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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF TRO APPLICATION

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# I. Introduction

Defendants market skincare products over the Internet using deceptive offers with hidden costs, negative option features, and return policies.

Specifically, Defendants falsely offer "risk free trials" or "gifts" of products to consumers nationwide, using online banners, popup advertisements, and websites. In truth, Defendants' offers are designed to trick consumers into purchasing Defendants' product and enrolling in a continuity plan that charges consumers for additional products each month.

Defendants require consumers who accept their "risk free trial" or "gift" to provide credit or debit card billing information, purportedly to pay nominal shipping and handling fees to receive the advertised products. However, 10 days after receiving consumers' billing information, Defendants charge consumers the full costs of the products—imposing charges of up to \$97.88 onto consumers' credit or debit cards. Defendants also enroll consumers into a negative option continuity plan, in which Defendants ship additional products each month and charge consumers' credit or debit cards the full costs of the products, usually \$97.88 per month. Finally, Defendants refuse to provide consumers with refunds for product returns unless the products are returned unused and unopened within 30 days of the order's placement. Defendants' practices violate Section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), Section 4 of the

Restore Online Shoppers' Confidence Act ("ROSCA"), 15 U.S.C. § 8403, Section 907(a) of the Electronic Funds Transfer Act ("EFTA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a), and Section 205.10(b) of Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(b), and have caused millions of dollars of consumer injury.

In similar cases, where a business is permeated by deception and causing significant consumer injury, the FTC typically requests, and district courts have regularly entered, *ex parte* temporary restraining orders enjoining the law violations and freezing Defendants' assets. There is strong precedent in Ninth Circuit district courts for granting such *ex parte* relief in FTC cases. This relief is

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access, and receiver); FTC V. Nat'l Vending Consultants, Inc., No. 05-00160 (D.

immediate access, and receiver); FTC v. Global Net Solutions, Inc., No. 05-00002 (D. Nev. Jan. 3, 2005) (Pro, J.) (granting ex parte TRO including asset freeze and

immediate access); FTC v. Tyme Lock 2000, Inc., No. 02-01078 (D. Nev. Aug. 19, 2002) (Mahan, J.) (granting ex parte TRO including asset freeze, receiver, and

Nev. Feb. 8, 2005) (Jones, J.) (granting ex parte TRO including asset freeze,

<sup>10</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> See, e.g., FTC v. Grant Connect, LLC, No. 09-01349 (D. Nev. July 28, 2009) (Pro, J.) (granting ex parte TRO including asset freeze); FTC v. Infusion Media, Inc., No. 09-01112 (D. Nev. June 24, 2009) (Hunt, J.) (granting ex parte TRO

including asset freeze); FTC v. ERG Ventures, LLC, No. 06-00578 (D. Nev. Oct. 31, 2006) (McKibben, J.) (granting ex parte TRO including asset freeze); FTC v. 3rd Union Card Servs., Inc., No. 04-00712 (D. Nev. May 25, 2004) (Jones, J.)

<sup>(</sup>granting ex parte TRO including asset freeze); FTC v. BTV Indus., No. 02-00437 (D. Nev. Apr. 16, 2002) (Hicks, J.) (granting ex parte TRO including asset

freeze).

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> See, e.g., FTC v. Health Formulas, LLC, Case No. 2:14-cv-01649-RFB-GWF, (D. Nev. Oct 9, 2014); FTC v. Ivy Capital, Inc., No. 11-00283 (D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2011) (Mahan, J.) (granting ex parte TRO including asset freeze, immediate

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<sup>20</sup> immediate access); FTC v. Elec. Processing Servs., Inc., No. 02-00500 (D. Nev. Apr. 11, 2002) (Hicks, J.) (granting ex parte TRO including asset freeze and

1	essential to prevent further harm to consumers, to prohibit Defendants from
2	dissipating assets or destroying documents, and to preserve the Court's ability to
3	award effective final relief for Defendants' law violations.
4	II. Defendants' Business Practices are Permeated with Deception <sup>3</sup>
5	Defendants have advertised, marketed, distributed, and sold skincare products
6	online from multiple Internet websites, including auraviefreetrial.com, and
7	mymiraclekit.com, and miraclefacekit.com, since at least 2010. <sup>4</sup> Defendants
8	deceptively offer free trials of their products under a variety of brand names,
9	including "AuraVie," "Dellure," and "Miracle Face Kit" (collectively,
10	"AuraVie"). Defendants' offers fail to disclose clearly and materially
11	misrepresent the terms of their offers.
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14	immediate access); FTC v. Nat'l Audit Defense Network, Inc., No. 02-00131 (D.
15	Nev. Feb. 1, 2002) (George, J.) (granting <i>ex parte</i> TRO including asset freeze, immediate access, and receiver).
16	The FTC's evidence is collected into an Appendix of Evidence ("App.") that, for
17	ease of citation and reference, is consecutively paginated. The appendix includes declarations from federal trade investigators, deceived consumers, an investigator
18	with the Florida Attorney General, a United Postal Service Inspector, and the Better Business Bureau.
19	<sup>4</sup> See App. 11-12; App. 173, 176, 179, 182.

20 | <sup>5</sup> App. 11 ¶22; App. 783 ¶13.

# A. Defendants Deceptive "Risk Free Trial" Offers

# 1. Defendants' Advertisements Contain Material Misrepresentations

Defendants contract with a network of third parties, known as "affiliate marketers," to direct consumers to Defendants' websites. Affiliate marketers use a variety of Internet advertising techniques, including banner and pop-up advertisements, sponsored search terms, and special offers to drive consumer traffic to Defendants' websites. Defendants provide affiliate marketers with advertisements describing their offers for the affiliate marketers to use. Some affiliate marketers also create their own advertising.

Defendants also purchase advertising space on third-party websites, such as Amazon.com, Facebook.com, and HomeDepot.com, and offer consumers a "risk free trial," "trial order," or "gift" of Defendants' products. <sup>10</sup> After consumers click on these advertisements and are directed to Defendants' websites, Defendants lure consumers into providing their credit or debit card information by representing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> App. 13-14 ¶30.

<sup>|| &#</sup>x27; *Id* 

<sup>18 |</sup>  $^{8}$  *Id*.

<sup>19 | 9</sup> *Id* 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> See App. 650 ¶2; App. 741 ¶2; App. 754 ¶2.

that consumers need to pay only a nominal shipping and handling charge, typically \$4.99 or less, to receive a "risk free trial," "trial order," or "gift." 11

Defendants' websites prominently claim that their offer is merely a "trial":



(screen capture from http://auraviefreetrial.com, last visited August 28, 2014)<sup>12</sup>
Additionally, many consumers also report receiving popup surveys that offer the products as a "gift" or "giveaway" that is seemingly associated with the website

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>11</sup> See App. 27 ¶55, App. 31 ¶65; App. 650 ¶2; App. 675 ¶2; App. 741 ¶2; App. 760 ¶2.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>12</sup> App. 27 ¶¶54-55; App. 465.

they have visited:

CONSUMER SURVEY

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Visitor Survey:

# **Amazon**

You've been selected to take part in an anonymous survey for visitors in the **San Francisco**, **California** area. Tell us what you think of **Amazon** in this 30 second questionnaire, and to say "thank you", we'll offer you a few exclusive giveaways. Available Today Only: **Thursday, May 28, 2015** 

Question 1 of 4: What is your Gender?

Female

Male

Copyright 2011-2012 All rights reserved. We are not affiliated nor partnered, with Amazon. Amazon has not authored, participated in, or in any way reviewed this advertisement or authorized it. The trial products offered on the last page pay this website for orders placed. See important terms and conditions regarding this ad <a href="https://example.com/herea/bases/">herea/bases/<a href="https:

▶ ■ ready

(http://consumers- research.com/survey/TV.c1.php?t202id= 71048&t202kw=amazon; URL is no longer available, but an archive of the can be seen at https://archive.org/web). 13

After completing the survey, consumers are offered a selection of products they can select as their "prize," including an AuraVie "risk FREE trial," which is allegedly available for only the \$4.99 cost of shipping:

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
<sup>13</sup> App. 30-31¶¶63-65.

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<sup>14</sup> App. 30-31 ¶¶63-65.

(screen capture from http://mymiraclekit.com, last visited April 13, 2015)<sup>15</sup>

Defendants also use deceptive pop-up advertisements that discourage consumers from leaving Defendants' websites without accepting their offer. When consumers attempt to leave the websites, a text box appears that offers to ship the trial offer at an even lower shipping price. These pop-up advertisements contain false representations that AuraVie is accredited by the Better Business Bureau ("BBB") with an "A-" rating:



<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>15</sup> App. 11 ¶25; App. 479.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>16</sup> App. 467.1.

(screen capture from http://auraviefreetrial.com, last visited April 13, 2015)<sup>17</sup>
In fact, AuraVie is not accredited by the BBB and has an F rating with the BBB.<sup>18</sup>

#### 2. Defendants' Offers Fail to Disclose Material Terms

Defendants' marketing practices employ hidden costs, negative option continuity plan features and, return policies, and are materially deceptive. In their advertisements and sales offers, Defendants fail to disclose clearly that they will charge consumers' credit or debit accounts for the trial product, typically as much as \$97.88, after a 10-day period. Defendants also fail to disclose clearly that consumers who accept the trial offer will be enrolled into a continuity program. Under the continuity program, Defendants send consumers monthly shipments of Defendants' skincare product and charge consumers' credit or debit cards the full cost of each product shipped. Defendants shipped.

Consumers are typically unaware that they have been billed for Defendants' products and enrolled in this continuity program until they discover

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>17</sup> App. 467.1; App. 11 ¶24.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>18</sup> App. 789-90 ¶5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>19</sup> App. 651 ¶¶3, 5-6; App. 692-93 ¶¶3-5; App. 697 ¶5; App. 705-06 ¶¶2, 6; App. 714-15 ¶¶3-5; App. 727-28 ¶¶2-5; App. 735 ¶5; App. 742-43 ¶7; App. 755 ¶¶4-6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> App. 652 ¶6; App. 668-69 ¶¶8, 14; App. 693 ¶4; App. 706 ¶6; App. 742-43 ¶7; *See also* App. 676 ¶6; App. 728 ¶5; App. 742-43 ¶7.

the charges—usually \$97.88—on their credit or debit card statements.<sup>21</sup> Often, by that time, Defendants contend that it is too late for consumers to return the products and obtain a refund.<sup>22</sup>

Finally, although they promote their offer as "risk free" with "100% satisfaction guaranteed," Defendants fail to disclose, or disclose clearly, material terms of their return policy.<sup>23</sup> Defendants fail to disclose clearly that opened product must be returned and received by Defendants within 10 days of placing the order to avoid a \$97.88 fee.<sup>24</sup> Defendants also fail to disclose clearly that after 10 days, only unopened products may be returned for a refund—and that no refunds will be provided for any product returned after 30 days.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>12 | 21</sup> App. 675 ¶3; App. 692 ¶3; App. 697 ¶5; App. 705 ¶3; App. 728 ¶4; App. 731 ¶3; App. 734 ¶3; App. 738 ¶5; App. 742 ¶6; App. 755 ¶5; App. 761 ¶4; See also App. 715 ¶4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>22</sup> App. 652 ¶6; App. 676 ¶6; App. 693 ¶4; App. 706 ¶6; App 735 ¶5.

<sup>App. 650-52 ¶¶2-6; App. 653 ¶10; App. 677 ¶8; App. 716 ¶8; App. 737 ¶2;
App. 744 ¶9; App. 756 ¶8; See also App. 669 ¶14; App. 675 ¶2; App. 692 ¶2;
App. 707 ¶7; App. 714 ¶3; App. 728 ¶7; App. 731 ¶2; App. 732 ¶7; App. 735 ¶7;
App. 739 ¶7; App. 760 ¶3; App. 762 ¶7.</sup> 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>24</sup> App. 650-52 ¶¶2-6; App. 652-53 ¶¶7, 10; App. 693 ¶5; App. 715 ¶4; App. 728 ¶7; App. 737 ¶¶2-3; App. 744 ¶9; App. 755 ¶4, App. 756 ¶8; See also App. 675 ¶2; App. 754 ¶3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>25</sup> App. 652-53 ¶¶7-10; App. 693 ¶5; App. 728 ¶7; App. 744 ¶9; App. 754 ¶3; App. 755 ¶4; App. 756 ¶8; App. 760 ¶3; *See also* App. 650-52 ¶¶2-6; App. 715 ¶4; App. 737 ¶¶2-3; App. 762 ¶7.

Because consumers often do not receive their "risk free trial" or "gift" until after 10 days have elapsed (or nearly elapsed), many consumers cannot return the product in time to avoid the \$97.88 fee. <sup>26</sup> Defendants also fail to disclose clearly to consumers that they often assess a "restocking" fee of up to \$15 for returning products. <sup>27</sup> Accordingly, consumers who accept Defendants' offers are likely to incur unexpected charges.

# 3. Defendants' Purported Disclosures are Inadequate

Defendants' websites do not contain a disclosure concerning the cost of the product, continuity program, or return policies until the "final step" of Defendants' ordering page. Many consumers report never seeing such a disclosure, even when they looked for a disclosure. As the screen capture below illustrates, the disclosure is in significantly smaller print and is obscured by a

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>26</sup> App. 755 ¶¶4,6; See also App. 731¶3.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>27</sup>App. 676-77 ¶7; See also App. 335 l. 8; App. 652 ¶6.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>28</sup> App. 341.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>29</sup> App. 677 ¶8; App. 714 ¶3.

variety of graphics and texts:



Information on this site is provided for informational purposes only. It is not meant to substitute for medical advice provided by your physician or other medical professional. You should not use the information contained herein for diagnosing or treating a health problem or disease, or prescribing any medication.

(screen capture from http://auraviefreetrial.com, last visited April 13, 2015; not to scale)<sup>30</sup>

In contrast, Defendants represent—in bold, red font at the top center of the page—that their trial shipment costs "\$0.00."

Even if the disclosure was prominently displayed, it fails to mention many

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>30</sup> App. 11 ¶24; App. 476.

material terms and conditions of Defendants' offer. Defendants' disclosure states:

We take great pride in the quality of our products & are confident that you will achieve phenomenal results. By submitting your order, you agree to both the terms of this offer (click link below) & to pay \$4.95 S&H for your 10 day trial. If you find this product is not for you, cancel within the 10 day trial period to avoid being billed. After your 10 day trial expires, you will be billed \$97.88 for your trial product & enrolled in our monthly autoship program for the same discounted price. Cancel anytime by calling 866.216.9336. Returned shipments are at customer's expense. This trial is limited to 1 offer per household.<sup>31</sup>

Defendants' disclosure paragraph fails to disclose: (a) that the 10-day trial period begins on the day that the product is ordered; (b) that, to avoid charges, the consumer must also return the product to Defendants before the end of the trial period; (c) that to return a product, the consumer must first obtain a Return Merchandise Authorization ("RMA") code from Defendants; (d) that consumers may not return the product for a refund after 10 days if it has been opened; (e) that consumers may not return the product for a refund after 30 days, even if it has not been opened; and (f) that a restocking fee, usually \$15, may be charged when a product is returned.

Most of the material terms and conditions of Defendants' offer are hidden in a separate, multi-page terms and conditions webpage accessible only by

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>31</sup> App. 11 ¶24;App. 476.

hyperlink.<sup>32</sup> On many of Defendants' affiliate sites, this hyperlink can be found by scrolling to the bottom of the website and clicking on a hyperlink labeled "T&C":

#### NOURISH, MOISTEN, AND PAMPER YOUR SKIN FOR A BEAUTIFUL NEW YOU!



T&C | Privacy Policy | Contact Us

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\*\*The testimonials herein were provided by real people who were not paid by the advertiser and the images are of the actual people.

\*\*\* The Free bonus gift valued at \$200.00 is free with this exclusive offer and the Processing fee of \$1.93 is included in the Shipping and Handling charge for your trial order.

(screen capture from auravietrialkit.com, last visited April 13, 2015)<sup>33</sup>

# 4. Defendants' Post-Sale Communications Do Not Disclose Material Terms

Defendants send consumers who accept their offer a confirmation email that reinforces the false impression that consumers will receive a free shipment of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>32</sup> App. 11 ¶¶ 24-25; App. 12¶¶ 26-27; App. 467-71, 476; *See also* App. 479-85, 495-500, 514-18, 523.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>33</sup> App. 467.

Defendants' skincare product.<sup>34</sup> Defendants' emails show no charges for the "risk free trial" other than the nominal shipping and handling fees.<sup>35</sup>

Defendants' emails do not disclose that consumers will be charged the full cost of the product, usually \$97.88, after 10 days unless the consumer cancels the order and returns the product during that time.<sup>36</sup> The emails do not disclose that the consumer has been enrolled into a continuity program that will result in future shipments of product and a monthly charge of \$97.88 on their credit or debit cards.<sup>37</sup> Nor do these emails state when the charge will be imposed or how consumers can avoid the charge.<sup>38</sup> Finally, the emails do not disclose that unopened products may be returned for a refund only within 30 days of ordering.<sup>39</sup>

#### B. Defendants Do Not Honor their Cancellation and Refund Policies

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<sup>14</sup> App. 715 ¶4; App. 718-19; App. 754-55 ¶3; App. 760 ¶3; App. 764; See also App. 737 ¶2; App. 739 ¶7; App. 754 ¶3; App. 756 ¶8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>35</sup> App. 715 ¶4; App. 718-19; App. 737 ¶2; App. 739 ¶7; App. 754 ¶3; App. 756 ¶8; App. 760 ¶3; App. 764.

 $<sup>^{36}</sup>$  *Id*.

 $<sup>18 \</sup>parallel ^{37} Id$ .

 $<sup>19 \</sup>parallel ^{38} Id$ 

 $<sup>20 \</sup>parallel ^{39} Id.$ 

After consumers learn that Defendants have charged their accounts and signed 1 them up for a continuity plan, they often have significant difficulty receiving a 2 refund and cancelling the continuity plan. Many consumers have difficulty 3 contacting Defendants, despite calling Defendants' toll-free number repeatedly.<sup>40</sup> 4 Even when consumers speak with one of Defendants' representatives and cancels 5 the continuity plan, consumers often receive further shipments and unauthorized 6 charges.<sup>41</sup> Other consumers report receiving multiple charges from Defendants 7 without receiving products. 42 As a result, consumers continue to incur unwanted 8 and unauthorized charges. 9 10

When consumers call Defendants to complain about unauthorized charges, Defendants often tell consumers that, while the continuity plan will be cancelled, their money will not be refunded. In some instances, Defendants offer consumers only a partial refund. Other times, Defendants condition a partial

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<sup>15</sup>  $\|^{40}$  See App. 667 ¶5; App. 668 ¶9; App. 676 ¶¶4-6; App. 697 ¶6; App. 715 ¶5; App. 735 ¶5; App. 755 ¶5.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>41</sup> App. 716 ¶6.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>42</sup> App. 731-32 ¶¶3-4.

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 $<sup>^{43}</sup>$  See App. 652 ¶6; App. 693 ¶4; App. 743 ¶7; See also App. 715 ¶5.

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 $<sup>^{44}</sup>$  See App. 669 ¶13; App. 676-77 ¶7; App. 706 ¶6; App. 728 ¶5; App. 735 ¶5; App. 755-56 ¶6; App. 761 ¶5.

refund upon the consumers' promise or signed statement that they will not complain to any government authority or to the Better Business Bureau.<sup>45</sup>

Further, Defendants often do not honor return policies, even when consumers satisfy them. For example, Defendants often tell consumers that they cannot obtain a refund on any product returned even when the product remains unopened and the 30-day period has not yet elapsed, contrary to Defendants' terms and conditions. <sup>46</sup> Some consumers report being refused a refund by Defendants despite sending the product back within the permissible time period, with Defendants' customer service representative stating they never received the return shipment. <sup>47</sup> In other instances, consumers receive refunds from Defendants only after they have complained to their credit card companies, state regulatory authorities, or the Better Business Bureaus. Even in those instances, however, Defendants have not always issued full refunds. <sup>48</sup>

# C. Defendants Deceive their Payment Network and Threaten Consumers who Seek Chargebacks

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>45</sup> See App. 693 ¶4; App. 698 ¶8.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>46</sup> See App. 735 ¶5; App. 312 *l*. 19.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>47</sup> See App. 706 ¶6; See also App. 743 ¶7.

 $<sup>^{48}</sup>$  App. 669 ¶¶12-13; App. 678 ¶11; App. 694 ¶8; App. 707-8 ¶9, App. 713; App. 745 ¶11; App. 752-53; App. 758-59.

In numerous instances, Defendants submit inaccurate or false information to financial institutions and otherwise obstruct consumers' efforts to seek chargebacks or refunds for unauthorized credit card charges.<sup>49</sup>

Merchants that accept credit card payments contract with financial institutions called "acquiring banks" and use the services of payment processing companies. Acquiring banks have various rules that a merchant must follow to qualify for and retain access to a merchant account. Acquiring banks want to avoid losses associated with consumer reversals of credit card transactions (termed "chargebacks"). Therefore, acquiring banks often require that merchants clearly and prominently disclose to consumers the terms and conditions of a sale before the consumer authorizes payment. Acquiring banks may suspend or terminate merchant accounts that have a high rate of chargebacks.

Many of Defendants' charges for their trial offer and continuity program result in chargeback requests by consumers.<sup>51</sup> In an effort to maintain access to credit card processing, Defendants have established as many as two dozen merchant accounts, held by shell corporations, that use a variety of billing

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>49</sup> See App. 783-84 ¶¶15-16.

<sup>19 | &</sup>lt;sup>50</sup> See App. 279.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>51</sup> See App. 27 ¶53; See also App. 783-84 ¶¶15-16, 18.

descriptors.<sup>52</sup> Many of these shell companies use the same payment processing companies and acquiring banks.<sup>53</sup>

To prevent consumers from receiving chargebacks for unauthorized charges, Defendants submit falsified documents to oppose consumers' chargeback requests. <sup>54</sup> These falsified documents are altered or doctored to make it appear that Defendants' websites require consumers to click a box on the ordering screen indicating they have read and agreed to the terms and conditions of their offer to complete a purchase <sup>55</sup> and show a disclosure that is larger and more prominent than appears on their actual websites. <sup>56</sup> Defendants also attempt to discourage chargebacks by threatening, in their terms and conditions, to refer consumers who request chargebacks to authorities for potential criminal prosecution:

CHARGEBACKS AND REVERSALS. We handle all chargebacks and reversals as potential cases of fraudulent use of our product offer and/or theft of product. In cases where we have provided a product and we have verified that a client has received a product and/or refused or returned product(s), whether or not they have used the product in any way, possible actions taken by the company may include filing a complaint with the Internet Crimes Bureau and/or local authorities, or

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>52</sup> See App. 784 ¶¶17-18; App. 786-88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>53</sup> See App. 786-88.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>54</sup> See App. 783-84 ¶¶15-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>55</sup> See App. 783-84 ¶¶15-16.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>56</sup> See App. 266, App. 470, App. 498, App. 517, App. 775.

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fraudulent use or theft of product(s).<sup>57</sup>

III. The Defendants

# A. Corporate Defendants

# 1. BunZai Media Group, Inc. ("BunZai")

reporting the incident to the appropriate authorities in your

state to investigate theft of product and possible mail fraud which is a Federal Crime. All cases of chargeback requests

that all activity and IP address information is captured. This digital proof of whom and where the order was placed will be

submitted to the proper authorities. This information may be used in a civil and criminal case against a customer if there is

will be vigorously fought by the Company. BE AWARE that if you choose to claim your online transaction was fraudulent

BunZai Media Group, Inc. ('BunZai''), also doing business as AuraVie, Miracle FaceKit, and Attitude Skincare, was a California corporation incorporated in January 2010 with its principal place of business at 7900 Gloria Avenue, Van Nuys, California 91406 ("the Van Nuys Office"). <sup>58</sup> BunZai, along with Defendant Pinnacle Logistics, Inc., is at the center of Defendants' scam. The company marketed skincare products using a variety of names through the shell corporations. <sup>59</sup> BunZai formally dissolved in June 2013. <sup>60</sup> BunZai was owned by

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>57</sup> See App. 266, App. 470, App. 498, App. 517, App. 775.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>58</sup> See App. 158.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>59</sup> App. 780 ¶5.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>60</sup> App. 558.

Defendants Alon Nottea, Igor Latsanovski, and Khristopher Bond. 61 Defendant 1 Motti Nottea was a Chief Executive Officer ("CEO"). 62 2 3 2. Pinnacle Logistics, Inc. ("Pinnacle") 4 Pinnacle Logistics, Inc. ("Pinnacle"), another California corporation, was 5 incorporated in June 2012<sup>63</sup> and took over BunZai's marketing and sale of the 6 various skincare products in 2013.<sup>64</sup> Pinnacle's principle place of business was at 7 the same location as BunZai, at the Van Nuys Office.<sup>65</sup> However, it recently 8 moved to 6914 Canby, Ste. 107, Reseda, California 91335 ("the Reseda 9 Office"). 66 With the formation of Pinnacle, virtually nothing changed in BunZai's 10 operation except for its name.<sup>67</sup> The principals are the same (save one, 11 Khristopher Bond, who left the enterprise), 68 and the location, employees, sales 12 13 <sup>61</sup> App. 158. 14 <sup>62</sup> App. 254, App. 258. 15 <sup>63</sup> App. 3 ¶7; App. 559. 16 <sup>64</sup> App. 69; App. 779-80 ¶4. 17 <sup>65</sup> App. 779 ¶2. 18 <sup>66</sup> App. 33 ¶70; App. 149. 19 <sup>67</sup> App. 779-80 ¶4. 20 <sup>68</sup> App. 42.

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tactics, and product remain unchanged.<sup>69</sup> Defendants Alon Nottea, Doron Nottea, 1 and Oz Mizrahi own or operate Pinnacle.<sup>70</sup> 2 3 3. Media Urge, Inc. Media Urge, Inc., was a California corporation with its principal place of 4 business at the same office campus as the Reseda Office.<sup>71</sup> The corporation was 5 formed in September 2012 and formally dissolved in July 2014. 72 This company 6 secured third-party advertising, tracked sales, and designed marketing materials.<sup>73</sup> 7 Media Urge, Inc., and Pinnacle are owned by the same parent company, 8 Defendant CalEnergy, Inc.<sup>74</sup> While Pinnacle took over BunZai's product 9 fulfilment, Media Urge appears to have taken over its affiliate marketing and 10 advertising work.<sup>75</sup> 11 12 13 <sup>69</sup> App. 779-80 ¶4. 14 <sup>70</sup> App. 3 ¶7; App. 560; App. 779-80 ¶4. 15 <sup>71</sup> App. 55. 16 <sup>72</sup> App. 8 ¶16; App. 596, 599. 17 <sup>73</sup> App. 55, 60-61. 18 <sup>74</sup> App. 809. 19

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<sup>75</sup> App. 61, App. 63, App. 69.

# 4. CalEnergy, Inc.

CalEnergy, Inc., a California corporation established in September 2009,<sup>76</sup> has held itself out as the parent company of Pinnacle and Media Urge, Inc.<sup>77</sup> The CEO and registered agent for CalEnergy, Inc., is Defendant Igor Latsanovski,<sup>78</sup> an owner of BunZai<sup>79</sup> and the CEO of Defendant Zen Mobile Media, Inc.<sup>80</sup> Igor Latsanovski has also held himself out to be the founder, president, and multinational manager of the company.<sup>81</sup>

# 5. Adageo, LLC

Adageo, LLC, a California limited liability corporation incorporated in September 2012, <sup>82</sup> is a consulting company Alon Nottea is an owner. <sup>83</sup> Its registered address is 16161 Ventura Boulevard, #378, Encino, California 91436. <sup>84</sup>

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>76</sup> App. 603.

<sup>13 | &</sup>lt;sup>77</sup> App. 809.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>78</sup> App. 8-9 ¶19; App. 604.

<sup>15 | &</sup>lt;sup>79</sup> App. 158.

<sup>16 80</sup> App. 26 52; App. 275; App. 786-88.

<sup>17 | 81</sup> App. 617.

<sup>18 82</sup> App. 8; App. 600.

<sup>19 83</sup> App. 60.

<sup>20 | 84</sup> App. 8 ¶ 17; App. 601.

Oz Mizrahi and Media Urge, Inc., hired Adageo, LLC, to consult Media Urge regarding affiliate marketing.<sup>85</sup>

#### 6. SBM Management, Inc.

SBM Management, Inc., was a California corporation was a California corporation with its principal place of business at 655 North Central Avenue, Suite 1700, Glendale, California 91203. A corporate credit card registered to SBM Management, Inc., was used to pay for numerous AuraVie "risk free trial" websites, <sup>86</sup> and the an SBM Management, Inc., email address was listed as the point of contact. <sup>87</sup>

#### 7. The Shell Corporations

Defendants use numerous shell corporations to further their scheme. These shell corporations include: Agoa Holdings, Inc.; Zen Mobile Media, Inc.; SafeHaven Ventures, Inc.; Heritage Alliance Group, Inc.; AMD Financial Network, Inc.; Kai Media, Inc.; and Insight Media, Inc. ("shell corporations"). 88 All of the shell corporations are California corporations. And although the shell corporations have various mailing addresses, they are in fact all operated from the

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>85</sup> App. 61, 63.

<sup>18 86</sup> App. 34 ¶73-76.

<sup>19 | &</sup>lt;sup>87</sup> App. 229.

<sup>20 88</sup> App. 782 10; App. 786-88.

same location by employees of BunZai and Pinnacle. <sup>89</sup> Each shell corporation is associated with at least one merchant account that the Individual Defendants use to process payments for AuraVie and related products. <sup>90</sup> By processing payments through a variety of accounts and a variety of names, the Individual Defendants attempt to disguise their chargeback rates from the credit card network. <sup>91</sup>

# **B.** Individual Defendants

Each of the Individual Defendants own, operate, or manage one or more of the Corporate Defendants, and each shares in the profits from the enterprise's illegal operation. Further, each of the Individual Defendants: (1) participated directly in the wrongful acts or had authority to control them; and (2) had some knowledge, either actual or constructive, of the wrongful acts.

#### 1. Alon Nottea

Alon Nottea, along with Defendants Igor Latsanovski and Khristopher

Bond, was an owner of BunZai. 92 He was a principal or manager of Pinnacle 93 and

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>89</sup> App. 780 ¶5.

<sup>17 90</sup> App. 784 ¶17; App. 786-88.

<sup>18 | &</sup>lt;sup>91</sup> App. 784-85 ¶¶ 18-19.

<sup>19 | &</sup>lt;sup>92</sup> App. 158.

<sup>20 | 93</sup> App. 780 ¶6.

also worked as a consultant for Media Urge, <sup>94</sup> assisting them in taking over some of BunZai's business. Alon is listed as mailing and billing contact for the enterprise's websites, <sup>95</sup> and a business credit card in his name was used to pay for many of the websites. <sup>96</sup> Alon Nottea was at one time listed as the billing and shipping contact for many of the enterprise's websites. <sup>97</sup>Alon Nottea was described by a former employee as the head of the common enterprise, <sup>98</sup> and he was integrally involved in the day-to-day operations of the scam. <sup>99</sup> Because he oversaw operations in both the chargeback and customer-service departments at BunZai and Pinnacle, <sup>100</sup> he had actual knowledge that consumers were being injured by unauthorized charges to their credit and debit card accounts.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>94</sup> App. 60.

<sup>15 | 95</sup> App. 223, 225-26, 228.

<sup>16 | 96</sup> App. 217-18, 220-21, 223, 225-26, 228.

<sup>17 | &</sup>lt;sup>97</sup> App. 217-228.

<sup>18 98</sup> App. 780 ¶6; App. 781 ¶9.

<sup>19 99</sup> App. 780-81 ¶¶6-7, 9; App. 783 ¶15; App. 784-85 ¶18.

<sup>20 | 100</sup> App. 780 ¶6.

#### 2. Motti Nottea

Motti Nottea, Alon's father, held himself out as a CEO of BunZai. <sup>101</sup> He also is or was the CEO or owner of DSA Holdings, Inc., <sup>102</sup> one of the shell corporations used to process payments for Defendants' continuity plans. <sup>103</sup> His position as CEO of BunZai and DSA Holdings, Inc., demonstrates an ability to control the companies. His management of at least one of the enterprises' merchant account suggests that he had actual knowledge of the unauthorized charges at issue.

# 3. Doron Nottea

Doron Nottea, Alon's brother, was a manager at BunZai and Pinnacle.<sup>104</sup> He handled Pinnacle and the shell companies' finances.<sup>105</sup> His position as manager and role in handling the Corporate Defendants' finances evinces his knowledge of the deceptiveness of the enterprise and of the resulting consumer injury.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>101</sup> App. 254, 258, 260, 274.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>102</sup> App. 787.

<sup>18 | 103</sup> App. 785¶19.

<sup>19 | 104</sup> App. 781 ¶9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>105</sup> App. 782 ¶10.

# 4. Igor Latsanovski

Igor Latsanovski was an owner of BunZai<sup>106</sup> and Zen Mobile Media, Inc., <sup>107</sup> as well as a president, <sup>108</sup> multinational manager, <sup>109</sup> and the registered agent for CalEnergy, Inc. <sup>110</sup> His name is also listed on the Zen Mobile Media, Inc., merchant account, <sup>111</sup> suggesting knowledge of the company's business practices and high chargeback requests. As an owner, Latsanovski had authority to control his companies' practices. His participation in obtaining merchant accounts for the enterprise shows that he was aware of the unauthorized billing scheme or, alternatively, was recklessly indifferent to the illegal business practices.

#### 5. Oz Mizrahi

Oz Mizrahi is the CEO and owner of Pinnacle<sup>112</sup> and was one of the "heads" of the company. He actively participated in Defendants' illegal scheme.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>106</sup> App. 158-59; App. 781 ¶8.

<sup>15 | 107</sup> App. 786-88.

<sup>16 | 108</sup> App. 617.

<sup>17 | 109</sup> App. 617.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>110</sup> App. 8-9 ¶18, App. 604-605.

<sup>19 | 111</sup> App. 5 ¶11; App. 26 ¶52.

In addition to managing the business itself,<sup>114</sup> he registered a post office box in the name of Pinnacle and AuraVie in which he held himself out as "administrator" of Pinnacle.<sup>115</sup> His position as an owner of two of the companies demonstrates an ability to control the companies' business practices, including the practices giving rise to the complaint.

#### 6. Roi Reuveni

Roi Reuveni, a cousin of the Nottea brothers, Alon and Doron, and was a manager of the customer service and chargebacks departments at BunZai and Pinnacle. As manager of the chargebacks department, he drafted the deceptive template used to respond to financial institutions with false information when consumers requested chargebacks. He is also the CEO or owner of Agoa Holdings, Inc., one of the shell corporations used to process payments for Defendants' continuity plans. Reuveni's knowledge of the deceptiveness of the

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113 App. 780 ¶4.
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<sup>16 | 114</sup> See App. 780 ¶4.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>115</sup> App. 553.

<sup>18 | 116</sup> App. 781 ¶9.

<sup>19 | 117</sup> App. 781 ¶9.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>118</sup> App. 786-87.

enterprise can be inferred from his positions as manager and CEO of companies in the enterprise and role in supervising the customer service and chargeback departments.

#### 7. Khristopher Bond, also known as Raymond Ibbot

Khristopher Bond, also known as Raymond Ibbot, was an owner of BunZai along with Igor Latsanovski and Alon Nottea. <sup>119</sup> A former employee stated that Bond trained him as an AuraVie customer service representative and prepared him to respond to customer complaints. <sup>120</sup> He eventually left the common enterprise, leading to the dissolution of BunZai. <sup>121</sup> His position as manager and role in supervising the customer service department shows his participation in and actual knowledge of the deceptive enterprise.

### IV. Legal Argument

To put an immediate stop to Defendants' ongoing deceptive practices and to preserve the possibility of effective final relief, the FTC requests the issuance of an *ex parte* TRO with provisions for asset and document preservation, the appointment of a receiver, immediate access to Defendants' business premises and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>119</sup> See App. 158-59; see also App. 780-81 ¶7.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>120</sup> App. 782 ¶11.

<sup>20 | &</sup>lt;sup>121</sup> App. 52.

records, and an order to show cause why a preliminary injunction should not issue. As shown below, the Court possesses authority to enter the relief sought, the evidence demonstrates that the FTC is likely to succeed on the merits, and the equities weigh in favor of the requested relief.

#### A. The Court Possesses Authority to Grant the Requested Relief.

Section 13(b) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b), gives the FTC authority to seek, and the district court authority to grant, both a permanent injunction against violations of any provisions of law enforced by the FTC and "any ancillary relief necessary to accomplish complete justice." This ancillary relief can include, among other remedies, an *ex parte* temporary restraining order, a preliminary injunction, an asset freeze, and the appointment of a receiver. <sup>123</sup> On numerous occasions, courts of this district have acted under the authority of Section 13(b) to grant preliminary relief similar to that sought here. <sup>124</sup>

15 Telephone 122 FTC v. H. N. Singer, Inc., 668 F.2d 1107, 1111–13 (9th Cir. 1982).

<sup>123</sup> E.g., FTC v. Affordable Media, LLC, 179 F.3d 1228, 1232 & n.2 (9th Cir. 1999) (ex parte TRO and preliminary injunction including asset freeze); FTC v. Am. Nat'l Cellular, Inc., 810 F.2d 1511, 1512 (9th Cir. 1987) (TRO and preliminary injunction including asset freeze and appointment of a receiver).

 <sup>124</sup> FTC v. Am. Mortg. Consulting Grp., No. SACV12-01561 DOC (JPRx), 2012
 WL 4718927 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2012); FTC v. Consumer Advocates Grp. Experts,
 LLC, No. CV12-04736 DDP (CWx), 2012 WL 2061702 (C.D. Cal. June 7, 2012);
 FTC v. National Foreclosure Relief, Inc., No. SACV09-117-DOC(MLGx), 2009
 WL 650401 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2009); FTC v. Myricks, No. CV05-7013 CAS

1	In determining whether to grant preliminary relief under Section 13(b), a
2	court must consider two factors: (1) the FTC's likelihood of ultimate success and
3	(2) whether the public equities outweigh any private equities. 125 "District courts
4	apply a more lenient standard to the FTC when it is seeking an injunction than
5	they do to private litigants." <sup>126</sup> Unlike private litigants, the FTC does not need to
6	prove irreparable injury, 127 which is presumed in a statutory enforcement action. 128
7	Because irreparable injury is presumed, the burden of establishing success on the
8	merits is decreased, and a court "need only to find some chance of probable
9	success on the merits" in order to award preliminary relief. <sup>129</sup> In addition, when

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FMOX, 2005 WL 3670908 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 27, 2005); *FTC v. Arlington Press, Inc.*, No. CV-98-9260-MMM(CWX), 1999 WL 33574020 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 11, 1999);

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<sup>125</sup> FTC v. Warner Commc'ns, Inc., 742 F.2d 1156, (9th Cir. 1984) (citing FTC v. Simeon Mgmt. Corp., 532 F.2d 708, 713-714 (9th Cir. 1976).

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<sup>126</sup> FTC v. Health Formulas, LLC, Case No. 2:14-cv-01649-RFB-GWF, 2015 WL 2130504, at \*5 (D. Nev. May 6, 2015) (citing FTC v. Affordable Media, 179 F.3d 1228, 1233 (9th Cir. 1999)).

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<sup>127</sup> Warner Commc'ns, 742 F.2d at 1159.

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<sup>128</sup> FTC v. World Wide Factors, Ltd., 882 F.2d 344, 347 (9th Cir. 1989); see also See United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1987).

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<sup>129</sup> *Id.* (quoting United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 176 (9th Cir. 1987)).

weighing the equities, the public interest receives greater weight than private interests. 130

#### B. The FTC is Likely to Succeed on the Merits

The evidence in the record amply demonstrates that the FTC is likely to succeed on the merits of its claims that Defendants have violated Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), Section 4 of ROSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 8403, Section 907(a) of EFTA, 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a), and Section 205.10(b) of Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(b). Further, the record illustrates that the equities weigh heavily in favor of the requested relief.

#### 1. Defendants are Violating Section 5 of the FTC Act

Section 5(a) of the FTC Act empowers the FTC to prevent "deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce." An act or practice is deceptive if "first, there is a representation, omission, or practice that, second, is likely to mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and third, the representation, omission, or practice is material." A misrepresentation may be

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>130</sup> Id. (citing Warner Comm'cns, 742 F.2d at 1165).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>131</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>132</sup> FTC v. Gill, 265 F.3d 944, 950 (9th Cir. 2001); FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095 (9th Cir. 1994) (quoting and adopting the standard set forth in *In re Cliffdale Assocs.*, 103 F.T.C. 110, 164–65 (1984)). Under Section 5, the FTC is not required to prove that a defendant intended to deceive consumers, nor is a

either express or implied.<sup>133</sup> A representation, omission, or practice is material if it "involves information that is important to consumers and, hence, likely to affect their choice of, or conduct regarding, a product."<sup>134</sup>

An act or practice is unfair, and also violates Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, if it causes, or is likely to cause, substantial injury to consumers that is not reasonably avoidable and is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition.

Here, Defendants engage in deceptive and unfair practices in violation of Sections 5(a) by: (i) failing to disclose clearly material terms of their offer; (ii) making false "risk free trial" claims; (iii) making false representations regarding

defendant's good faith a defense to liability. FTC v. World Travel Vacation
Brokers, Inc., 861 F.2d 1020, 1029 (7th Cir. 1988); FTC v. NCH, Inc., 1995-2
Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶71.114, at 75.346 (D. Ney, 1995) (O'Connor, I.): FTC v.

Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶71,114, at 75,346 (D. Nev. 1995) (O'Connor, J.); *FTC v. Pioneer Enters., Inc.*, 1992-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶70,043, at 69,156 (D. Nev. 1992) (George, C.L.)

14 | 1992) (George, C.J.).

<sup>133</sup> FTC v. Figgie Int'l, Inc., 994 F.2d 595, 604 (9th Cir. 1993) ("[N]othing in statute or case law . . . protects from liability those who merely imply their deceptive claims . . . .").

<sup>134</sup> FTC v. Cyberspace.com LLC, 453 F.3d 1196, 1201 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Cliffdale Assocs., 103 F.T.C. at 165). The FTC need not prove actual reliance by each individual consumer. Figgie Int'l, 994 F.2d at 605. Requiring such proof would defeat the intent of the FTC Act and would frustrate prosecutions of large consumer redress actions. Id. Instead, a presumption of actual reliance arises once the FTC has proved that the defendant made material misrepresentations, that they were widely disseminated, and that consumers purchased the defendant's product. Id. at 605–06.

their Better Business Bureau rating and accreditation status; and (iv) unfairly
charging consumers without authorization.

i. Defendants Fail to Disclose Clearly the Material
Terms of Their Offer and Falsely Represent that their
Trial Offer is "Risk Free"

As alleged in Counts I and II of the Complaint, Defendants use trickery to
obtain consumers' credit card information. The Defendants represent that the
products they sell are available on a "risk free" basis—consumers need only pay

their offer. In particular, the Defendants fail to disclose clearly that their "risk free" trial offer of product converts into a \$97.88 charge after just 10 days.

Further, Defendants fail to disclose when the trial begins and ends; that consumers are automatically enrolled into a negative option continuity plan with monthly charges; or how consumers can cancel their membership in this program.

shipping—but Defendants then bury material, contradictory terms concerning

An advertisement that fails to disclose material information is deceptive. <sup>135</sup> Importantly, numerous courts have held that an inconspicuous disclosure does not remedy the deceptiveness of a material omission. <sup>136</sup>

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>135</sup> Simeon Mgmt. Corp. v. FTC, 579 F.2d 1137, 1146 (9th Cir. 1978).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>136</sup> FTC v. Cyberspace.com LLC, No. C00-1806L, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25564, \*8-9 (W.D. Wash. July 10, 2002) (holding that a fine print disclosure was inadequate to escape liability), *aff'd* 453 F.3d 1196, 1200 (9th Cir. 2006) (collection case where deception was found because fine print disclosures were inadequate); FTC v. Direct Marketing Concepts, Inc., 624 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir.

Count III addresses Defendants' practice of falsely representing

accreditation by the Better Business Bureau ("BBB") with an "A-" rating. 137

year ago and has an "F" rating with the BBB. 139 Express product claims are

reasonable. 141 Accordingly, Defendants representations about their company's

2010) ("[d]isclaimers or qualifications in any particular ad are not adequate to avoid liability unless they are sufficiently prominent and unambiguous to change

the apparent meaning of the claims and leave an accurate impression") (quoting

Removatron Intern. Corp. v. FTC, 884 F.2d 1489, 1497 (1st Cir. 1989)); FTC v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 778 F.2d 35, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (holding

that an advertisement's description of cigarette tar content was deceptive despite a fine print disclosure at the bottom of the ad); FTC v. Porter & Deitsch, 605 F.2d

294, 301 (7th Cir. 1979) (upholding FTC and finding that disclosures "buried in

These representations are false. 138 AuraVie had its accreditation revoked over a

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7 presumed to be material, 140 and reliance upon such claims is presumptively

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small print" were inadequate to qualify weight loss claims in advertising); *FTC v*.

14 *Gill*, 71 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1044 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (disclaimers made in contract for credit repair services were insufficient to counteract advertising claims about the

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16 | 137 App. 467.1.

service).

17 | 138 App. 789-90 ¶5.

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<sup>139</sup> App. 789-90 ¶5.

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<sup>140</sup> FTC v. Pantron I Corp., 33 F.3d 1088, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1994).

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<sup>141</sup> FTC v. Five-Star Auto Club, Inc., 97 F. Supp. 2d 502, 528 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).

#### MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF TRO APPLICATION

BBB rating and accreditation status are materially deceptive in violation of Section 5 of the FTC.

## iii. Defendants Unfairly Charge Consumers without Authorization

As alleged in Count IV, Defendants routinely charge consumers' credit or debit cards without consumers' express informed consent. Such conduct is consistently held to be unfair under the FTC Act. 142

## 2. Defendants are Violating the Restore Shoppers Online Confidence Act

Section 4 of ROSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 8403, generally prohibits charging consumers for goods or services sold on the Internet through a negative option feature, unless the seller clearly and conspicuously discloses all material terms of the transaction before obtaining the consumer's billing information, obtains the consumer's express informed consent before making the charge, and provides a simple mechanism to stop recurring charges. Defendants' continuity plans are a

<sup>18 | 142</sup> See, e.g., FTC v. J.K. Publ'ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1201 (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. Global Mktg. Grp., Inc., 594 F. Supp. 2d 1281, 1288-89 (M.D. Fla. 2008).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>143</sup> See 15 U.S.C. § 8403 (2006).

negative option feature, as defined by the TSR. 144 Under Section 5 of ROSCA, 15 U.S.C. § 8404, a violation of ROSCA is a violation of a rule promulgated under Section 18 of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 57a.

As described in Count V of the Complaint, Defendants violate ROSCA in three ways. First, Defendants fail to disclose clearly, if at all, material terms of their continuity plan. Second, Defendants routinely charge consumers for continuity plans without obtaining their express informed consent. Third, Defendants fail to provide a simple mechanism for cancelling the continuity plan.

### 3. Defendants are Violating the Electronic Fund Transfer Act and Regulation E

The Electronic Fund Transfer Act and its implementing Regulation E regulate the circumstances under which a merchant may make regularly recurring debits from a consumer's bank account. EFTA and Regulation E require that, before a merchant can make such recurring debits, it must obtain a written

<sup>144</sup> It is unlawful "for any person to charge or attempt to charge any consumer for

any goods or services sold in a transaction effected on the Internet through a

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negative option feature (as defined in the Federal Trade Commission's Telemarketing Sales Rule in part 310 of title 16, Code of Federal Regulations)" without clearly and conspicuously disclosing material terms, obtaining a consumer's informed consent, and providing a simple mechanism to stop recurring charges. 15 U.S.C. § 8403 (2006). The TSR defines a negative option feature as "an offer or agreement to sell or provide any goods or services, a provision under which the consumer's silence or failure to take an affirmative action to reject goods or services or to cancel the agreement is interpreted by the seller as acceptance of the offer." 16 C.F.R. § 310.2(u) (2006).

authorization signed or similarly authenticated by the consumer. For an authorization to be valid, the terms of the preauthorized transfer must be "clear and readily understandable" and the authorization "should evidence the consumer's identity and assent to the authorization." Moreover, a copy of the authorization must be provided to the consumer. These protections ensure that consumers' consent to recurring debits will be knowing and informed. A consumer's rights under EFTA cannot be waived.

Defendants' business practices fail to comply with EFTA for several reasons. First, Defendants' terms and conditions regarding recurring monthly fees are not clear and readily understandable. In fact, this information is concealed in documents available only by hyperlink or in hard-to-read disclosures. Further, Defendants' websites are covered with claims that their offer is "risk free" and other directly contradictory statements.

Second, Defendants' websites or terms and conditions pages cannot serve as the consumer's "copy" of the authorization, as required by 15 U.S.C. §

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>145</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 1693e(a) (2006); 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(b) (2006).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>146</sup> Federal Reserve Board's Official Staff Commentary to Regulation E, 12 C.F.R. Part 205, Supp I, ¶ 10(b), comments (5) & (6).

<sup>19 | 147 15</sup> U.S.C. § 1693e(a); 12 C.F.R. § 205.10(b).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>148</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 1693*l* (2006).

1693e(a), because it is not signed or similarly authenticated by the consumer and does not evidence the consumer's identity and assent to additional transfers. In short, consumers who purchased Defendants' products using their debit cards were not authorizing recurring debits from their bank accounts and never received a copy of any purported authorization for such debits. In light of this evidence, the Commission has clearly demonstrated a likelihood of success on Count VI of the Complaint.

#### C. Balancing of the Equities Serves the Public Interest

The FTC has demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits of every count contained in the Complaint, and injunctive relief is further warranted because the public equities outweigh the private equities. The public equities are served by enjoining deceptive or unfair acts or practices that violate the law, maintaining status quo over assets and business documents relating to Defendants' law violations until a fair and impartial hearing may be held, and preserving the Court's ability to award full and effective final relief at trial or other disposition of this matter. <sup>149</sup>

Defendants have operated their deceptive scheme since at least 2010, and have received millions of dollars in ill-gotten gains from hundreds of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>149</sup> See World Wide Factors, 882 F.2d at 347.

consumers. Consumers nationwide lost money as a result of Defendants'
misrepresentations. Despite receiving numerous complaints from the BBB, state
attorneys general, and consumers themselves, Defendants continue to promote
their program, products, and services in the same deceptive manner.

Absent injunctive relief, there is a strong likelihood that future violations will occur. Here, the public's interest in immediately halting this unlawful scheme and preventing the victimization of additional consumers far outweighs any limited interest Defendants may have in continuing to operate their businesses.<sup>152</sup>

#### D. Defendants are Each Liable for the Law Violations

# 1. The Corporate Defendants Operate as a Common Enterprise

Defendants run their scam through a tangled web of companies that operate as a common enterprise. Participants in a common enterprise are held jointly and

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>150</sup> App. 2 ¶6, 27 ¶53.

 $<sup>^{151}</sup>$  See App. 791-806; App. 650 ¶1; App. 666 ¶1; App. 675 ¶1; App. 692 ¶1; App. 696 ¶1; App. 705 ¶1; App. 714 ¶1; App. 731 ¶1; App. 734 ¶1; App. 737 ¶1; App. 741 ¶1; App. 754 ¶1; App. 760 ¶1.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>152</sup> See World Wide Factors, 882 F.2d at 347 (affirming the district court's finding that "there is no oppressive hardship to defendants in requiring them to comply with the FTC Act, refrain from fraudulent representation or preserve their assets from dissipation or concealment").

severally liable for the law violations. <sup>153</sup> To determine the existence of a common 1 enterprise, a court may consider a variety of factors including: common control; 2 the sharing of office space and officers; whether business is transacted through a 3 maze of interrelated companies; the commingling of corporate funds and failure to 4 maintain separation of companies; unified advertising; pooled resources and staff; 5 and evidence which reveals that no real distinction existed between the Corporate 6 Defendants<sup>154</sup> It has been held by the Ninth Circuit that "entities constitute a 7 common enterprise when they exhibit either vertical or horizontal commonality – 8 qualities that may be demonstrated by a showing of strongly interdependent 9 economic interests or the pooling of assets and revenues." 155 10

The Corporate Defendants have operated as a common enterprise under the leadership of Alon Nottea and the other Individual Defendants. <sup>156</sup> All 14 Corporate Defendants are owned and operated by Alon Nottea or one of his

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 $<sup>^{153}</sup>$  FTC v. J.K. Publ'ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. Wolf, 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) ¶ 71,713, at 79,080 (S.D. Fla. 1997);

 $<sup>^{154}</sup>$  FTC v. J.K. Publ'ns, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1202 (C.D. Cal. 2000); FTC v. Wolf, 1997-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)  $\P$  71,713, at 79,080 (S.D. Fla. 1997).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>155</sup> FTC v. Network Servs. Depot, Inc., 617 F.3d 1127, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010)

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>156</sup> See App. 2-10 (explaining connections between the 14 Corporate Defendants); App. 779 ¶¶4, 6.

family members or associates and all participate in the scam of luring consumers to provide billing information with false offers of "risk free trials." <sup>157</sup>

As detailed above, many of the Corporate Defendants have no business premises, employees, or business function except to process charges for Defendants' "risk free trial." Many, if not all, of the Corporate Defendants operated out of a single address. Several other factors show the intertwined nature of these companies: BunZai and Pinnacle share phone numbers, mailing addresses, and dozens of employees. Further, the finances for almost all of the corporate Defendants are derived from the sale of the same products. The finances of these Corporate Defendants are handled by the same managers and employees. Because the Corporate Defendants operate as a common enterprise, they are all jointly and severally liable for the violations alleged in the Complaint.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>157</sup> App. 2-10; App. 782 ¶10.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>158</sup> App. 780, ¶5; *Cf. J.K. Publications, Inc.*, 99 F. Supp. 2d at 1202 (finding a common enterprise where "the corporate defendants utilized at least five different merchant accounts and four fictitious business names to process over \$40 million in credit and debit card transactions").

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>159</sup> App. 779-80 ¶4 App. 782 ¶10.

<sup>19 | 160</sup> App. 2-3; App. 782 ¶10.

<sup>20 | 161</sup> App. 782 ¶10.

## 2. The Individuals are Liable for Injunctive and Monetary Relief

To obtain injunctive and monetary relief against individuals for injury to

consumers resulting from a company's conduct, the FTC must establish that the individuals both: (1) participated directly in the unlawful acts or practices or had authority to control them; and (2) had some knowledge of these acts or practices. Authority to control the company can be demonstrated by "active involvement in business affairs and the making of corporate policy, including assuming the duties of a corporate officer." The FTC may satisfy the knowledge requirement by showing either actual knowledge of the misrepresentations, reckless indifference to the truth or falsity of the misrepresentations, or an awareness of a high probability of fraud coupled with an intentional avoidance of the truth. The degree of participation in business affairs is probative of knowledge. To establish individual liability, the FTC need not show that the individual intended to defraud consumers.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>162</sup> FTC v. Publ'g Clearing House, Inc., 104 F.3d 1168, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1997); FTC v. Amy Travel Serv., Inc., 875 F.2d 564, 573 (7th Cir. 1989).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>163</sup> Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 573.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>164</sup> Publ'g Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171; Amy Travel, 875 F.2d at 574.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>165</sup> *Publ'g Clearing House*, 104 F.3d at 1170; *FTC v. Sharp*, 782 F. Supp. 1445, 1450 (D. Nev. 1991) (Pro, J.).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>166</sup> Publ'g Clearing House, 104 F.3d at 1171.

Prevent Further Harm to Consumers, Prohibit Defendants from Dissipating Assets or Destroying Documents, and to Preserve the Court's Ability to Award Effective Final Relief

As part of the permanent relief in this case, the FTC seeks restitution for the

E. An Ex Parte TRO with Asset Freeze and Receiver is Essential to

As part of the permanent relief in this case, the FTC seeks restitution for the consumer victims of AuraVie. To preserve this possibility, the FTC seeks a TRO with an immediate freeze of Defendants' assets, the appointment of a temporary receiver, access to Defendants' business premises and records, and expedited discovery. Absent such relief, there is a substantial risk that Defendants will continue to operate their deceptive scheme, dissipate their ill-gotten assets, and destroy documents to preclude satisfaction of any final order requiring monetary relief.

Such actions by Defendants are a common occurrence in FTC cases.

Defendants involved in similar scams have secreted assets, destroyed documents, and otherwise stymied courts' abilities to provide relief to consumers after learning of a federal action. The Certification and Declaration of Plaintiff's Counsel Reid Tepfer in Support of Plaintiff's: (A) *Ex Parte* Motion for Temporary Restraining Order; (B) *Ex Parte* Seal Order Application; and (C) *Ex Parte* Application for Waiver of Notice Requirement, filed contemporaneously with this motion, details the FTC's experience in many of these cases.

Further, the facts here show Defendants are particularly likely to attempt to thwart potential victim relief. Defendants have made substantial efforts to conceal

their identities and locations and operate their scam using countless fictitious business names and billing descriptors that do not reflect the real name of the 2 company. They have numerous drop box locations, business addresses, and 3 telephone numbers. Such a deceptive scheme demonstrates such an indifference to 4 the law that both the individuals and the corporations may reasonably be expected 5 to frustrate the FTC's law enforcement efforts by destroying evidence and 6 concealing or dissipating assets. Defendants' business practices amount to trickery 7 and deceit: Defendants trick consumers into providing billing information, bilk 8 them of sometimes hundreds of dollars each, and then submit false or forged 9 documents to financial institutions to prevent refunds. They have continued these 10 practices unabated by hundreds of consumer chargeback transactions and 11 complaints. 12

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Notably, a former employee informed the FTC that Defendants have planned and attempted in the past to hide assets in other companies or countries. 167 These measures were taken to hide assets from the government to avoid taxes. 168 Defendants may also have been avoiding possible government enforcement actions. Accordingly, Defendants will likely move money out of the FTC's reach quickly if given the opportunity.

 $<sup>^{167}</sup>$  See App. 13 ¶29; See FTC v. Williams, No. C11-828 MJP (W.D. Wash. 2011). <sup>168</sup> App. 13 ¶29.

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Moreover, many, if not all, of the Defendants have connections abroad. In fact, one of the key Defendants in this case, Igor Latsanovski, is currently in the process of having his lawful status in the U.S. revoked. 169 These facts demonstrate the substantial difficulties that would arise without the benefit of the preliminary relief requested below.

#### 1. The Proposed TRO Should be Entered Ex Parte

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b) permits this Court to enter ex parte orders upon a clear showing that "immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result" if notice is given to Defendants. Proper situations for ex parte relief include situations where notice would "render fruitless further prosecution of the action." Consumer fraud cases such as this fall within the category of situations where *ex parte* relief is not only appropriate but necessary to preserve the possibility of full and effective final relief.

Providing notice of this action would likely impair the FTC's ability to secure relief for consumers because it is highly likely that Defendants will dissipate assets and destroy documents—a result that would cause immediate,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>169</sup> See App. 32 ¶67; App. 612-631.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>170</sup> In re Vuitton et Fils, 606 F.2d 1, 5 (2d Cir. 1979).

irreparable harm. It is therefore appropriate, in light of the facts above, for this Court to grant the requested relief *ex parte*.<sup>171</sup>

### 2. An Asset Freeze is Critical to Preserve Effective Consumer Relief

Defendants have generated millions in income from their deceptive activities at the expense of consumers. Without a freeze of Defendants' assets, these funds will likely disappear during the course of this action. An asset freeze should be imposed where there exists a likelihood of success on the merits and there is a likelihood of dissipation of assets in the absence of an injunction.<sup>172</sup>

Defendants who engage in deceit may be considered likely to waste assets prior to resolution of the action. And as discussed extensively above,

Defendants have taken steps and made attempts to secrete assets before, possibly in anticipation of law-enforcement actions, and will likely attempt to frustrate restitution if given the opportunity.

#### 3. A Receiver is Appropriate in this Case

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>171</sup> See AT&T Broadband v. Tech Comm'n., Inc., 381 F.3d 1309, 1319 (11th Cir. 2004) (holding that *ex parte* relief is appropriate where either the defendant or persons involved in similar activities have concealed evidence or disregarded court orders in the past).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>172</sup> Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1085 n.11 (9th Cir. 2009).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>173</sup> SEC v. Manor Nursing Ctrs., Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1106 (2d Cir. 1972).

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cases in which a corporate defendant, through its management, has defrauded members of the public, "it is likely that in the absence of the appointment of a receiver to maintain the status quo, the corporate assets will be subject to diversion and waste" to the detriment of the victims. <sup>174</sup> A receiver can monitor the use of Defendants' assets, marshal and preserve records, identify assets, determine the size and extent of the fraud, and identify additional consumers who were injured. As the facts above demonstrate, diversion and waste of funds is likely without the benefit of a receiver.

It is also necessary to appoint a receiver for the Corporate Defendants. In

# 4. Expedited Discovery and Immediate Access to Defendants' Business Premises are Essential

To locate assets wrongfully obtained from defrauded consumers, the FTC respectfully requests that this court permit expedited discovery, including immediate access to Defendants' business premises and records, and order financial reporting by Defendants.

District courts are authorized to depart from normal discovery procedures and fashion discovery by order to meet discovery needs in particular cases. <sup>175</sup>

Moreover, the prompt and full disclosure of the scope and financial status of

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>174</sup> SEC v. First Fin. Group, 645 F.2d 429, 438 (5th Cir. 1981).

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>175</sup> FED. R. CIV. P. 1, 26(d), 34(b).

1	Defendants' business operations is necessary to locate and preserve the
2	Defendants' assets and business records. For these reasons, the proposed Order
3	requires that Defendants produce certain financial records and information on
4	short notice, and requires financial institutions served with the order to disclose
5	whether they are holding any of Defendants' assets.
6	V. Conclusion
7	The FTC respectfully requests that the court grant its motion for an ex parte
8	TRO with an asset freeze, appointment of a temporary receiver, and other
9	equitable relief.
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11	Respectfully submitted,
12	Dated: 6/15/15 /s/ Reid Tepfer
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MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF TRO APPLICATION