *John Beck*, 2:09-cv-04719-JHN-CWx, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70068, at *68-69.

The proper calculation of equitable monetary relief is the full amount that consumers paid, less any refunds. *See, e.g., Stefanchik*, 559 F.3d at 931-932; *Figgie*, 994 F.2d at 606-607. The FTC bears the initial burden of demonstrating that its calculations reasonably approximate consumer losses. *FTC v. Medicor*, *LLC*, 217 F. Supp. 2d 1048, 1058 (C.D. Cal. 2002); *FTC v. J.K. Publ'ns, Inc.*, No. 99-0044 ABC (AJWx), 2000 WL 35594143, at *17 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 9, 2000). The burden then shifts to defendants to show that the FTC's figures are inaccurate. *Medicor*, 217 F. Supp. 2d at 1058. Any uncertainty over the exact amount of consumer loss "should fall on the wrongdoer whose illegal conduct created the uncertainty." *J.K. Publ'ns*, 2000 WL 35594143, at *17.

Defendants' lack of financial books and records complicates the calculation of consumers' losses. (SF 16.) In addition, because the individual Defendants invoked the Fifth Amendment in refusing to respond to discovery, and no representative was provided for ATR's Rule 30(b)(6) deposition, the FTC was unable to obtain information in discovery from those persons with the most knowledge of ATR's finances. (SF 19, 50, 77.) Furthermore, to date, Defendants have not produced their tax returns for several tax years, which would provide information about ATR's revenues. Therefore, the FTC's calculation of restitution is based on the Receiver's reports; Defendants' tax returns for the years 2005 through 2008; available bank records; and, only where no other information is available, information from an ATR database. These records demonstrate that

ATR's total sales, net of refunds and fees paid by customers who obtained OICs, were \$100,686,519.68. (SF 458-459.) A monetary judgement should be entered in that amount.⁹

E. The Court Should Order Equitable Relief Against Relief Defendants

Relief Defendants Young Soon Park and Il Kon Park received significant sums of money and property that were directly or indirectly derived from the proceeds of Defendants' unlawful activities and to which they have no legitimate claim. Courts have repeatedly exercised their broad equitable power to order the turnover of assets held by third parties where 1) the relief defendant possesses illegally obtained profits, and 2) the relief defendant has no legitimate claim to those funds. *SEC v. Cross Fin. Servs., Inc.*, 908 F. Supp. 718, 730-732 (C.D. Cal. 1995); *see also FTC v. Network Servs. Depot*, 617 F.3d 1127, 1142 (9th Cir. 2010); *Colello*, 139 F.3d at 678-79 (affirming summary judgment against a nominal defendant ordering disgorgement of ill-gotten gains); *FTC v. Inc21.com Corp.*, 745 F. Supp. 2d 975, 1009 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (granting summary judgment against relief defendant ordering disgorgement of ill-gotten funds). Even where a relief defendant has not engaged in wrong-doing, "[a]s between the [relief] defendant [] and the victims of fraud, equity dictates that the rights of the victims should control." *SEC v. Antar*, 831 F. Supp. 380, 402-403 (D.N.J. 1993).

The evidence demonstrates that Young Soon Park received at least \$18,068,953 from Defendants since 2003. (SF 82-83, 87-88.) Additionally, individual Defendants placed their Beverly Hills home, purchased for \$3,425,000, in her name. (SF 84-86.) Defendants also transferred at least \$175,281 to Il Kon

⁹ Fees for consumers who obtained PAs should not be subtracted from this amount because the evidence indicates that the PAs were for less than the fees consumers paid to ATR, or were obtained by consumers themselves. (SF 407, 409.)

Park, and paid off the \$420,000 mortgage on Relief Defendants' condominium. (SF 95-97.) Neither Relief Defendant has a legitimate claim to these funds and assets. Indeed, individual Defendants even admit that they placed title to their \$3.4 million Beverly Hills home in Young Soon Park's name, as well as depositing "approximately \$5 million" into a bank account in her name, as "asset protection measure[s]." (SF 45-46, 71-72.) Defendants also admit to paying off the mortgage on Relief Defendants' condominium, and transferring monthly sums to them

ranging from \$1,000 to \$3,000, as "gifts." (SF 47-48, 73-74.)

The FTC requests that Young Soon Park be ordered to disgorge \$18,068,953, the amount of ATR proceeds she received, as well as turn over title to Defendants' Beverly Hills home. The FTC further requests that Il Kon Park be ordered to disgorge the \$595,281 he received in ATR proceeds, including title to the Los Angeles condominium. Allowing Relief Defendants to retain these assets would unjustly allow them to benefit from Defendants' illegal activities.

VI. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the FTC respectfully requests that the Court enter summary judgment against Defendants and Relief Defendants on all Counts of the FTC's Complaint, and enter a permanent injunction banning Defendants from telemarketing and debt relief services, enjoining them from making material misrepresentations, and awarding equitable monetary relief.

Dated: June 8, 2012

Respectfully Submitted,

24 /s/Karen D. Dodge KAREN D. DODGE MARISSA J. REICH Attorneys for Plaintiff Federal Trade Commission