	Case 2:18-cv-00183-GMN-CWH	Document 12 Filed 02/13/18 Page 1 of 7	
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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA		
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11	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,	Case No. 2:18-cv-00183-GMN-CWH	
12	Petitioner,	FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION'S OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS'	
13	v.	MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK	
14	DONOR RELATIONS, LLC, and	OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, FOR INSUFFICIENT PROCESS,	
15	COURTESY CALL, INC.,	AND FOR INSUFFICIENT PROCESS MADE BY SPECIAL	
16	COURTEST CALL, INC.,	APPEARANCE	
17	Respondents.	Hearing date: February 20, 2018	
18		Hearing Time: 2:00 p.m.	
19			
20	Having failed to file any opposition to the Federal Trade Commission's		
20	Petition to Enforce Civil Investigative Demands (CIDs), Respondents Donor		
22	Relations, LLC, and Courtesy Call, Inc., instead have moved to dismiss the		
23	enforcement petition, contending that personal jurisdiction is lacking and service		
24	was improper. The sole basis for their motion is the novel notion that the FTC		
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summons issued by a clerk under FED. R. CIV. P. 4, instead of an order to show

should have initiated these enforcement proceedings by serving them with a

cause signed and entered by this Court. Such a summons, they further claim, is necessary to establish personal jurisdiction.

It is long established that the district courts may initiate proceedings to enforce agency process by issuing an order to show cause. Moreover, service of an order to show cause is sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. The motion to dismiss should be denied.

Argument

1.a. Respondents' insistence on a rigid and technical application of Rule 4 in proceedings to enforce FTC CIDs is both improper and contrary to longstanding precedent. As courts have recognized, "the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were written for post-complaint litigation." United States v. Markwood, 48 F.3d 969, 982 (6th Cir. 1995) (Department of Justice CID). Therefore, "[m]ost of the Rules are simply inapplicable to the pre-complaint enforcement of an administrative subpoena." Id. Accord EEOC v. Deer Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 968 F.2d 904, 906 (9th Cir. 1992) (local and FED. R. CIV. P. discovery rules inapplicable to agency subpoena enforcement proceedings "which may or may not result in any further action before the district court."); United States v. Church of Scientology of Cal., 520 F.2d 818, 821 (9th Cir. 1975) (holding, in IRS summons¹ enforcement, that FED. R.

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¹ Under 26 U.S.C. § 7602, the name of the IRS's compulsory process is the "summons," which should not be confused with the "summons" discussed in FED. R. CIV. P. 4.

CIV. P. are flexible and district court may limit their application in summary proceeding to enforce investigative process).²

This flexible approach is consistent with the intent of the Advisory Committee responsible for drafting the rules. Rule 81(a)(5) states that the Federal Rules apply to subpoena enforcement proceedings, but only to the extent that it is not "otherwise provided . . . *by court order in the proceedings*." FED. R. CIV. P. 81(a)(5) (emphasis added). As explained in the accompanying Notes, the Rule is intended to provide for a "summary determination" in process enforcement proceedings and thus "is drawn so as to permit application of the rules in the proceedings *whenever the district court deems them helpful.*" FED. R. CIV. P. 81, advisory committee notes to subdivision (a)(3) (1946 amendment) (emphasis added).

b. For these reasons, courts have consistently rejected the proposition that service of a complaint and summons are required mechanisms for initiating the resolution of disputes in agency law enforcement investigations. See In re Line of Bus. Rep. Litig., 595 F.2d at 704-05 (complaint and summons are not required to initiate proceedings to enforce FTC compulsory process); United States v. Stoltz, 525 F. Supp. 617, 620 (D.D.C. 1981) ("The proceeding here, though denominated an order to show cause rather than a complaint, and thereby shortening the time limits involved, is appropriate for a subpoena enforcement proceeding."). As the Ninth

² See also United States v. Dick, 694 F.2d 1117, 1118-19 (8th Cir. 1982) ("Further, Rule 81(a)(3) of the Federal Rules clearly gives district courts the discretionary authority to limit the applicability of the Rules."); In re Line of Bus. Rep. Litig., 595 F.2d 685, 704-05 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Rule 81 gives district courts authority to deviate from the federal rules in subpoena enforcement proceedings).

Circuit has described, "Once the Government has established its prima facie case, the district court issues an order requiring the party on whom the [IRS] summons has been served to show cause, at an enforcement hearing, why compliance with the summons should not be required." *United States v. Samuels, Kramer & Co.*, 712 F.2d 1342, 1345 (9th Cir. 1983) (IRS).

c. While a Rule 4 summons and an order to show cause both give notice, an order to show cause is better suited to the needs of administrative investigative process because it also establishes a briefing schedule and hearing date, thus facilitating a quick resolution of issues in an ongoing agency investigation. By contrast, a Rule 4 summons does none of these, but merely sets in motion the extended procedures that were crafted for plenary civil litigation. For this reason, courts – including this court – have invariably issued such orders in proceedings to enforce FTC CIDs and subpoenas, as well as compulsory process from other agencies.³ See, e.g., FTC v. Bowman, 248 F.2d 456, 457 (7th Cir. 1957); FTC v. Paglia, Case No. 2:14-cv-01480-GMN-CWH (D. Nev. 2014); see also United States v. Groo LLC, Case No. 2:17-cv-01605-RFB-PAL (D. Nev. 2017) (IRS); EEOC v. Fisher Packing & Gravel Co., Case. No. 2:-12-cv-00649-JCM-CWH (D. Nev. 2012); EEOC v. Maryland Cup Corp., 785 F.2d 471, 475 (4th Cir. 1986); United States v. Assoc'd

⁴ ³ Other recent FTC process enforcement cases include the following, all of which the courts initiated by issuing an order to show cause: *FTC v. Redwood Scientific Techs., Inc.*, Case No. 2:17-cv-07921-SJO-PLA (C.D. Cal. 2017); *FTC v. Tracers Info. Specialists, Inc.*, Misc. No. 8:16-mc-00018-VMC-TGW (M.D. Fla. 2016); *FTC v. The Western Union Co.*, Misc. No. 1:13-mc-00131-AKH (S.D.N.Y. 2013); *FTC v. Church & Dwight Co., Inc.*, Misc. No. 1:10-mc-00149-EGS/JMF (D.D.C. 2010).

Merch. Corp., 256 F. Supp. 318, 320 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (observing that IRS sought summons enforcement by order to show cause for "years").

The Order to Show Cause issued in this proceeding is no different than those entered in prior cases and follows perfectly from the agency's need for prompt resolution of these issues in order to investigate in an expeditious manner. The Order acknowledged that these are "summary" proceedings for which discovery is not allowed, except upon a specific showing of need. ECF No. 3 at 2. Citing Rule 81(a)(5) and the Advisory Committee Notes, the Order then directed the FTC to serve a copy of the Order and related pleadings on Respondents "using as expeditious means as possible." It thus required a manner of service that, while not a summons issued by the Clerk, nonetheless ensured that notice would be provided quickly. ECF No. 3 at 3.

2. Respondents are also wrong in arguing that personal jurisdiction is lacking unless the Clerk issues a summons. The Court of Appeals for this Circuit has rejected this proposition, explaining that "the district court acquired personal jurisdiction . . . by service of the show cause order and petition for enforcement." *United States v. Hooper*, No. 95-35565, 76 F.3d 389, *1 (9th Cir. Dec. 11, 1995) (citing *United States v. Gilleran*, 992 F.2d 232, 233 (9th Cir. 1993)); accord United *States v. Miller*, 609 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir. 1979) (service of petition and order to show cause was "proper basis for asserting personal jurisdiction"). In short, service of the show cause order on Respondents pursuant to the terms of the Court's show cause order on February 6, 2018, was sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction. See
ECF No. 7.

Conclusion	
The motion to dismiss should be denied.	
Respectfully submitted,	
DAVID C. SHONKA	
Acting General Counsel	
LESLIE RICE MELMAN Assistant General Counsel for Litigation	
<u>/s/ Burke W. Kappler</u> BURKE W. KAPPLER Attorney	
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Dated: February 13, 2018	
FTC Opposition - Page 06 -	

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on February 13, 2018, I served the foregoing OPPOSITION TO RESPONDENTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION, FOR INSUFFICIENT PROCESS, AND FOR INSUFFICIENT PROCESS MADE BY SPECIAL APPEARANCE upon counsel for Respondents Donor Relations, LLC, and Courtesy Call, Inc., by filing it through the CM/ECF system which provides a Notice of Electronic Filing to counsel appearing in the case. <u>/s/ Burke W. Kappler</u> BURKE W. KAPPLER

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF NEVADA

FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION,

Petitioner,

v.

Case No. 2:18-cv-00183-GMN-CWH

[PROPOSED] ORDER

DONOR RELATIONS, LLC, and

COURTESY CALL, INC.,

Respondents.

Upon review of Respondents Donor Relations, LLC's and Courtesy Call, Inc.'s Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction, for Insufficient Service, and for Insufficient Process Made by Special Appearance [ECF No. 8], the Opposition filed by Petitioner Federal Trade Commission [ECF No. 11], any related pleadings, and the arguments of counsel, it is hereby

ORDERED that Respondents' Motion to Dismiss be, and hereby is, DENIED.

1 Dated: _____

Gloria M. Navarro, Chief Judge United States District Court