| 1  | WILLARD K. TOM   |  |
|----|--|--|
| 2  | General Counsel  |  |
| 3  | DEANYA T. KUECKELHAN   |  |
| 4  | Regional Director  |  |
| 5  | JASON C. MOON, Tex. Bar No. 24001188<br>THOMAS B. CARTER, Tex. Bar No. 03932300  | )  |
| 6  | EMILY B. ROBINSON, Tex. Bar No. 2404673  |  |
| 7  | Federal Trade Commission 1999 Bryan Street, Suite 2150                           |  |
| 8  | Dallas, Texas 75201  | •  |
| 9  | (214) 979-9378; jmoon@ftc.gov (Moon)<br>(214) 979-9372; tcarter@ftc.gov (Carter) |  |
| 10 | (214) 979-9386; erobinson@ftc.gov (Robinson)<br>(214) 953-3079 (Fax)             |  |
| 11 | Attorneys for Plaintiff  |  |
| 12 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   |  |
| 13 |  |  |
| 14 | UNITED STATES DIS<br>FOR THE DISTRICT  |  |
| 15 | FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   | ı  |
| 16 | TEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION   | Case No  |
| 17 | Plaintiff  |  |
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| 25 | AFB LLC, an Arizona limited liability company;                                   | APPOINT RECEIVER                                   |
| 26 |  |  |
| 27 | Western GPS LLC, an Arizona limited liability company;                           |  |
| 28 | - Josephan J   | ш  |

Chris Ambrosia, individually and as a manager of Ambrosia Web Design LLC, AFB LLC, and CAM Services Direct LLC; and LeRoy Castine, a/k/a Lee Castine, individually and as a manager of Ambrosia Web Design LLC, Concord Financial Advisors LLC, AFB LLC, and Western GPS LLC; **Defendants** 

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### I. INTRODUCTION<sup>1</sup>

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) brings this action under Sections 13 (b) and 19 of the Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b) and 57b, and the Telemarketing and Consumer Fraud and Abuse Prevention Act (Telemarketing Act), 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108, to halt Defendants' unlawful telemarketing of credit card interest rate reduction services. Defendants employ illegal prerecorded messages or "robocalls," violate the FTC's National Do Not Call Registry (DNC Registry), deceive consumers about their services, charge illegal advance fees, bill some consumers without authorization, refuse to honor refund promises, and commit multiple additional violations of the FTC Act and the FTC's "Telemarketing Sales Rule" (TSR), 16 C.F.R. Part 310. The FTC seeks temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctive relief, rescission or reformation of contracts, the refund of monies paid, disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, and other equitable relief to halt Defendants' deceptive and abusive practices and to provide restitution for Defendants' victims.

<sup>1</sup> In support of this application, Plaintiff is concurrently filing a two-volume Appendix. The Appendix includes consumer declarations, declarations from a Tempe, Arizona police detective and two FTC investigators, and other declarations and exhibits. The Appendix will be cited as "App. at 00000x." The citation will note source declarations and attachments. The exhibits to the Declaration of FTC Investigator Brent McPeek (App. at 000598-000601) are separately listed in the Appendix and will be cited by Appendix number (App. at 000602-000915) for ease of reference.

The most compelling evidence in support of a temporary restraining order (TRO) comes from consumers themselves. Ten consumers have provided declarations detailing Defendants' deceptive, unfair, and abusive practices. *See* App. at 000264-285 (Declaration of Felisha Bradley, with Attachments A-D); 000286-325 (Declaration of Lorene Carter, with Attachments A-E); 000326-353 (Declaration of Robert Clifton, with Attachments A-D); 000354-358 (Declaration of Beulah Johnson, with Attachment A); 000359-371 (Declaration of Sharon McClellan, with Attachments A-D); 000372-389 (Declaration of Carolyn Paglia, with Attachment A); 000390-392 (Declaration of Gregory Ramsey); 000393-418 (Declaration of Lydia Reagan, with Attachments A-C); 000419-435 (Declaration of Paul Smith, with Attachments A-D); 000436-478 (Declaration of Shirley Tester, with Attachments A-I).

Defendants Ambrosia Web Design, LLC (AWD), Concord Financial Advisors, LLC (Concord), CAM Services Direct, LLC (CAM Services), and Western GPS LLC (Western GPS), a group of closely affiliated companies, contact consumers directly or through third-party telemarketing companies. These Defendants, or the telemarketing companies they use, blast illegal robocalls to consumers on the DNC Registry. These robocalls use names like "Card Member Services" or "Card Services" to disguise Defendants' identities and mislead consumers into believing Defendants are connected with credit card companies. The robocalls sometimes claim to be calling in connection with a government program to reduce credit card interest rates. These "Card Member Services" or "Card Services" calls are responsible for hundreds of thousands of Do Not Call complaints to the FTC from beleaguered consumers.

Consumers who answer the phone are barraged with an aggressive, highly deceptive sales pitch intended to convince them that Defendants can drastically lower their credit card interest rates and save them thousands of dollars. Trusting consumers

Consumers who answer the phone are barraged with an aggressive, highly deceptive sales pitch intended to convince them that Defendants can drastically lower their credit card interest rates and save them thousands of dollars. Trusting consumers give Defendants their credit card account information, often after being led to believe that Defendants need the information to verify debts or perform services. Instead, immediately after the call, Defendants charge consumers an illegal advance fee ranging from \$595 to \$1995. Defendants then typically provide minimal or no service and fail to achieve the promised results. In addition, Defendants routinely refuse to allow consumers to cancel and fail to honor refund promises. Defendants' scam leaves consumers who were already deeply in debt in grave financial condition. These practices have generated hundreds of complaints against Defendants with the FTC, the Arizona Attorney General, and the Better Business Bureau (BBB). Not including Do Not Call complaints, consumers filed 68 FTC complaints against AWD, 26 FTC complaints against Concord, 20 FTC complaints against CAM Services, 1 FTC complaint against

AFB, and 24 FTC complaints against Western GPS.<sup>2</sup> The BBB rates both AWD and Western GPS an "F."<sup>3</sup>

Defendant AFB, LLC (AFB) supports the operations of the other Defendants.

Individual Defendants LeRoy Castine (Defendant Castine) and Chris Ambrosia

(Defendant Ambrosia) own and manage one or more of the corporate Defendants.

Together, all of the Defendants operate as a common enterprise.<sup>4</sup>

Plaintiff respectfully moves the Court to issue an *ex parte* temporary restraining order against Defendants under Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 65(b). Defendants have a history of deceiving consumers, the BBB, and law enforcement. Defendants also changed the operation's name to avert law enforcement attention and disassociate the operation from negative national media coverage. If provided with advance notice of this action, there is a serious risk that Defendants will destroy documents and dissipate or conceal assets, which would severely undermine the Court's ability to provide effective final relief to injured consumers. Plaintiff further moves for an asset freeze to preserve assets for consumer restitution, appointment of a temporary receiver, immediate access to Defendants' business premises, certain limited expedited discovery, and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. The requested relief is necessary to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> App. at 000600-601, ¶¶ 8-9 (McPeek). The FTC has also received 19,736 Do Not Call complaints that cite telephone numbers linked to Defendants through consumer complaints. See footnote 84 and accompanying text, infra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> App. at 000004, ¶ 11; 000256-258 (Attachment D); 000259-261(Attachment E) (Declaration of Koriann M. Morales, Vice-President, BBB, with Attachments A-F, App. at 000001-000263). The BBB previously rated Concord an "F," but currently assigns "No Rating" because it believes Concord may be out of business. *Id.* at 000004-5, ¶ 11, 000262-263 (Attachment F) (Morales). For a discussion of Concord's status, see discussion at Section II.B.2, *infra*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> See Section III, *infra*. The common enterprise likely stopped using the name AWD, Concord and CAM Services with consumers after February 2012 and is now calling consumers as Western GPS. See footnotes 18-21 and accompanying text, *infra*.

bring an immediate halt to Defendants' egregious conduct and to protect any unlawfully obtained assets pending a hearing on preliminary injunctive relief. This type of *ex parte* relief has been granted in this Circuit, including this District, as well as in federal district courts across the country in similar FTC cases.<sup>5</sup>

#### II. THE PARTIES

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#### A. Plaintiff

The FTC is an independent agency of the United States Government created by the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 41 et seq. The FTC enforces Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), which prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce. The FTC also enforces the Telemarketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108. Pursuant to the Telemarketing Act, the FTC promulgated and enforces the TSR, 16 C.F.R. Part 310, which prohibits deceptive and abusive telemarketing acts or practices. Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), authorizes the FTC, through its own attorneys, to initiate federal district court proceedings to enjoin violations of the FTC Act

granted by other district courts in the Ninth Circuit, see Moon Declaration at ¶ 17.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> For cases in this District, see FTC v. North America Marketing and Associates, LLC, No. CV-12-914-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. May 2, 2012); FTC v. Premier Nationwide Corp., No. CV-12-09-PHX-GMS (D. Ariz. Jan. 3, 2012); FTC v. Government Careers, Inc., No. CV-09-721-TUC-DCB (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2010); FTC v. Freedom Foreclosure Prevention Services, LLC, No. CV-09-1167-PHX-FJM (D. Ariz. June 1, 2009); FTC v. Helping Hands of Hope, Inc., No. CV-08-0909-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz. May 13, 2008); FTC v. Handicapped & Disabled Workshops, Inc., No. CV-08-0908-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. May 13, 2008); FTC v. The Results Group, LLC, No. CV-06-2843-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz. November 28, 2006). For additional cases in which ex parte preliminary relief has been granted in this District, see Certification and Declaration of Plaintiff's Counsel Jason C. Moon in Support of Plaintiff's: (A) Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order Application; and (B) Ex Parte Seal Order Application ("Moon Declaration") at ¶ 17, filed concurrently. Other district courts in the Ninth Circuit have issued similar ex parte TROs: FTC v. Moneymaker, No. 2:11-CV-00461-RLH-RJJ (D. Nev. Mar. 29, 2011); FTC v. U.S. Homeowners Relief, Inc., No. SACV-10-1452 JST (PJWx) (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2010); FTC v. Advanced Management Services NW LLC, No. CV-10-148-LRS (E.D. Wash. May 10, 2010); FTC v. Your Magazine Provider, Inc., No. CV-08-64-M-DWM (D. Mont. May 14, 2008); FTC v. Merchant Processing, Inc., No. CV 07-0533-BR (D. Ore. Apr. 11, 2007). For additional cases in which ex parte preliminary relief has been

and the TSR and to secure appropriate equitable relief, including rescission or reformation of contracts, restitution, the refund of monies paid, and the disgorgement of ill-gotten gains. 15 U.S.C. §§ 53(b), 56(a)(2)(A)-(B), 57b, 6102(c) and 6105(b).

B. Defendants

The FTC sued seven Defendants - five corporate Defendants and two individual Defendants. The corporate Defendants operate as a common enterprise. Individual Defendants Ambrosia and Castine own or manage one or more of the corporate Defendants.

1. Ambrosia Web Design, LLC is an Arizona company organized on March 30, 2011 by Defendant Ambrosia.<sup>6</sup> Although Defendant Ambrosia listed a Mesa residential address, 2906 South Revere Circle, on the formation documents, AWD uses two Tempe addresses, 123 East Baseline Road, Suite D-208, and 209 East Baseline Road, Suite E-

address, 2906 South Revere Circle, on the formation documents, AWD uses two Tempe addresses, 123 East Baseline Road, Suite D-208, and 209 East Baseline Road, Suite E-201, in correspondence with consumers. While investigating a fraud complaint against AWD in January 2012, Detective Christine Connors of the Tempe Police Department went to the office buildings at 123 East Baseline Road and 209 East Baseline Road. She observed an AWD call center in Suite D-208 in the 123 East Baseline Road building and an additional office in Suite E-201 in the 209 East Baseline Road building.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> App. at 000602-603 (McPeek).

 $<sup>^7</sup>$  Cf App. at 000618 (McPeek) with 000602 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>8</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000270 (Attachment B) (Bradley); 000379 (Attachment A) (Paglia).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>9</sup> App. at 000479-480, ¶ 2-5 (Declaration of Tempe Police Detective Christine Connors, with Attachment A, App. at 000479-533).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> *Id.* at 480, ¶ 5 (Connors). The two buildings have separate street addresses, but are physically connected by a hallway. *Id.* On later visits to the two office buildings, Detective Connors observed that there were no internal walls between Suites D-208, D-207, and D-206 in the 123 East Baseline Road building, and the office was actually occupying all three suites. *Id.* at 000483, ¶ 16 (Connors). As of October 2012, AWD was also using suite D-204. *Id.* at 000483-484, ¶ 17 (Connors).

Defendant Ambrosia is the sole listed member of Ambrosia Web Design, which is obviously named after him. 11 He handles charge-back requests against AWD 12 and corresponds with law enforcement agencies<sup>13</sup> and the BBB<sup>14</sup> on behalf of AWD. However, he shares ownership and management of AWD with Defendant Castine, who met with Detective Connors in January 2012 and admitted that he was a partner in the company with Defendant Ambrosia. <sup>15</sup> Defendant Castine described AWD's operations to Detective Connors in great detail, <sup>16</sup> and it appeared to her that he was supervising calling operations in one of the office suites. 17

Defendant Castine told Detective Connors in January 2012 that AWD was no longer operating under its own name, but was using the name "AFB LLC." Consumer complaints against "Ambrosia Web Design" or "AWD" dropped significantly after February 2012. 19 However, in April 2012 consumers began filing similar complaints

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> App. at 000603 (McPeek).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000279-280 (Attachment C) (Bradley).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>13</sup> App. at 000936 (Fisher complaint) (Declaration of Deborrah Miller, Arizona Attorney General's Office, with Attachment A, App. at 000933-1044).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>14</sup> App. at 000099 (Reagan complaint) (Morales).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> App. at 000480, ¶ 6 (Connors).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> *Id.* at 000480-481, ¶ 6-9 (Connors).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> *Id.* at 000480, ¶ 5 (Connors). 25

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> *Id.* at 000481, ¶ 8 (Connors).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> App. at 000601, ¶ 9 (McPeek).

against Western GPS,<sup>20</sup> which was formed by Defendant Castine in February 2012.<sup>21</sup>
The FTC has received only one complaint naming AFB.<sup>22</sup>
When Detective Connors returned to the premises on October 9, 2012, she saw that the names "AFB" and "AWD" still appeared on the suites at 123 East Baseline Road and 209 East Baseline Road, and that there were still employees working there.<sup>23</sup> She saw

2. Concord Financial Advisors LLC is an Arizona company organized by Defendant Castine on March 30, 2011.<sup>25</sup> He is the sole listed member.<sup>26</sup> He listed one of AWD's Tempe addresses, 123 E. Baseline Road, Suite D-208, as the official address on the formation documents.<sup>27</sup> The company markets the same credit card interest rate reduction services as AWD.

that AWD and AFB continue to operate, but the name they now use with consumers is

Like AWD, Concord is no longer actively receiving complaints, which may indicate that Defendants Ambrosia and Castine are no longer using the name in

Western GPS.24

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> Id. (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> App. at 000606-607 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> App. at 000600, ¶ 8 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>23</sup> App. at 000483, ¶ 16 (Connors).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> At the time Western GPS was formed in February 2012, AWD had received scrutiny from the national news media. For a description of media coverage of AWD, see footnotes 85-87 and accompanying text, *infra*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> App. at 000610-612 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> App. at 000611 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup> App. at 000610 (McPeek).

communications with consumers. However, the company is still listed as active by the State of Arizona.<sup>28</sup>

3. CAM Services Direct LLC is an Arizona company organized by Defendant Ambrosia on April 21, 2011.<sup>29</sup> The formation documents list 2906 South Revere Circle, Mesa, Arizona as the address,<sup>30</sup> but the company uses both the 123 East Baseline Road and 209 East Baseline Road addresses with consumers.<sup>31</sup>

Although Concord and CAM Services were separately incorporated by Castine and Ambrosia, respectively, the two companies are essentially the same operation. Consumers who speak with CAM Services representatives sometimes receive packets of information from Concord,<sup>32</sup> and vice versa.<sup>33</sup> Typically, CAM Services is the billing name that appears on consumers' receipts and credit card statements, which indicates that CAM Services holds a merchant account.<sup>34</sup> In at least one instance, CAM Services billed a consumer who was initially called by Concord.<sup>35</sup> CAM Services handles credit card

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> App. at 000612 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> App. at 000613 (McPeek).

<sup>30</sup> Id. (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000331, 333 (Attachment A) (Clifton).

 $<sup>^{32}</sup>$  Cf App. at 000326, ¶ 3 (spoke with CAM Services) with 000331 (Attachment A) (first page of packet received from Concord) (Clifton).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> Cf App. at 000359, ¶ 4 (spoke with Concord) with 000367 (Attachment B) (first page of packet received from CAM Services) (McClellan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>34</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000333 (Attachment A) (Clifton); 000446 (Attachment B) (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> Cf App. at 000359, ¶ 4 (spoke with Concord) with 000369 (Attachment B) (billed by CAM Services) (McClellan).

4. Western GPS LLC is an Arizona company organized by Defendant Castine on February 8, 2012.<sup>38</sup> Defendant Castine listed 1935 E. Redmon, Tempe, Arizona, a residential mailing address on the formation documents,<sup>39</sup> and the company uses this address on correspondence.<sup>40</sup> However, two consumers who purchased Western GPS's services obtained the 123 East Baseline Road address.<sup>41</sup>

As discussed below, Western GPS, the most recently formed company, appears to be a reincarnation of AWD. It uses the same customer service telephone numbers and even some of the same sales representatives as AWD.<sup>42</sup>

5. AFB LLC was formed by Defendant Castine on January 28, 2010.<sup>43</sup> He is the sole listed member.<sup>44</sup> He listed a residential address, 3021 S. Woodruff Circle, Mesa, Arizona on the formation documents.<sup>45</sup> On October 9, 2012, its name appeared on the

 $<sup>^{36}</sup>$  Cf App. at 000359, ¶ 4 ("Concord") with 000370 (Attachment C) ("CAM Services") (McClellan). CAM Service's response letter to Ms. McClellan's dispute was from Chris Ambrosia. *Id.* at App. 000370 (McClellan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>37</sup> App. at 000480, ¶ 6 (Connors).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>38</sup> App. at 000606-607 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>39</sup> Cf App. at 000620 (McPeek) with App. at 000606 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>40</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000300 (Attachment C) (Carter).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> See App. at 000291, ¶ 26 (Carter); 000981 (Anderson complaint) (Miller) (given address by representative Orlando Brown).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> See footnotes 59-62 and accompanying text, infra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>43</sup> App. at 000609 (McPeek).

<sup>44</sup> Id. (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> Cf App. at 000619 (McPeek) with App. at 000608 (McPeek).

door of Suite D-208 at 123 East Baseline Road. Defendant Castine told Detective Connors that AWD was operating under the name AFB. AFB and Defendant Castine registered the domain name for Concord's website, <a href="www.concordfinancialadvisors.net">www.concordfinancialadvisors.net</a>, and a sample invoice included on Western GPS's website is marked at the top with an AFB logo. Defendants Ambrosia and Castine both listed an AFB email address, <a href="mailto:office@afbllconline.com">office@afbllconline.com</a>, in their contact information for a telephone account that included telephone number 888-583-1956. AWD provides this telephone number to consumers.

- 6. Chris Ambrosia lives at 2335 W. Nopal Avenue, Mesa, Arizona.<sup>52</sup> He is an owner and managing member of AWD and CAM Services, as discussed above.
- 7. LeRoy Castine lives at 8155 E. Obispo Avenue, Mesa, Arizona.<sup>53</sup> He is an owner and manager of AWD, and an owner and managing member of Concord, AFB, and Western GPS, as discussed above.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> App. at 000483, ¶ 16 (Connors).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> *Id.* at 000481, ¶ 8 (Connors).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>48</sup> App. at 000562 (Certification of Authenticity of Business Records by Keena R.Willis, GoDaddy.com, App. at 000552-566).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> App. at 000600, ¶ 7, 000643 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> Cf App. at 000918, ¶¶ 7-9 (Thacker) (Defendant Ambrosia listed office@afbllconline.com on account) with 000918-919, ¶ 10 (Defendant Castine listed same email address on same account); 000540-544 (Certification of Authenticity of Business Records by Heather M. Blais, Freedom Voice Systems, Inc., App. at 000538-550).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000400 (Attachment A) (Reagan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> App. at 000615 (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> App. at 000616 (McPeek).

#### III. COMMON ENTERPRISE

Defendants AWD, Concord, CAM Services, and Western GPS operate as a "common enterprise," as defined by case law.<sup>54</sup> They conduct their business practices through an interrelated network of companies that have common ownership, managers, business functions, representatives, customer service telephone numbers, and office locations, and they correspond with third parties on each other's behalf. Defendants Ambrosia and Castine formulate, direct, control, have authority to control, and participate in the practices of the corporate Defendants.

## A. Common ownership and management

As discussed in Section II, subsections 2, 4, and 5, *supra*, Defendant Castine is the sole listed member on the formation documents of three of the five corporate Defendants, Concord, AFB, and Western GPS. He also admitted he is an owner and manager of AWD. His company Concord is essentially an alter-ego of CAM Services. <sup>55</sup> Defendant Ambrosia is the sole listed member of AWD and CAM Services, and is connected with Concord through CAM Services. Also, in at least one instance, Defendant Ambrosia sent a letter to the BBB on behalf of Concord. <sup>56</sup>

#### B. Common Business Functions, Representatives, and Telephone Numbers

AWD, Concord, CAM Services, and Western GPS offer very similar credit card interest rate reduction services. The companies market their services in much the same manner, including using robocalls and falsely claiming to be associated with the federal government.<sup>57</sup> In fact, Western GPS uses some of the same sales representatives or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> The law of common enterprise is discussed in Section VII.B.2, *infra*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> See footnotes 32-37 and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> App. at 000199 (McKenna complaint) (Morales).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> See footnotes 72, 74, 89, 90 and accompanying text, infra.

"financial advisors" as AWD. Representative Brian Scoloff is named in complaints against both AWD and Western GPS. In November 2011, attorney Ashley Adams responded to an inquiry by AWD's payment processor and provided a batch of letters signed by persons purporting to be AWD representatives, including Orlando Brown and Larry Penman. Lorene Carter, a Western GPS customer, dealt with Mr. Brown (she wrote his name down as "Orlanzo") and Mr. Penman. AWD and Western GPS also provide consumers with the same customer service telephone number, 800-273-3214. This evidence indicates that Western GPS is simply a continuation of AWD. Moreover, Western GPS has adopted much of Concord's business model; for example, the packets it sends to consumers are almost identical to the packets sent to Concord customers.

Concord and CAM Services also share employees and telephone numbers with AWD. Two of AWD employees, Norman Eckles and Michael Bogner, <sup>63</sup> are listed as

<sup>15</sup> Cf App. at 000396-397, ¶ 14 (Reagan) (naming "Brian Scoloff" as AWD representative) with App. at 000889 (Waddams complaint) (McPeek) (naming "Brian Scolof" as Western GPS representative); see also App. at 000903 (Dickinson complaint)

<sup>(</sup>McPeek) (naming "Ryan Scoloff" as Western GPS representative).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> App. at 000926, 931 (Attachment A) (Declaration of James Stavig, Fraud Risk Manager, Citi Cards N.A., citing CITI-000001 through 12, App. at 000919-932). These company policy acknowledgement letters, signed by AWD employees, were provided to a Fraud Risk Manager for Citi Cards in response to concerns that Citi expressed about AWD's practices. *Id.* at 000919-920, ¶¶ 4,5 (Stavig).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> App. at 000286- 287, 290, ¶¶ 5-6, 19 (Carter); see also App. at 000898 (Western GPS) (Spears complaint) (McPeek) (naming "Orlando Brown").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>61</sup> Cf App. at 000781 (AWD) (Reagan complaint) (McPeek) with 000891, 892 (Western GPS) (Gaven, Hedington complaints) (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>62</sup> Cf App. at 000331-349 (Attachment A) (Clifton) (Concord packet) with App. at 000300-322 (Attachment C) (Carter) (Western GPS packet).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>63</sup> App. at 000925, 930 (Attachment A) (Stavig).

Concord "financial advisors" on Concord's website.<sup>64</sup> Lee Miceli corresponds with the BBB on behalf of both the Concord and AWD "billing departments."<sup>65</sup> In addition, CAM Services uses the same business telephone number as AWD, 888-583-1956.<sup>66</sup> C. Common Office Locations

As discussed in Section IIB, subsections 1-3 and 5, *supra*, AWD, Concord, CAM Services, and AFB all operate out of the same addresses on East Baseline Road in Tempe. Western GPS uses a different address in correspondence with consumers, but two Western GPS consumers obtained the 123 E Baseline Road address from Western GPS.<sup>67</sup>

# D. Distinction between Companies Blurred in Correspondence

Defendants do not preserve the distinction between companies in their correspondence. Consumers who believe they are dealing with CAM Services sometimes get correspondence from Concord, and vice versa.<sup>68</sup> In one instance, consumer Sharon McClellan received a sales pitch from Concord and was billed by CAM Services.<sup>69</sup> Ms. McClellan's complaint to the BBB about CAM Services was responded to in a letter from "AWD" in which the company referred to itself as "CAM Services," thereby linking all

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>64</sup> App. at 000622 (McPeek). On the website, Mr. Eckles' first name is abbreviated to "Norm" and his last name is spelled "Ekles," and Mr. Bogner's name is spelled "Bougner." *Id*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>65</sup> Cf App. at 000060 (AWD) (Hanger complaint) (Morales) with 000187 (Concord) (McCarter complaint) (Morales).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>66</sup> Cf App. at 000270 (AWD) (Bradley Complaint) (Morales) with 000475 (Attachment H) (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>67</sup> See footnote 41 and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>68</sup> See footnotes 32, 33 and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>69</sup> App. at 000359, 000362, ¶¶ 4, 13, (McClellan).

three companies together. <sup>70</sup> In another example, during the course of Detective Connors' investigation of AWD, Defendant Castine provided her with a sample CAM Services consumer file to illustrate the type of services AWD claimed to provide. <sup>71</sup>

#### IV. JURISDICTION AND VENUE

This Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the FTC's claims according to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1337(a), and 1345. Personal jurisdiction over Defendants exists under the FTC Act's provision for nationwide service of process, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). Venue is proper in the District of Arizona. Under the FTC Act, an action may be brought where a corporation or person "resides or transacts business." 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). As described above, Defendants reside and do business in this district.

#### V. DEFENDANTS' ILLEGAL PRACTICES

#### A. Robocalls

With their first contact with consumers, Defendants violate the TSR. Defendants, or telemarketers acting on their behalf, make nationwide robocalls to consumers who have not consented in writing to receive robocalls from Defendants. The messages offer to reduce consumers' credit card interest rates, and request that consumers press a number if they are interested in the company's services. The robocalls sometimes state that this is the consumers "last chance" or "last notice" to reduce their rates, and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>70</sup> App. at 000188, 000192 (McClellan complaint) (Morales).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>71</sup> App. at 000480, 482, ¶¶ 6, 12 (Connors) (identifying Attachment A, subpart g as "sample client documents sent by Ambrosia Web Design (24 pages)"), 000509-533 (Attachment A, subpart g) (Connors).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>72</sup> App. at 000286, 000287, ¶¶ 3, 6 (Carter) (Western GPS); 000326, ¶¶ 2-3 (Clifton) (CAM Services); 000359, ¶¶ 2, 4 (McClellan) (Concord); 000372, ¶¶ 2-3 (Paglia) (AWD); 000390-392, ¶¶ 3, 6, 7 (Ramsey) (Concord); 000436, 437 ¶¶ 3-4, 6 (Tester) (CAM Services). The TSR prohibits sending prerecorded messages to consumers unless consumers have previously given telemarketers written consent to receive the messages. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(v).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>73</sup> App. at 000390, ¶ 3 (Ramsey); 000326, ¶ 2 (Clifton).

sometimes state that the services are being offered as part of a "stimulus package" or government program.<sup>74</sup> Often consumers receive several of these calls before finally pressing "1" to speak to a representative.<sup>75</sup>

In a response letter to a consumer complaint filed against AWD with the Arizona Attorney General, Defendant Ambrosia admitted that AWD used a third-party "automatic dialer" to deliver prerecorded messages to consumers. Defendant Castine admitted to Detective Connors that AWD used a third-party telemarketer that used the name "Card Member Services." Consumer Gregory Ramsey, who is on the DNC Registry, received so many calls from a company calling itself "Card Services" that he started pressing "1" to try to identify the calling company and stop the calls. By pretending he was interested in the caller's services, Ramsey got a representative to admit he worked for Concord, and the representative provided a telephone number. Ramsey called the telephone number and was connected with CAM Services. Consumer Lydia Reagan

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>74</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000390, ¶ 3 (Ramsey); 000436, ¶ 3 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>75</sup> App. at 000390-391, ¶¶ 3, 6 (Ramsey); 000436, ¶¶ 3-4 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> App. at 000936 (Fisher complaint) (Miller).

App. at 000480, ¶ 7 (Connors). Defendant Castine claimed that AWD stopped using the service in January 2012 because of complaints about abusive representatives, and began to make calls directly from its Tempe, Arizona office. *Id.* at 000481, ¶ 8 (Connors). However, Western GPS, which was formed by Defendant Castine in February 2012, continues to use prerecorded messages. App. at 000286, 287 ¶¶ 3-6 (Carter).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> App. at 000390-391, ¶¶ 3-5 (Ramsey). In addition to the robocalls, Defendants make live telephone calls to consumers on the DNC Registry. *See, e.g.*, App. at 000419, 000422 ¶¶ 3, 20 (Smith).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> App. at 000391-392, ¶ 7 (Ramsey).

 $<sup>^{80}</sup>$  *Id.* at 000392, ¶ 8 (Ramsey).

spoke with a representative who used the name "Card Member Services," but later turned out to be calling on behalf of AWD.<sup>81</sup>

Defendants have likely committed thousands of violations of the DNC Registry.

Consumers have filed 522,408 Do Not Call complaints against companies using the names "Card Member Services" and "Card Services." The FTC has received 310 Do Not Call complaints specifically naming the corporate Defendants. The FTC has received 19,736 Do Not Call complaints that cite telephone numbers that are linked with the corporate Defendants. On November 29, 2011, Los Angeles Times reporter David Lazarus published an article describing the nationwide impact of the "Card Member Services" telemarketing scheme. According to the article, consumers nationwide receive robocalls from "Rachel" with "Card Member Services," offering credit card interest rate reduction services. The reporter called a telephone number obtained from one of the robocalls and was connected with a representative who said she was "Ambrosia Web Design" and "AWD CAM Services."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>81</sup> App. at 000393-395, ¶¶ 3, 8 (Reagan).

App. at 000917, ¶ 6 (Thacker). Plaintiff does not contend that all "Card Member Services" or "Card Services" calls can be attributed to the Corporate Defendants, because there are several companies offering similar services that use similar telemarketing tactics.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>83</sup> *Id.* at 000916-917, ¶ 4 (Thacker).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>84</sup> Id. at 000917, ¶ 5 (Thacker).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> See App. at 000601, ¶ 10 (McPeek); 000534-535 (David Lazarus, Hard to Stop Telemarketing Calls from 'Rachel,' Los Angeles Times, Nov. 29, 2011).

<sup>86</sup> Id. at 000534 (L.A. Times Article).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> Id. at 000535 (L.A. Times Article).

#### **B.** Live Sales Presentations

Once consumers press "1" or answer a live call from Defendants' sales representatives, Defendants launch into their aggressive, deceitful sales pitch. The sole purpose of the pitch is to obtain consumers' credit card account information, so Defendants can immediately charge an exorbitant fee to consumers' existing credit cards.

Defendants try to build trust with skeptical consumers. They often<sup>88</sup> claim that they are calling on behalf of a U.S. government agency<sup>89</sup> or are offering services in connection with a federal government program to reduce credit card interest rates.<sup>90</sup> As noted above, Defendants also mislead consumers by using generic names that suggest Defendants are affiliated with credit card companies, like "Card Member Services" or "Card Services." In one instance, AWD combined the two misrepresentations by telling a consumer that it was "Account Services Quality Services" for Visa, and was calling on behalf of the Federal Trade Commission.<sup>91</sup> Western GPS representatives sometimes say they are "Account Management Assistance."

Defendants ask consumers for balances and interest rates on their credit cards.<sup>93</sup>
In numerous instances, Defendants promise the company can save consumers a specific

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>88</sup> Defendants' business practices are not uniform even for consumers supposedly dealing with the same Defendants. Defendants' representations to consumers vary, as do their descriptions of the services they provide, and the actions they take on consumers' accounts. See generally App. at 000264-478 (consumer declarations).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> App. at 000264, ¶ 2 (Bradley); 000286, ¶ 3 (Carter).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>90</sup> See App. at 000393, ¶ 3 (Reagan); 000436, ¶¶ 3-4 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> App. at 000264, ¶ 2 (Bradley).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> App. at 000883 (Lynch complaint) (McPeek).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>93</sup> App. at 000286, ¶ 4 (Carter); 000354, ¶ 3 (Johnson); 000359, ¶ 4 (McClellan); 000393-394, ¶ 4 (Reagan).

amount between \$2500 to \$5000 through reduced interest rates.<sup>94</sup> In other instances, Defendants promise a specific very low interest rate, such as zero percent.<sup>95</sup>

These promises are wholly unsubstantiated. Often, the only credit-related information Defendants obtain from consumers before Defendants make these promises is the terms of existing credit cards. According to Lisa Wilhelm, a consultant with extensive experience and expertise in the field of credit card practices, actual credit card issuers engage in a sophisticated analysis of a variety of factors related to a consumer's payment history (including non-credit accounts), credit history, creditworthiness, financial profile, and relationships with financial institutions. Without an understanding of these factors, it would be impossible for Defendants to predict whether a creditor would lower interest rates or issue a new, low-rate credit card for an individual consumer. In Ms. Wilhelm's experience, Defendants' blanket promises to deliver a specific interest rate reduction such as 0% to 7% or a minimum interest savings amount such as \$2500 or more would be impossible to deliver without a case-by-case assessment by the creditor.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> App. at 000264, ¶ 3 (Bradley) (\$2500); 000286, ¶ 5 (Carter) (\$5000); 000359-360, ¶ 4 (McClellan) (\$5000); 000372, ¶ 4 (Paglia) (\$2500); 000393-394, ¶¶ 3, 7 (Reagan) (\$2500); 000419-420, ¶ 4 (Smith) (\$3000).

<sup>21 | 95</sup> App. at 000326, ¶ 3 (Clifton) (0%); 000354, ¶ 4 (Johnson) (0%).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>96</sup> See App. at 000264, ¶ 3 (Bradley); 000326, ¶ 3 (Clifton); 000361, ¶ 8 (McClellan); 000419, ¶ 4 (Smith).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> App. at 000580, ¶ 17 (Declaration of Lisa Wilhelm, with Attachment A, App. at 000570-597) (listing multiple factors considered by credit card issuers).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>98</sup> *Id.* at 000584-585, ¶ 22 (Wilhelm).

<sup>99</sup> Id. (Wilhelm).

balance transfer cards would be impossible to obtain without the prior approval of the creditor offering the card. 100

As discussed in more detail in Section V.F, *infra*, Defendants often guarantee that they will provide a full or partial refund if they do not obtain the promised interest rate reduction or interest savings. In other presentations, Defendants say nothing about a refund or cancellation policy. Regardless of what the Defendants say about refunds, Defendants often later take the position that they have a no-refund, no-cancellation policy.

Defendants give consumers a variety of explanations about how they will obtain lower interest rates. Sometimes they do not specify how they will lower interest rates. <sup>101</sup> Other times they specifically promise a new reduced interest rate credit card. <sup>102</sup> Still other times they specifically promise to contact existing creditors and negotiate lower interest rates. <sup>103</sup> Occasionally they say they will use a combination of these methods. <sup>104</sup>

Defendants often claim to have special relationships with credit card companies that allow them to obtain the lower rates. <sup>105</sup> It is highly unlikely that Defendants have

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>100</sup> *Id.* at 585 (Wilhelm).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> App. at 000361, ¶ 9 (McClellan); 000436-437, ¶ 4 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> App. at 000354, ¶ 4 (Johnson).

App. at 264, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Bradley). AWD did not explain in the sales presentation to consumers Paglia and Reagan how it was going to obtain a lower interest rate for them, but later sent them a Service Agreement in which it offered to negotiate with their existing creditors. App. at 000372-373, ¶ 5, 000387 (Attachment A) (Paglia); 000394, ¶ 6, 000411 (Attachment A) (Reagan).

 $<sup>^{104}</sup>$  App. at 000327, ¶ 5 (Clifton).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> App. at 000419, ¶ 4 (Smith) ("excellent relations"); 000374, ¶ 10 (Paglia) ("inside connections"); 000327, ¶ 5 (Clifton) (CAM Services had "companies all over the world that could lend money").

any such connections. In fact, most financial institutions view involvement by companies like Defendants "in a negative light." In many cases, Defendants simply apply for new credit cards with other companies on consumers' behalf, <sup>107</sup> which is something consumers can easily do themselves. <sup>108</sup>

# C. Unauthorized Billing and Advance Fees

During the sales presentation, Defendants ask consumers for detailed credit card account information, including account numbers and expiration dates. Consumers often do not understand that Defendants will use this information to charge a fee to consumers' existing credit cards. Defendants tell consumers, or allow consumers to believe based on the context of the request, that the information will be used to verify consumers' debts or financial information and for providing services. Sometimes Defendants do not disclose there will be an out-of-pocket fee. Other times they claim there will be no out-of-pocket fee. Even when a fee is disclosed, they sometimes create confusion about how and when it will be paid, claiming the fee will be "absorbed" by later interest savings.

Consumers provide credit card account information, sometimes with great reluctance, after being pressured by multiple representatives. 113 Defendants then use it to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> App. at 000591-592, ¶ 32 (Wilhelm).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>107</sup> See footnote 125 and accompanying text, infra.

 $<sup>^{108}</sup>$  Id. at 000592-593, ¶ 33.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>109</sup> App. at 000360-361, ¶ 7 (McClellan); 000394, ¶ 5 (Reagan); 000437-438, ¶ 8 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> App. at 000355, ¶ 5 (Johnson).

<sup>111</sup> App. at 000437, ¶ 7 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>112</sup> App. at 360, ¶ 6 (McClellan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>113</sup> App. at 000265, ¶¶ 5, 6 (Bradley); 000359-360, ¶¶ 3, 5 (McClellan).

charge a fee ranging from \$595 to \$1995 to one of consumers' existing credit cards, typically on the very same day. 114 Defendants request, obtain, and use this payment information in advance of providing any services. 115

#### **D.** Information Packets

In the first few days after the sales presentations and after Defendants have charged their fee to consumers' credit cards, Defendants often send packets of materials to consumers. AWD often sends a Personal and Financial Profile asking for detailed financial information (including consumers' Social Security numbers), a "Service Agreement," and an invoice. Western GPS and Concord/CAM Services often send a packet that includes a "Summary of Savings" and a "Debt Analysis Report." These documents devote several pages to explaining how consumers can reduce their long-term interest payments by making larger balance payments each month. Consumers do not

<sup>\$\</sup>frac{114}{114}\$ App. at \$000265\$, \$\quad 6\$ (Bradley) (\$995\$, same day); \$000288\$, \$\quad 11\$ (Carter) (\$595\$, same day); \$000327\$, \$\quad 5\$ (Clifton) (\$1995\$, same day); \$000355\$, \$\quad 7-8\$ (Johnson) (\$1995\$, within a "couple of days"); \$000362\$, \$\quad 13\$ (McClellan) (\$1995\$, same day); \$000395\$, \$398\$ \$\quad \quad 9\$, \$18\$ (Reagan) (\$695\$, same day); \$000421\$, \$\quad 13\$ (Smith) (\$1498\$, same day); \$000438-439\$, \$\quad \quad 13\$, \$18\$ (Tester) (\$1495\$, same day).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> See generally App. at 000264-478 (consumer declarations). Defendants sometimes call consumers' credit card companies or other credit card companies on the same telephone call, but not until after consumers have agreed to pay Defendants' fees. See, e.g., App. at 000287, ¶¶ 6, 7 (Carter); 000327, ¶¶ 5, 6 (Clifton).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>116</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000379-389 (Attachment A) (Paglia); 000400-416 (Attachment A), (Reagan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>117</sup> App. at 000300-322 (Attachment C) (Carter); 000331-349 (Attachment A) (Clifton); 000447-462 (Attachment C) (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> App. at 000306-320 (Attachment C) (Carter); 000337-349 (Attachment A) (Clifton); 000451-462 (Attachment C) (Tester).

find this information useful.<sup>119</sup> After CAM Services promised to reduce consumer Shirley Tester's credit card interest rates, charged her \$1495, and failed to negotiate lower interest rates as it promised her, it resisted her charge-back request by claiming its packet fulfilled the services it promised her.<sup>120</sup> Unfortunately, this misrepresentation by CAM Services to Ms. Tester's credit card company caused the company to reinstate the charge.<sup>121</sup>

#### E. Lack of Results

After promising consumers specific results and charging an advance fee,

Defendants sometimes simply do nothing and keep the money. When Defendants do

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> App. at 000327-328, ¶ 7 (Clifton); 000289, ¶ 17 (Carter). The report Western GPS sent to Ms. Carter also claimed that it had reduced her interest rate on one of her credit cards when in fact it had not. App. at 000289, ¶ 16, 000321-322 (Attachment C) (Carter).

App. at 000436-438, 442, ¶¶ 4, 7, 13, 27, 000476 (Attachment H) (Tester). Also, Defendants defend their charges by claiming that they provide financial advice rather than the credit card interest rate reduction services that they sold. AWD falsely claimed in a letter to the BBB that it provided Lydia Reagan advice on how to lower her credit card interest rates. See App. at 000398, ¶21 (Reagan); 000103 (Reagan BBB complaint) (Morales). Western GPS told the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services that it is an "advisement company" that "educates our clients on ways they can save money by paying less interest on their debt than they will otherwise pay." App. at 000325, (Attachment E) (Carter).

<sup>121</sup> App. at 000436, 000441, ¶¶ 2, 26 (Tester). CAM Services/Concord's conduct toward Ms. Tester, a senior citizen living on Social Security income, was particularly egregious. CAM Services told her it was working with the government, and that there would be no out of pocket fee. *Id.* at 000436-437, ¶¶ 4, 6, 7 (Tester). Sears lowered her credit limit at least in part because of too many credit inquiries; she believes this was a result of CAM Services repeatedly trying to open a credit card for her, which it had not disclosed it would do. *Id.* at 000442-443, ¶ 28 (Tester). As a result of her lowered credit limit and the \$1495 fee by CAM Services, her balance exceeded her credit limit and her minimum payments quadrupled; she is now facing severe financial hardship. *See Id.* at 000443, ¶ 29 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>122</sup> App. at 000268, ¶ 15 (Bradley); 000397, ¶ 16 (Reagan); 000421-422, ¶¶ 16, 17 (Smith).

act on a customer's account, the actions are usually minimal. For example, on one occasion, while still on the initial telephone call with the consumer, Concord initiated a three-way call with the consumer's credit card company. The Concord representative asked for an interest rate reduction for the consumer, but the request was denied. 124

Most often, however, Defendants simply apply for new credit cards on consumers' behalf. These credit card applications frequently result in denials. On some occasions, Defendants obtain zero-interest, introductory rate cards for consumers. Although these cards could theoretically provide consumers with some level of interest savings, there often are problems. For example, the introductory rate cards may balloon to extraordinarily high interest rates after the introductory period ends; consumers often reject these introductory rate cards because they believe they cannot pay off the balance during the introductory period. Another problem is the low credit limit that sometimes accompanies introductory rate cards. In one case, Defendants only obtained a new introductory rate credit card with a \$3900 credit limit, but the consumer had

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>123</sup> App. at 000327, ¶ 6 (Clifton).

<sup>18 | 124</sup> *Id.* (Clifton).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>125</sup> App. at 000288, ¶ 12 (Carter); 000328, ¶ 8 (Clifton); 000356, ¶ 10 (Johnson); 000361, ¶ 11 (McClellan); 000375, ¶ 13 (Paglia); 000440, ¶ 20 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>126</sup> App. at 000361, ¶ 11 (McClellan); 000375, ¶ 13 (Paglia); 000440, ¶ 20 (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>127</sup> Western GPS, in particular, has sometimes been able to obtain introductory rate cards for longer time periods and with higher credit limits.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>128</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000288, ¶ 12, 13 (Carter) (rate jumped to 21.99%); 000356, ¶ 12 (Johnson) (rate jumped to 24.99%). Even if consumers were to keep and use the introductory rate cards Defendants sometimes obtain, they would almost certainly not achieve the interest savings Defendants typically promise. For a discussion of three hypothetical scenarios demonstrating the problems with introductory rate cards, see App. at 000588-590, ¶ 27-29 (Wilhelm).

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approximately \$11,000 in credit card debt. Another consumer received a new credit card with a \$500 limit, but had \$7000 in credit card debt. 130

#### F. Refunds and Cancellation

Defendants make specific refund promises to some consumers during the sales presentations. 131 In some instances. Defendants make or affirm these refund promises in subsequent documents sent to consumers. 132 Defendants typically do not honor these refund promises. When Defendants fail to obtain the promised results and consumers try to get refunds, cancel participation, or reverse the credit cards charges, Defendants typically refuse to give refunds and resist credit card charge-backs. For example, some consumers are promised refunds that never come. 133 Other consumers are denied refunds or charge-backs because they supposedly failed to comply with the company's refund or cancellation policies, even though the company provided no services. 134

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>129</sup> App. at 000286, 288, ¶¶ 4, 12 (Carter).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> App. at 000328, ¶ 8 (Clifton).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> App. at 000326-327, ¶ 4 (Clifton); 000372, ¶ 4 (Paglia); 000419, ¶ 4 (Smith).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> App. at 000372, ¶ 4, 000387 (Attachment A) (Paglia); App. at 000394, ¶ 7 and 000411 (Attachment A) (Reagan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>133</sup> App. at 000329, ¶¶ 11, 12 (Clifton); 000376-377, ¶¶ 18, 19 (Paglia); 000396, ¶ 13 (Reagan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>134</sup> App. at 000421, ¶ 16 (Smith). AWD's treatment of consumer Paul Smith was particularly brazen. AWD promised a partial refund to Mr. Smith if it did not achieve the promised interest savings. Id. at 000419, 420, ¶¶ 4-5 (Smith). Mr. Smith decided to purchase AWD's services and provided the AWD representative with his credit card information. Id. (Smith). When Mr. Smith changed his mind and tried to cancel while still on the original sales call, the AWD representative told him the company had a nocancellation policy. Id. at 000420, ¶¶ 7-9 (Smith). In the subsequent charge dispute, AWD took the position that Mr. Smith had failed to comply with a 10-day cancellation policy and was therefore not due a refund. Id. at 421, ¶ 16, 000430 (Attachment B). (Smith).

In some instances, Defendants fail to disclose anything about a refund or cancellation policy in the sales presentation, but when consumers later try to cancel or get a refund or charge-back. Defendants deny the request and falsely claim that they disclosed a no-cancellation or no-refund policy. 135 Defendants make these false claims even when they previously sent consumers documents that state refund or cancellation policies. 136

Defendants make other false and deceptive statements in response to credit card charge disputes and BBB complaints, including: 1) that consumers verbally authorized the charge when in fact they did not: 137 2) that Defendants provide financial advice or information, when that is not what Defendants promised consumers; 138 4) that consumers did not request a refund or cancellation, when in fact they did; 139 or 5) that Defendants

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> App. at 000363, ¶ 18, 000371 (Attachment D) (McClellan); 000398, ¶ 19 (Reagan); 000101 (Reagan BBB complaint) (Morales); 000442, ¶ 27, 000476 (Attachment H) (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> App. at 000398, ¶ 19, 000412 (Attachment A) (Reagan) (invoice stated 10-day refund period); 000363, ¶ 18, 000368 (Attachment B) (McClellan) (invoice stated 10-day refund request period).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>137</sup> App. at 000363, ¶ 17, 000371 (Attachment D) (McClellan); 000442, ¶ 27, 000476 (Attachment H) (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>138</sup> App. at 000291, ¶ 24, 000325 (Attachment E) (Carter); 000398, ¶ 21 (Reagan); 000101 (Reagan complaint) (Morales); 000442, ¶ 27, 000476 (Attachment H) (Tester).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>139</sup> App. at 000267, ¶ 11, 000282 (Attachment C) (Bradley); 000398, ¶ 20 (Reagan); 000101(Reagan BBB complaint) (Morales); 000420-422, ¶¶ 7-9, 17, 000430 (Attachment B) (Smith); 000442, ¶ 27, 000476 (Attachment H) (Tester).

provided services to the consumer, when in fact they did not. <sup>140</sup> Unfortunately, these badfaith rebuttals were sometimes successful. <sup>141</sup>

## VI. DEFENDANTS HAVE VIOLATED THE FTC ACT AND TSR

#### A. Violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act

Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), prohibits "unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." Misrepresentations or deceptive omissions of material fact constitute deceptive acts or practices prohibited by Section 5. Acts or practices are unfair under Section 5 if they cause substantial injury to consumers that consumers cannot reasonably avoid themselves, and that injury is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n).

## Count One - Misrepresenting Material Facts

Defendants make a number of false and unsubstantiated<sup>142</sup> promises to consumers to convince them to use Defendants' purported credit card interest rate reduction services.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>140</sup> App. at 000267, ¶ 11, 000282 (Attachment C) (Bradley); 000398, ¶ 21 (Reagan); 000101 (Reagan BBB complaint) (Morales); 000421, ¶ 16, 000430 (Attachment B) (Smith).

 $<sup>^{141}</sup>$  App. at 000267-268,  $\P\P$  12, 15 (Bradley); 000441,  $\P$  26 (Tester).

The Commission's substantiation doctrine states that when an objective claim is made, there is an implication that the speaker relies on a reasonable basis supporting the claim. Failure to possess and rely upon a reasonable basis for an objective claim constitutes an unfair and deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. See 1984 Policy Statement Regarding Advertising Substantiation, appended to In re Thompson Medical Co., 1984 F.T.C. Lexis 6, \*434 (1984), aff'd, 791 F.2d 189 (D.C. Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1086 (1987). In the instant case, Defendants frequently make unsubstantiated claims that they can lower consumers' credit card interest rates or save consumers thousands of dollars, before Defendants know anything about the consumers' credit worthiness. See footnotes 96-100 and accompanying text, supra. While some consumers may have high enough credit scores to qualify for a new credit card with a low introductory rate or to receive a low promotional rate on balance transfers to existing credit cards, Defendants often make their outlandish promises with little or no information about the consumer. In any event, regardless of their creditworthiness, consumers scammed by Defendants rarely, if ever, receive all that Defendants promise.

Defendants frequently claim that they can save consumers thousands of dollars, typically anywhere from \$2500 to \$5000, by lowering their credit card interest rates. Defendants also frequently claim that they can obtain a very low interest rate, such as zero percent, for all, or substantially all, of the consumers' stated credit card debt.<sup>143</sup>

Defendants rarely, if ever, make good on their promises. Often Defendants do little or nothing on behalf of consumers. When Defendants fail to deliver the promised results, these deeply indebted consumers are left far worse off than before. Even in instances where Defendants render some service, they rarely, if ever, deliver all that they promise consumers.<sup>144</sup>

Defendants' false and unsubstantiated claims are deceptive. To prove deception, the FTC must show "first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice is material." FTC v. Stefanchik, 559 F.3d 924, 928 (9th Cir. 2009).

This three-prong test is easily met. First, Defendants make express representations that they can substantially lower consumers' credit card interest rates and save them thousands of dollars. Second, these representations are false and unsubstantiated and, therefore, are likely to, and in fact did, mislead consumers. In addition, these representations are believable because Defendants claim to be affiliated with the government or to have relationships with the credit card companies. Consumers who accept Defendants' offer, act reasonably under the circumstances because they are promised they will save far more than Defendants' charge for the services or they will receive a refund. Third, Defendants representations are material. Consumers simply

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> See footnotes 94-95 and accompanying text, supra.

See footnotes 120-130 and accompanying text, supra.

would not pay \$595 to \$1995 unless they believed Defendants' claims that the services will save them substantially more than the cost of the services. Thus, Defendants' false and unsubstantiated claims used to market and sell their so-called credit card interest rate reduction services are misleading and constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act. 145

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The FTC can prove its claims through a small number of injured consumers; the FTC is not required to demonstrate that each individual consumer relied on Defendants' representations or omissions. FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 605-06 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1110 (1994); FTC v. Int'l Diamond Corp., No. C-82-0878 WAI (JSB), 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P65,725, 1983 WL 1911, at \*6-7 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 1983). The court specifically stated that "[r]equiring proof of subjective reliance by each individual consumer would thwart effective prosecutions of large consumer redress actions and frustrate the statutory goals of [Section 13(b)]." Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d at 605 (quoting FTC v. Kitco of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1293-94 (D. Minn. 1985)).

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From this small number of consumers, a court can infer a pattern or practice of deceptive behavior. FTC v. Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d 1312, 1316 (8th Cir. 1991); FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 576 (7th Cir. 1989); FTC v. Kitco of Nev., Inc., 612 F. Supp. 1282, 1293-94 (D. Minn. 1985); FTC v. Nat'l Bus. Consultants, 781 F. Supp. 1136, 1141-42 (E.D. La. 1991); Int'l Diamond, 1983 WL 1911, at \*6-7. This pattern or practice of deceptive behavior can be proven by consumer declarations and complaints, which are admissible under Rule 807. See Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d at 608-09 (affirming district court's ruling that consumer complaint letters are admissible to prove the price paid by consumers and total injury). See also FTC v. Kuvkendall, 312 F.3d 1329, 1343 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's ruling that consumer declarations and consumer complaints are admissible as evidence of the appellants' violative behavior); Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 576 (affirming district court's ruling that sworn consumer declarations are admissible to show actual harm to consumers had resulted from the defendants' activities); Kitco, 612 F. Supp. at 1294-95 (holding that affidavits are admissible as proof of purchase, injury to consumers, and entitlement to restitution); FTC v. Cyberspace.com, 2003-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) P73,960, No. C00-1806L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25565, at \*13 n.5 (W.D. Wash. July 10, 2002) (holding that "[e]-mails and letters of complaint from recipients of the solicitations are admissible both to show notice and to show the truth of the matters asserted . . . ").

## Count Two - Misrepresenting Refund Policy

In some instances, Defendants make specific refund promises in order to convince consumers that employing Defendants is a smart decision that involves little or no risk. Defendants typically fail to honor the refund pledge, even when they have not delivered the promised results. Defendants use a number of tactics to avoid paying refunds when consumers are clearly entitled to them.<sup>146</sup>

Although some consumers are occasionally successful in convincing their credit card companies to reverse the charges, <sup>147</sup> such charge-backs are often over Defendants' strenuous objection. <sup>148</sup>

These actions constitute deception, because Defendants frequently make express refund claims that are reasonably relied upon by consumers. Then Defendants refuse to honor their refund promises, costing consumers hundreds, if not thousands, of dollars. Thus, Defendants' refund promises are false and misleading and constitute deceptive acts or practices in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.

## Count Three - Misrepresenting Affiliation with a Government Entity

Both in prerecorded robocall messages and through live sales calls, Defendants often tell consumers that Defendants are contacting them on behalf of a federal government agency (even the FTC!), or as part of a government program to reduce consumers' credit card interest rates. Obviously, Defendants are not the federal government, nor are they carrying out a government program, nor are they affiliated with the FTC or any other agency of the U.S. government. Defendants use such bold-faced

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> See footnotes 131-134, 138-140, and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>147</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000377, ¶ 19 (Paglia).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> App. at 000363, ¶¶ 17-19 (McClellan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> See footnotes 74, 89-91 and accompanying text, supra.

lies to bolster their creditability and to create a false sense of security for consumers who are asked to reveal personal information like Social Security numbers, credit card numbers, expiration dates, and security codes.

These actions constitute deception, because: 1) Defendants expressly claim to be affiliated with the federal government; 2) these claims are likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, because there are government efforts to assist consumers in the current recession; and 3) the clams are material to consumers, who are more likely to believe Defendants' savings promises and to trust Defendants with personal financial information. Thus, Defendants' claims of affiliation with the federal government are false and misleading and constitute a deceptive act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.

## Count Four - Unauthorized Billing

During the course of the sales pitch, Defendants obtain consumers' account numbers, expiration dates, and security codes for one or more of the consumers' credit cards. In some instances, consumers are led to believe they are providing this information merely to enable Defendants to verify the debts and negotiate lower interest rates with their credit card companies, not to authorize payment to the Defendants. In other instances, when Defendants collect this information, they specifically state that there will be no out-of-pocket fee charged to the consumer. See discussion at Section V.C, supra. Nevertheless, Defendants routinely bill their entire fee to the consumers' credit card accounts immediately after talking with consumers.

To prove this practice is unfair, the FTC must show: 1) Defendants' billing practices cause, or are likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers; 2) the harm is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits to consumers or competition; and 3) the harm

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> See footnotes 109-112 and accompanying text, supra.

is not reasonably avoidable by consumers. 15 U.S.C. § 45(n); FTC v. Neovi, 604 F.3d 1150, 1155 (9th Cir. 2010).

Each prong of the three-part test is met. First, Defendants injure consumers by charging their credit cards without authorization. Moreover, Defendants \$595 to \$1995 fee is "substantial." Second, the harm is not outweighed by any countervailing benefits, because even when Defendants provide some service to consumers, the service rarely, if ever, is worth more than the consumer is charged. See FTC v. J.K. Publications, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1201 (C.D.Cal. 2000). Finally, consumers cannot reasonably avoid the harm because Defendants place the charges on their credit cards without their knowledge or consent. Courts have consistently held that unauthorized credit card billing satisfies the three-part test, making it an unfair practice. See FTC v. The Crescent Publ'g Group, Inc., 129 F. Supp. 2d 311, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); J.K. Publications, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1201. Thus, Defendants' unauthorized billing of consumers' credit card accounts constitutes an unfair act or practice in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.

#### B. Violations of the Telemarketing Sales Rule

Congress directed the FTC to prescribe rules prohibiting abusive and deceptive telemarketing acts or practices under the Telemarketing Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6101-6108. The FTC adopted the original TSR in 1995, extensively amended it in 2003, and amended certain sections thereafter. 16 C.F.R. Part 310. Under the TSR, "Telemarketing" means a plan, program, or campaign which is conducted to induce the purchase of goods or services or a charitable contribution, by use of one or more telephones and which involves more than one interstate telephone call. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(dd). "Seller" means any person who, in connection with a telemarketing transaction, provides, offers to provide, or arranges for others to provide goods or services to the customer in exchange for consideration. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(aa). "Telemarketer" means any person who, in connection with telemarketing, initiates or receives telephone calls to or from a customer or donor. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(cc).

"Outbound telephone call" means a telephone call initiated by a telemarketer to induce the purchase of goods or services or to solicit a charitable contribution. 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(v). Defendants, or others they employ, use outbound robocalls and live telephone calls to consumers throughout the U.S. to induce the purchase of their interest rate reduction services. Thus, Defendants are "sellers" or "telemarketers" engaged in "telemarketing," and have initiated, or caused telemarketers to initiate, "outbound telephone calls" to consumers to induce the purchase of goods or services, as those terms are defined in the TSR. Therefore, Defendants are covered by the requirements of the TSR.

#### **Count Five - Misrepresenting Material Facts**

The TSR prohibits sellers and telemarketers from misrepresenting, directly or by implication, in the sale of goods or services, any material aspect of the performance, efficacy, nature, or central characteristics of the goods or services that are the subject of a sales offer. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(iii).

The same facts and arguments that support a finding that Defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, as alleged in Count One, <sup>151</sup> also support a finding that Defendants misrepresented material aspects of the performance, efficacy, nature, or central characteristics of goods and services in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(iii).

#### Count Six - Misrepresenting Debt Relief

The TSR, as amended, effective September 27, 2010, also *specifically* prohibits sellers and telemarketers from misrepresenting, directly or by implication, in the sale of goods or services, any material aspect of any debt relief service. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(x). The TSR defines a "debt relief service" as any service to "renegotiate, settle, or in any way alter the terms of payment or other terms of the debt between a

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>151</sup> See discussion of Count One at Section VI.A, supra.

person and one or more unsecured creditors or debt collectors, including a reduction in the balance, interest rate, or fees owed[.]" 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(m). Defendants are sellers or telemarketers of debt relief services when they promise consumers they will negotiate with consumers' existing credit card companies to lower the interest rates those companies charge. Defendants peddled these debt relief services after September 27, 2010. Defendants peddled these debt relief services after September 27, 2010.

In those instances where Defendants offer debt relief services, the same facts and arguments that support a finding that Defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC Act, as alleged in Count One<sup>154</sup> also support a finding that Defendants misrepresented, directly or by implication, in the sale of goods or services, any material aspect of any debt relief service in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. §310.3(a)(2)(iii).

#### **Count Seven - Misrepresenting Refund Policy**

The TSR prohibits sellers and telemarketers from misrepresenting, directly or by implication, in the sale of goods or services, any material aspect of the nature or terms of the seller's refund, cancellation, exchange, or repurchase policies. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(iv).

The same facts and arguments that support a finding that Defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC Act as alleged in Count Two<sup>155</sup> also support a finding that Defendants misrepresented, directly or by implication, that they will provide full or

<sup>22 | 152</sup> App. at 000264, ¶¶ 2, 4 (Bradley); 000327, ¶ 5 (Clifton); 000372-374, ¶¶ 5, 10, 000387 (Attachment A) (Paglia); 000411 (Attachment A) (Reagan).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>153</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000264,  $\P$  2 (Bradley) (agreed to purchase on August 11, 2011); 000326,  $\P$  2 (Clifton) (agreed to purchase on January 14, 2012).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>154</sup> See discussion of Count One at Section VI.A., supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>155</sup> See discussion of Count Two at Section VI.A., supra.

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partial refunds if consumers do not achieve the guaranteed interest rate reductions or interest savings in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. §310.3(a)(2)(iv).

## Count Eight - Failing to Disclose No-Refund, No-Cancellation Policy

The TSR prohibits sellers and telemarketers from failing to disclose, in a clear and conspicuous manner, if the seller has a policy of not making refunds, cancellations, exchanges, or repurchases, a statement informing the customer that this is the seller's policy. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(iii).

Defendants often claim to have a strict no-refund, no-cancellation policy when they refuse refunds or resist charge-backs. However, Defendants rarely, if ever, disclose this policy to consumers during Defendants' sales presentations. Consumers only learn of the policy after they have agreed to purchase Defendants' services. This failure to disclose their no-refund, no-cancellation policy is a deceptive telemarketing act or practice that violates the TSR. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(1)(iii).

## Count Nine - Misrepresenting Affiliation with a Government Entity

The TSR prohibits sellers and telemarketers from misrepresenting, directly or by implication, in the sale of goods or services, a seller's or telemarketer's affiliation with, or endorsement or sponsorship by, any person or government entity. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(vii).

The same facts and arguments that support a finding that Defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC Act as alleged in Count Three<sup>157</sup> also support a finding that Defendants misrepresented, directly or by implication, that they are carrying out a government program or are otherwise affiliated with the U.S. government in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. § 310.3(a)(2)(vii).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> See discussion at footnotes 135 and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup>See discussion of Count Three at Section VI.A., supra.

# Count Ten - Charging or Receiving a Fee in Advance of Obtaining a New, Lower Interest Credit Card

The TSR prohibits sellers and telemarketers from requesting or receiving payment of any fee or consideration in advance of obtaining a loan or other extension of credit when the seller or telemarketer has guaranteed or represented a high likelihood of success in obtaining or arranging a loan or other extension of credit for a person. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(4).

Defendants routinely promise that they can lower consumers' interest rates to very low rates on all, or substantially all, of their stated credit card debt, or save consumers thousands of dollars in interest payments as a result of lowered interest rates. In some instances, Defendants guarantee results; in others, Defendants' promises are implicit representations that their methods are likely to succeed. Defendants sometimes tell consumers specifically that they will accomplish this by arranging a new credit card at a lower interest rate. More often Defendants are vague about how they will obtain the rate reductions. Regardless of what Defendants say they will do, often, the only service they provide is applying for new credit cards on consumers' behalf. See discussion at Section V.E, supra. In those instances in which Defendants promise to arrange or attempt to arrange a new credit card, Defendants are offering to obtain a loan or other extension of credit.

Under these circumstances, the TSR prohibits Defendants from even requesting a fee before the loan or extension of credit is obtained. Defendants routinely request and receive payment information from consumers during the initial telephone call, and bill the consumers' credit cards the same day. Some consumers are charged and never receive extensions of credit.<sup>160</sup> Other consumers receive a new credit card, but it is issued

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> See footnotes 93-95 and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> See footnote 125 and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>160</sup> See footnote 126 and accompanying text, supra.

after Defendants charge their fee.<sup>161</sup> Thus, Defendants request and receive payment of a fee in advance of obtaining or arranging an extension of credit in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(4).

## Count Eleven - Charging or Receiving a Fee In Advance of Providing Debt Relief Services

The TSR, as amended, effective October 27, 2010, prohibits sellers and telemarketers from requesting or receiving payment of any fee or consideration for any debt relief service unless and until:

- a. the seller or telemarketer has renegotiated, settled, reduced, or otherwise altered the terms of at least one debt pursuant to a settlement agreement, debt management plan, or other such valid contractual agreement executed by the customer; and
- b. the consumer has made at least one payment pursuant to that settlement agreement, debt management plan, or other valid contractual agreement between the customer and the creditor or debt collector. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5)(i).

In some instances, since October 27, 2010, Defendants specifically promised consumers that they would negotiate with consumers' existing credit card companies to lower their interest rate. This meets the definition of a "debt relief service." Under the TSR, a company offering debt relief services cannot request or receive payment of any fee until a valid modification agreement has been executed by the consumer and the consumer has made at least one payment under the plan. Defendants routinely request payment information and bill consumers' credit cards the same day consumers agree to employ Defendants. In every instance, this is before the consumer has made at least one

 $<sup>^{161}</sup>$  Cf App. at 000288, ¶¶ 11-12 (Carter) (charged \$595 fee on April 5, 2012) with 000295-297 (Attachment B) (new Citi Card issued on April 7, 2012) (Carter).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> See discussion of Count Six at Section VI.B., supra.

payment under a modification agreement obtained by Defendants. <sup>163</sup> See discussion at Section V.C., supra. Thus, Defendants request and receive payment of a fee for debt relief services before these prerequisites are met in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(5).

#### **Count Twelve - Unauthorized Billing**

The TSR prohibits telemarketers and sellers from causing billing information to be submitted for payment, directly or indirectly, without the express informed consent of the consumer. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(7).

The same facts and arguments that support a finding that Defendants violated Section 5 of the FTC Act as alleged in Count Four<sup>164</sup> also support a finding that Defendants have caused billing information to be submitted for payment without the express informed consent of the consumer in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(a)(7).

## Count Thirteen - Violating the National Registry

The TSR, as amended in 2003, established the DNC Registry, maintained by the FTC, of consumers who do not wish to receive certain types of telemarketing calls. The TSR prohibits sellers and telemarketers from initiating, or causing others to initiate, an outbound telephone call to a person's telephone number that is on the DNC Registry, unless the Defendants have obtained an express agreement, in writing, that clearly evidences that person's authorization that calls made by or on behalf of Defendants may be placed to that person; or have an established business relationship with that person. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B).

None of the consumers who were offered debt relief services obtained modification agreements. *See generally* App. at 000264-265 (Bradley Declaration); 000326-353 (Clifton Declaration); 000372-389 (Paglia Declaration); 000393-418 (Reagan Declaration).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> See discussion of Count Four at Section VI.A.

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companies, have made unsolicited telemarketing calls to consumers throughout the U.S. to sell their purported credit card interest rate reduction services. These calls are often placed to telephone numbers on the DNC Registry. Moreover, Defendants have not obtained express written agreements that evidence authorization for these calls to be placed, nor do Defendants have established business relationships with the persons called. Thus, Defendants have engaged, or caused a telemarketer to engage, in initiating an outbound telephone call to a person's telephone number on the DNC Registry in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(iii)(B).

After 2003, Defendants directly, or through the use of third-party telemarketing

## Count Fourteen - Initiating Unlawful Prerecorded Messages On or After September 1, 2009

The TSR, as amended, effective September 1, 2009, prohibits initiating, or causing others to initiate, a telephone call that delivers a prerecorded message to induce the purchase of any good or service unless the seller has obtained from the recipient of the call an express agreement, in writing, that evidences the willingness of the recipient of the call to receive calls that deliver prerecorded messages by or on behalf of a specific seller. The express agreement must include the recipient's telephone number and signature, must be obtained after a clear and conspicuous disclosure that the purpose of the agreement is to authorize the seller to place prerecorded calls to the person, and must be obtained without requiring, directly or indirectly, that the agreement be executed as a condition of purchasing any good or service. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(v)(A).

After September 1, 2009, Defendants directly, or through the use of third-party telemarketing companies, have blasted unwanted and repetitive robocalls to consumers across the U.S. to sell their purported credit card interest rate reduction services.

Consumers harassed by these calls have not given Defendants their express written

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000291-292, ¶ 27 (Carter); 000359, 364 ¶¶ 2, 20 (McClellan); 000372, 377, ¶¶ 2, 23 (Paglia).

consent evidencing their willingness to receive robocalls. Thus, Defendants have made, or caused others to make, outbound telephone calls that deliver prerecorded messages to induce the purchase of goods or services in violation of the TSR. 16 C.F.R. § 310.4(b)(1)(v).

#### VII. LEGAL ANALYSIS

The FTC respectfully requests that the Court stop Defendants' ongoing deceptive marketing of purported credit card interest rate reduction services and Defendants' violations of the FTC Act and multiple provisions of the TSR, by issuing a TRO enjoining future misrepresentations; prohibiting the unlawful acts and practices; appointing a temporary receiver; preserving assets and documents; requiring a prompt reporting of customers and status; requiring an accounting of Defendants' finances and scope of their operations; and ordering Defendants to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not be entered. The requested relief, which the Court is authorized to grant under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, is warranted. The FTC is likely to succeed on the merits. Irreparable injury is likely to occur if Defendants' misrepresentations and their unlawful acts and practices are not enjoined and assets and documents are not preserved.

#### A. The Court is Authorized to Grant the Requested Relief

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to seek, and the Court to issue, temporary, preliminary, and permanent injunctions. The second proviso of Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), states that "in proper cases the Commission may seek, and, after proper proof, the court may issue, a permanent injunction" against violations of "any provision of law enforced by the Federal Trade Commission." 15 U.S.C. § 53(b). 167

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> See previous footnote.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>167</sup> See also FTC v. Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d 466, 468 (11th Cir. 1996) ("Section 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act authorizes the FTC to seek, and the district courts to grant, preliminary and permanent injunctions against practices that violate any of the laws enforced by the Commission."). The FTC is not proceeding under the first proviso

The Ninth Circuit has recognized that any case alleging violations of a law enforced by the FTC constitutes a proper case for which injunctive relief may be sought. FTC v. Evans Prod. Co., 775 F.2d 1084, 1086-87 (9th Cir. 1985); FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1110-13 (9th Cir. 1982). Moreover, Section 13(b) preserves the Court's inherent authority not only to order permanent relief, restitution, or disgorgement of ill-gotten gains, but also to grant ancillary and preliminary equitable relief, including temporary orders imposing asset freezes and issuing other relief. FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1102 (9th Cir. 1994); H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d at 1113-14 (finding that the district court is authorized to order an asset freeze in a case brought under 13(b)). 168

Here, where the public interest is at stake, exercise of the court's broad equitable authority is particularly appropriate. *United States v. Laerdal Mfg. Corp.*, 73 F.3d 852, 857 (9th Cir. 1995); *FTC v. World Wide Factors, Ltd.*, 882 F.2d 344, 346-47 (9th Cir. 1989). The Ninth Circuit has held that a Court may exercise the full breadth of its equitable authority in a Section 13(b) action because Congress "did not limit that traditional equitable power" when enacting the FTC Act. *H.N. Singer, Inc.*, 668 F.2d at 1113. Thus, the Court has latitude to issue the full range of equitable relief, including a TRO to freeze assets, enjoin deceptive practices, and allow expedited discovery. *See, e.g., id.* at 1113-14; *see also U.S. Oil & Gas Corp.*, 748 F.2d at 1432; *FTC v. Gill*, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1176-77 (C.D. Cal. 2001); *see also* S. Rep. No. 103-130, 15-16, 1993 WL 322671, at \*\*13 (Aug. 24, 1993) ("Section 13 of the FTC Act authorizes the FTC to file

of 13(b), which allows the Court to issue temporary relief in aid of an administrative action brought by the FTC. Therefore, the procedural and notice requirements of the first proviso do not apply to this case. FTC v. H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1111 (9th Cir. 1982); FTC v. U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1434 (11th Cir. 1984).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>168</sup> See also Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d at 469-70 (district court may award consumer restitution under 13(b)); Sec. Rare Coin & Bullion Corp., 931 F.2d at 1314-15 (8th Cir. 1991) (upholding the district court's rescission remedy); FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, Inc., 665 F.2d 711, 718 (5th Cir. 1982) (court authorized to "exercise the full range of equitable remedies traditionally available to it" in Section 13(b) actions).

suit to enjoin any violation of the FTC [Act]. The FTC can go into court *ex parte* to obtain an order freezing assets . . ."). Finally, district courts are authorized to depart from normal discovery procedures and to fashion discovery by court order to meet needs in particular cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. 1, 26(b)(2), 30(a), 34(b).

#### B. The FTC Has Met the Standard for Issuance of a TRO

To determine whether to grant a temporary or preliminary injunction in a case under Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, the Court must consider the Plaintiff's likelihood of success on the merits and weigh the equities. World Wide Factors, 882 F.2d at 346-347; see also FTC v. Arlington Press, Inc., No. 98CV9260, 1999 WL 33562452, at \*8 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 18, 1999); FTC v. Sage Seminars, Inc., No. 95-2854, 1995 WL 798938, at \*2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 1995). Irreparable injury is presumed in statutory enforcement actions. World Wide Factors, 882 F.2d at 347; United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-Op, 833 F.2d 172, 175 (9th Cir. 1987) ("No specific or immediate showing of the precise way in which violation of the law will result in public harm is required[.]"). The district court need only find "some chance of probable success on the merits" to grant an injunction. World Wide Factors, 882 F.2d at 347 (citing Odessa, 833 F.2d at 176). In balancing the equities, the public interest should receive greater weight, particularly where, as here, the evidence demonstrates that Defendants are engaged in deceptive and abusive practices. World Wide Factors, 882 F.2d at 347. A TRO should issue in this case because the FTC has demonstrated that it is likely to prevail in proving that Defendants are violating the FTC Act and the TSR, and will continue to do so absent court intervention, and because the public interest favors entry of the requested Order.

#### 1. The FTC Is Likely to Succeed on the Merits

The FTC is likely to succeed on the merits of this case. Based on the acts and practices described in Section V, *supra*, discussed in detail in Section VI, *supra*, and evidenced by the cited and attached exhibits to this memorandum, Defendants commit

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multiple violations of the FTC Act and the TSR. Therefore, the FTC is likely to prevail on each of the fourteen counts alleged in the Complaint.

## 2. Defendants Are Subject To Joint and Several Liability

Corporate defendants may be held jointly and severally liable if they operate as a common enterprise. FTC v. J.K. Publ'ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1202. [169] "[I]n situations where corporations are so entwined that a judgment absolving one of them of liability would provide the other defendants with a 'clear mechanism for avoiding the terms of the order,' courts have been willing to find the existence of a common enterprise." FTC v. Nat'l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d 1167, 1182 (N.D. Ga. 2008) (citing Delaware Watch Co., Inc., 332 F.2d at 746-746), aff'd 356 Fed. Appx. 358 2009 WL 4810345 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 401 Fed. Appx. 522, 2010 WL 2787701 (11th Cir), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 505 (2010) (quotation omitted). "When corporations act as a common enterprise, each may be held liable for the deceptive acts and practices of the other." Id.

"[E]ntities constitute a common enterprise when they exhibit either vertical or horizontal commonality--qualities that may be demonstrated by a showing of strongly interdependent economic interests or the pooling of assets and revenues." *FTC*  $\nu$ . *Network Servs. Depot, Inc.*, 617 F.3d 1127, 1142-43 (9th Cir. 2010). To determine whether a common enterprise exists, the court considers factors such as:

common control; the sharing of office space and officers; whether business is transacted through a maze of interrelated companies; the commingling of corporate funds and failure to maintain separation of companies; unified advertising; and evidence that reveals that no real distinction exists between the corporate defendants.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> See Sunshine Art Studios, Inc. v. FTC, 481 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1st Cir. 1973); FTC v. Kennedy, 574 F. Supp. 2d 714, 722 (S.D. Tex. 2008); FTC v. SkyBiz.com, Inc., No. 01-CV-396-K(E), 2001 WL 1673649, at \*5-6 (N.D. Okla. Aug. 2, 2001); FTC v. Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d 993, 1011 (N.D. Ind. 2000); see also FTC v. Para-Link Int'l, Inc., No. 8:00-CV-2114-T-17E, 2000 WL 33988084, at \*2-4 (M.D. Fla. Nov. 21, 2000) (holding multiple corporate entities liable as participants in a common enterprise).

Nat'l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1182; see also Delaware Watch Co., Inc., 332 F.2d at 746 (finding common enterprise where "the same individuals were transacting an integrated business through a maze of interrelated companies"). The court evaluates "the pattern and frame-work of the whole enterprise." Nat'l Urological Group, Inc., 645 F. Supp. 2d at 1182 (quotation omitted). No one factor is dispositive, and all factors need not be present to justify a finding of common enterprise. Kennedy, 574 F. Supp. 2d at 722 ("It is not necessary that the FTC prove any particular number of entity connections and any specific connection.")

For example, the Ninth Circuit found a common enterprise existed where companies were commonly owned; pooled resources, staff, and funds; and participated to some extent in a common venture to sell the same products. *Network Servs. Depot, Inc.*, 617 F.3d at 1143. Because the defendants participated in and benefitted from a "shared business scheme," the "common revenue generated in the course of that scheme was the proper subject of the court's equitable powers under the FTC Act." *Id.* 

As discussed in Section III, *supra*, the corporate Defendants operate as a common enterprise. They are an interrelated network of companies that share common owners and managers; offer the same services, including in some instances the same consumer materials; use common sales representatives and customer service telephone numbers; occupy the same office locations; and fail to maintain separation between companies by corresponding on each other's behalf. Finally, the common enterprise is used to perpetuate a deceit, and unjust loss or injury would result from treating the Defendants separately because all companies are involved actively in the deception.

## 3. Individual Defendants Are Liable for Acts of Common Enterprise

Individuals can be held liable for corporate violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act. FTC v. Cyberspace.com LLC, 453 F.3d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 2006); FTC v. Am. Standard Credit Sys., Inc., 874 F. Supp. 1080, 1089-90 (C.D. Cal. 1994). Individual liability for injunctive relief is appropriate where the individual defendant directly participated in or

had the authority to control corporate deceptive acts and practices. *Am. Standard*, 874 F. Supp. at 1089. Authority to control can arise from active involvement in business affairs and the making of corporate policy, including assuming the duties of a corporate officer. *Amy Travel Serv., Inc.*, 875 F.2d at 573; *see also Am. Standard*, 874 F. Supp. at 1089. This is especially true when the corporate defendants are closely held corporations. *Think Achievement*, 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1011. Individual defendants are further subject to monetary liability if they had knowledge of the practices at issue. *Id.* 170 "The degree of participation in business is probative of knowledge." *FTC v. Transnet Wireless Corp.*, 506 F. Supp. 2d 1247, 1270 (S.D. Fla. 2007); *Amy Travel*, 875 F.2d at 574 (citing *Int'l Diamond Corp.*, 1983-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 69,707-8). The individual defendants' awareness of a high volume of consumer complaints further demonstrates knowledge of deceptive practices. *Amy Travel*, 875 F.2d at 574-75.

Here, each individual Defendant is liable for both injunctive and monetary relief. Defendant Ambrosia is the sole listed member of CAM Services and AWD (which is named after him) and an owner of AWD according to Castine.<sup>171</sup> He is the primary contact person on the telephone account that includes 888-583-1956, a business number for AWD.<sup>172</sup> He paid for registration of ambrosiawebdesign.net, AWD's defunct website.<sup>173</sup> He corresponds on behalf of AWD and CAM Services/Concord regarding

however, an individual need not have had subjective intent to deceive or actual knowledge of the deception; reckless indifference to the truth or falsity of a misrepresentation or an awareness of a high probability of fraud coupled with intentional avoidance of the truth will suffice. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d at 573-74; Think Achievement Corp., 144 F. Supp. 2d at 1011; Cyberspace.com LLC, 453 F.3d at 1202; Am. Standard Credit Systems, Inc., 874 F. Supp. at 1089; J.K. Publ 'ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1204.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> See discussion at Section II.B.1. and II.B.3., supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> App. at 000540 (Blais); see also footnote 50-51 and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> App. at 000555-556 (Willis).

complaints and chargebacks,<sup>174</sup> and the letters that go out under his name claim detailed familiarity with the companies' business practices.<sup>175</sup> The evidence shows he is well aware of the business practices of AWD, CAM Services, Concord, and AFB, and of the complaints against these companies.

Defendant Castine is the sole listed member of corporate Defendants Concord, AFB, and Western GPS, and an admitted owner of AWD. <sup>176</sup> In his statements to Detective Connors, he displayed a detailed familiarity with AWD's operations, including use of a third-party telemarketer, a large volume of complaints about the telemarketer's representatives, the details of the sales presentations and the fees charged, the fact that AWD used "CAM Services" as a merchant account, and specific details about some consumers' files. <sup>177</sup> Defendant Castine paid for a telephone account that included 800-530-1093, a business number used by Western GPS. <sup>178</sup> He also paid for registration of concordfinancialadvisors.net. <sup>179</sup>

"A heavy burden of exculpation rests on the chief executive and primary shareholder of a closely held corporation whose stock-in-trade is overreaching and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>174</sup> For examples of Defendant Ambrosia's correspondence on behalf of AWD, see footnotes 12-14 and accompanying text, *supra*. For correspondence on behalf of CAM Services/Concord, see footnote 36, *supra*.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000936 (AWD) (Fisher complaint) (Miller) (Ambrosia letter describing AWD's telemarketing methods); 000099 (AWD) (Reagan complaint) (Morales) (Ambrosia letter describing Reagan billing transaction); 000370 (Attachment C) (McClellan) (CAM Services) (Ambrosia letter describing McClellan billing transaction).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>176</sup> See discussion at Section II.B., subsections 1, 2, 4, and 5, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>177</sup> App. at 000480-481, ¶¶ 6-9 (Connors).

 $<sup>^{178}</sup>$  Cf. App. at 000918-918.1, ¶¶ 7, 8, 11 (Thacker) and App. at 000545-547 (Blais) (Defendant Castine paid for a telephone number) with App. at 000287, ¶ 9 (Carter) (telephone number used by Western GPS).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>179</sup> App. at 000562-563 (Willis).

deception." Standard Educators, Inc. v. FTC, 475 F.2d 401, 403 (D.C. Cir. 1973) cert. denied, 414 U.S. 828 (1973). The evidence shows that both Defendant Castine and Defendant Ambrosia each participate in and exercise control over these single-member limited liability companies. Therefore, this Court should hold both individual Defendants liable for monetary and injunctive relief.

#### 4. The Balance of Equities Favors Issuance of an Injunction

The public interest in halting Defendants' violations of Section 5 of the FTC Act and the TSR, and in preserving assets for a meaningful monetary remedy, far outweighs any interest Defendants may have in continuing to deceptively market their services, engage in unfair practices, and engaging in telemarketing practices prohibited by the TSR. In balancing the hardships between the public and private interest, "public equities must receive far greater weight." FTC v. World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1030, 1031 (7th Cir. 1988); see also FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1236 (9th Cir. 1999) ("Obviously, the public interest in preserving the illicit proceeds . . . for restitution to the victims is great."). Here, the balance tips strongly in favor of issuance of the requested TRO. Defendants' ongoing law violations, hardly isolated in nature, strongly suggest they will persist in scamming consumers absent the requested injunctive relief. In contrast, "[t]here is no oppressive hardship to defendants in requiring them to comply with the FTC Act, refrain from fraudulent representation or preserve their assets from dissipation or concealment." World Wide Factors, 882 F.2d at 347. Thus, the Court has no obligation to protect ill-gotten gains or illegal business interests. CFTC v. British Am. Commodity Options Corp., 560 F.2d 135, 143 (2d Cir. 1977); United States v. Diapulse Corp. of America, 457 F.2d 25, 29 (2d Cir. 1972). The public interest strongly favors entry of the requested TRO.

#### 5. Injunctive Relief Is Appropriate

To prevent ongoing consumer injury, the proposed TRO prohibits Defendants from making material misrepresentations in connection with marketing credit card

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interest rate reduction services, billing consumers without having previously obtained their express informed consent, and violating any provision of the TSR, including the specific violations alleged in the Complaint. The proposed TRO also prohibits Defendants from releasing customer information. As discussed above, this Court has broad equitable authority under Section 13(b) to grant ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice. *Amy Travel*, 875 F.2d at 571-72; *H.N. Singer, Inc.*, 668 F.2d at 1113; *FTC* v. *Five-Star Auto Club, Inc.*, 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 533 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). These prohibitions are necessary to prevent ongoing consumer injury.

## 6. An Asset Freeze and Evidence Preservation Order Is Necessary

In addition to injunctive relief, the FTC will seek a final order with monetary restitution. To preserve the availability of funds to redress consumers' injury, to determine the scope of the harm, and to preserve evidence, the FTC requests that the Court issue an asset freeze and evidence preservation order. Such an order is well within the Court's authority. Moreover, courts have imposed asset freezes and evidence preservation orders on the basis of the mere possibility of dissipation. <sup>181</sup>

Here, Defendants are likely to conceal or dissipate assets and conceal or destroy documents, as demonstrated by the steps that they take to conceal their true identities and disguise the true nature of their operations. From their first contact with consumers,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>180</sup> See CFTC v. Am. Metals Exch. Corp., 991 F.2d 71, 79 (3d Cir. 1993); World Travel Vacation Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d at 1031-1032 (affirming asset freeze obtained by FTC); H.N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d at 1113 (same); In re Nat'l Credit Mgmt. Group, L.L.C., 21 F. Supp. 2d 424, 462 (D. N.J. 1998) ("[A] freeze of the assets of all Defendants is appropriate to preserve those assets for possible restitution awards."); Gem Merch. Corp., 87 F.3d at 469.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>181</sup> See, e.g., Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Sahni, 868 F.2d 1096, 1097 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that when a government agency is the movant, the possibility of a dissipation of assets is sufficient to justify a freeze). But see Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1085 (9th Cir. 2009) ("A party seeking an asset freeze must show a likelihood of dissipation of the claimed assets, or other inability to recover monetary damages, if relief is not granted.")

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Defendants make efforts to disguise who they are. As discussed previously, they use robocalls that do not disclose Defendants' true identities, and use generic, deceptive names like "Card Member Services." Sometimes Defendants resist disclosing their real names even when speaking with consumers personally. 182

Defendants often mischaracterize their services for billing purposes, presumably to mislead their merchant account providers and consumers' credit card companies as to the true nature of their services. One consumer was told by her bank that AWD had characterized the \$795 fee as being for computer equipment. 183 Another consumer was billed for "website design." 184 As discussed above, Defendants often make a variety of false statements to the BBB and payment processors to avoid refunds or chargebacks. 185

Defendants changed the name of their operation in approximately February 2012 to disassociate themselves from negative publicity and avert the attention of law enforcement. Defendant Castine told Detective Connors in January 2012 that AWD was now operating as AFB. However, a month later he formed Western GPS, and resumed business under that name, using some of the same representatives, customer service telephone numbers, and consumer materials. 186 From the anonymous robocalls, to the false billing descriptions, to the multifarious company names, to the efforts to mislead law enforcement, the BBB, and payment processors, Defendants' common enterprise is built on deceit and relies on deceit to continue. The Court cannot rely on Defendants to

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>182</sup> See, e.g., App. at 000391, ¶ 5 (Ramsey); 000394-395, ¶ 8 (Reagan).

 $<sup>^{183}</sup>$  See, e.g, App. at 000377, ¶ 21 (Paglia).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>184</sup> App. at 000266,  $\P$  8, 000270.1 (Attachment B) (Bradley). AWD's response letter for the charge-back dispute referred to it as a "Referral Program." Id. at 000282 (Attachment C) (Bradley).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>185</sup> See footnotes 135, 137-140 and accompanying text, supra.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>186</sup> See footnotes 18-21, 58-62 and accompanying text, supra.

preserve assets and evidence absent an order. The requested relief is similar to that ordered in recent FTC cases in the District of Arizona. 187

An asset freeze is appropriate where, as here, the magnitude of the financial injury is large, and there is a possibility of dissipation. See, e.g., FTC v. USA Bevs., Inc., No. 05-61682-CIV-LENARD/KLEIN, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 39075 at \*24-25 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 5, 2005) (considerable motivation to hide assets because of potential size of monetary remedy.) Defendants' potential liability possibly already exceeds the funds that are available for restitution, and therefore any new business expenditures would jeopardize the possibility of effective relief. When a district court determines that the FTC is likely to prevail in a final determination on the merits, it has "a duty to ensure that ... assets ... [are] available to make restitution to the injured customers." World Travel Vacation Brokers, 861 F.2d at 1031. To help ensure the availability of assets, preserve the status quo, and guard against the dissipation and diversion of assets, the Court may issue an order freezing Defendants' assets.

Further, the Court can order Defendants' assets to be frozen whether the assets are located inside or outside the U.S. *United States v. First Nat'l City Bank*, 379 U.S. 378, 384 (1965) ("Once personal jurisdiction of a party is obtained, the District Court has authority to order it to 'freeze' property under its control, whether the property be within or without the United States."). Courts have frozen company assets and individual defendants' assets where the individual defendants controlled the deceptive activity and had actual or constructive knowledge of the deceptive nature of the practices in which

<sup>187</sup> See, e.g., FTC v. North America Marketing and Associates, LLC, No. CV-12-914-

they were engaged. Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 574-76; Nat'l Credit Mgmt., 21 F. Supp. 2d at 462.

In addition to a provision directing Defendants not to dissipate or conceal assets, the FTC seeks a provision in the TRO directing banks and other financial institutions to freeze Defendants' assets in their custody or control. This Court has the authority to direct its order to such third parties to freeze assets that are easily dissipated and may be difficult or impossible to trace.<sup>188</sup>

Finally, the FTC seeks an immediate accounting of Defendants' assets, and seeks an order requiring that Defendants complete and return to the FTC financial statements on the forms attached to the proposed TRO. Requiring accounting and financial statements, combined with an asset freeze, will increase the likelihood of preserving existing assets pending final determination of this matter.<sup>189</sup>

Here, Defendants' ongoing deception demonstrates their willingness to engage in wrongdoing. The possibility of a large monetary judgment provides Defendants with ample incentive to conceal or dissipate otherwise recoverable assets. Without an immediate freeze of the recoverable assets of Defendants, it is unlikely that funds will remain to satisfy any final order granting restitution to deceived consumers or disgorging Defendants' ill-gotten gains.

## C. A Temporary Receiver Should Be Appointed

Appointment of a temporary receiver over the affairs of the corporate Defendants is necessary to preserve evidence for trial and assets for effective final relief in this case, and to evaluate the true nature of the Defendants' common enterprise.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>188</sup> See First Nat'l City Bank, 379 U.S. at 385; Reebok Int'l, Ltd. v. McLaughlin, 49 F.3d 1387, 1391-92 (9th Cir. 1995); Waffenschmidt v. Mackay, 763 F.2d 711, 714 (5th Cir. 1985).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>189</sup> See, e.g., SEC v. Parkersburg Wireless Ltd. Liability Co., 156 F.R.D. 529, 532 n.3 (D.D.C. 1994); SEC v. Bankers Alliance Corp., 881 F. Supp. 673, 676-77 (D.D.C. 1995).

Federal district courts have the inherent power to appoint a temporary receiver incident to their statutory authority to issue a permanent injunction under Section 13(b). <sup>190</sup> A court's exercise of its equity jurisdiction to appoint a receiver is necessary in instances in which a corporate defendant, via its management, has defrauded the public. <sup>191</sup> A receiver is also appropriate where the business may continue to operate in an unlawful manner without a receiver's oversight. <sup>192</sup> The appointment of a receiver in this case is appropriate under both standards.

Defendants have persisted in their unlawful business practices, while changing the names under which they do business. The risk that Defendants' common enterprise will continue to operate unlawfully is extremely high. It is inconceivable that they can be relied upon to immediately develop a legal business model. The individual Defendants who have overseen the creation and operation of the common enterprise's unlawful program cannot be left in control of the corporate Defendants pending resolution of this case. Otherwise, the entire nature of the dispute, discovery, and the ultimate proof of the case will likely be hampered by the alteration or destruction of corporate records. A neutral Court-appointed temporary receiver should be entrusted to take over the operations of the corporate Defendants. A temporary receiver will assist in the preservation of evidence and marshaling of assets. By timely reporting the status of the Defendants' operations, the receiver can assess the nature of the Defendants' business and, if instructed, wind-down its unlawful operations.

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810 F.2d 1511, 1512-14 (9th Cir. 1987).

190 See U.S. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d at 1432-34 (all the inherent equitable powers of

the District Court are available in an action filed pursuant to the final proviso in FTC Act 13(b)); see also SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1105 (2d Cir. 1972).

<sup>191</sup> See, e.g., World Wide Factors, Ltd., 882 F.2d at 348; FTC v. Am. Nat'l Cellular, Inc.,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>192</sup> See SEC v. Keller Corp., 323 F.2d 397, 403 (7th Cir. 1963).

#### D. The Temporary Restraining Order Should Be Issued Ex Parte

A TRO may be granted without notice if it appears notice will result in irreparable injury, and the applicant certifies the reasons why. Fed. R. Civ. 65(b). As previously discussed, there is a considerable risk that, if given notice, Defendants will dissipate or conceal assets and destroy documents identifying injured consumers. Defendants' scheme exposes them to substantial liability. If they succeed in concealing assets, any monetary judgment for the FTC will be rendered unenforceable. The FTC's experience shows that defendants engaged in similar schemes will withdraw funds from bank accounts and move or shred documents upon learning of impending legal action. District Courts therefore have regularly granted the FTC ex parte relief in similar cases. It is particularly appropriate where giving notice could result in an inability to provide any relief at all. In re Vuitton et Fils S.A., 606 F. 2d 1, 4 (2nd Cir. 1979).

The threat of irreparable harm in this case meets the Rule 65(b) standard for ex parte relief. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 679 (1974) ("[P]reseizure notice and hearing might frustrate the interests served by the statutes, since the property seized . . . will often be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction, destroyed or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given."); Cenergy Corp. v. Bryson Oil & Gas P.L.C., 657 F. Supp. 867, 870 (D. Nev. 1987) ("[I]t appears proper to enter the TRO without notice, for giving notice itself may defeat the very purpose for the TRO.").

#### E. Immediate Access Is Appropriate

The FTC also seeks immediate access to Defendants' premises to locate assets wrongfully obtained from consumers and ensure the integrity of books and records. The proposed TRO requires the Defendants to provide both the FTC and the temporary

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>193</sup> For a discussion of cases in which Defendants have dissipated or concealed assets or evidence, see Moon Declaration at ¶¶ 14, 15.

receiver reasonable access to Defendants' premises. This District has previously granted immediate access in *ex parte* TROs requested by the FTC. 194

#### F. Limited Expedited Discovery Is Necessary

The Court should grant the FTC's request for limited discovery to locate and identify consumers, documents, and assets. The Court's ability to award meaningful final relief in this action would be irreparably injured if Defendants conceal either their assets or records. District courts are authorized to depart from normal discovery procedures and fashion discovery to meet discovery needs in particular cases. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(d), 33(a), 34(b) (authorizing alteration of standard discovery provisions, including applicable time frames governing depositions and production of documents). Such a departure is justified in light of the Court's broad and flexible authority in equity to grant preliminary emergency relief in cases involving the public interest. 195

In this case, limited discovery is crucial. First, it will aid in locating and securing assets for final relief and ensuring compliance with any asset freeze the FTC requests that the Court order. Second, limited discovery into Defendants' business practices will shed light on the scope of consumer injury. It also will help to determine the existence and location of documents needed to determine the nature and extent of consumer injury. Further, the FTC's request will not unduly burden Defendants as the requested information should be available readily in a computerized, business-records format

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>194</sup> See, e.g., FTC v. North America Marketing and Associates, LLC, No. CV-12-914-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. May 2, 2012); FTC v. Government Careers, Inc., No. CV-09-721-TUC-DCB (D. Ariz. Jan. 5, 2010); FTC v. Helping Hands of Hope, Inc., No. CV-08-0909-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz. May 13, 2008); FTC v. Handicapped & Disabled Workshops, Inc., No. CV-08-0908-PHX-DGC (D. Ariz. May 13, 2008); FTC v. The Results Group, LLC, No. CV-06-02843-PHX-JAT (D. Ariz. Nov. 28, 2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>195</sup> See, e.g., Gill, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-77 (granted expedited discovery); FTC v. Productive Mktg., Inc., 136 F. Supp. 2d 1096, 1100 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (same). See also Fed. Sav. & Loan Ins. Corp. v. Dixon, 835 F.2d 554, 557, 562 (5th Cir. 1987).

1 because it is the information needed daily by Defendants in the course of their telemarketing program. 196 2 3 VIII. CONCLUSION 4 For the reasons delineated above, the FTC respectfully requests that 5 the Court enter the proposed Order Granting Application for Temporary Restraining 6 Order and Order to Show Cause, filed concurrently with this Memorandum, to halt 7 Defendants' ongoing violations of the FTC Act and the TSR, and to protect the Court's 8 ability to issue effective, final relief in this matter as it may deem appropriate. 9 Dated:  $\frac{0/22}{26/2}$ Respectfully submitted, 10 11 WILLARD K. TOM 12 General Counsel 13 DEANYATI. KUECKELHAN 14 Regional Director 15 16 JASON C. MOON, Tex. Bar No.24001188 THOMAS B. CARTER, Tex. Bar No.03932300 17 EMILY B. ROBINSON, Tex. Bar No.24046737 18 Federal Trade Commission 19 1999 Bryan Street, Suite 2150 Dallas, Texas 75201 20 (214) 979-9378; jmoon@ftc.gov (Moon) 21 (214) 979-9372; tcarter@ftc.gov (Carter) (214) 979-9386; erobinson@ftc.gov (Robinson) 22 (214) 953-3079 (Fax) 23 Attorneys for Plaintiff

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>196</sup> This type of information is commonly kept on proprietary, client-contact software, which is often not readable in its native format without the underlying software. As a result, an order to provide information in written format, rather than produce the computer records themselves, will facilitate the design of appropriate preliminary injunctive relief by the Court.